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This [A]ct flows from a clear and simple wrong. Its only purpose
is to right that wrong. Millions of Americans are denied the right
to vote because of their color. This law will ensure them the right
to vote. The wrong is one which no American, in his heart, can
justify. The right is one which no American, true to our principles,
can deny.'
President Lyndon B. Johnson
August 6, 1965
Probably the "most important civil rights bill [ever] enacted by Con-
gress,"2 the Voting Rights Act of 19651 marked the "end of the beginning"'
in the drive for black access to the ballot box. The Act was, and following
the enactment of the 1982 amendments still is, a complex statute. The
temporary provisions apply principally to Southern States, and the per-
manent provisions affect voting practices throughout the country.5 First
amended in 1970,' then again in 1975,' the Act underwent a dramatic
substantive transformation in June of 1982.' In order to understand fully
how the 1982 amendments came about, and how the legislative process
* Associate Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Represen-
tatives. B.A., 1968, Virginia Military Institute; J.D., 1971, University of Virginia School of Law.
** Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate. BA., 1971, Duke University; J.D., 1974, University of Cincinnati School of Law.
The editorial views expressed in this article are those of the authors and are not
intended to reflect the position of any member of the Congress of the United States.
' Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Book II, at 840 (1965) U.S.
Government Printing Office: 1966 (Washington, D.C.)[hereinafter cited as Public Papers].
2 Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No.227,97th Cong. (1965), reprinted in 1st Sess.
3 (1981)[hereinafter cited as House Report].
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a-(p) (1976).
'See Public Papers, supra note 1, at 636 (paraphrasing Winston Churchill).
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a)-(p) (1976). The national provisions of the Act include a perma-
nent ban of literacy tests, added in 1975 to the temporary ban in effect until that time,
§ 4(e)(1); elimination of the poll tax, S 10(a;, criminal penalties for using intimidation or the
like to influence the exercise of the vote, S 11(b), et seq.; criminal penalties for altering
ballots once cast, § 12(b) et seq.; and, in Title II, provisions that apply requirements for
bilingual ballots through a nationwide "trigger" § 203(b). Id. Title III provides for enforce-
ment of the Twenty-sixth Amendment's grant of suffrage to eighteen year-olds. Id.
Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 315 (1970).
Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975).
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982).
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affected their form and content, it is necessary to review the original act,
its early amendments, and the Supreme Court decision that galvanized
support for change.
I. THE ACT
As originally passed, the Voting Rights Act sought to suspend the
use of certain tests and devices9 that historically frustrated blacks" from
exercising their Fifteenth Amendment rights." The Act accomplished this
feat by eliminating the use of such tests or devices in states and counties,
including all parts of covered states,2 (a) that maintained them as a precon-
dition to registration and voting on November 1, 1964, and (b) in which
less than fifty percent of the total voting-age population was registered
on November 1, 1964, or in which less than fifty percent of those registered
voted in the Presidential election held in that month.13 These jurisdictions
were subsequently required to submit all new qualifications, prerequisites,
standards, practices, or procedures with respect to voting14 to the Justice
' 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1976). As defined in 5 4(c), the phrase "test or device" means
"that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the
ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational
achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character,
or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other
class." Id.
-0 42 U.S.C. S 1973b(a) (1976). In the first sentence of 5 4(a), which is 257 words long,
only citizens who face voting discrimination "on account of race or color" were protected.
Id. The second sentence, added in 1975, extends the protection by reference to members
of a "language minority group," as defined in S 14(c)(3). Id.
11 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1976). Ratified on February 3, 1870, but often unenforced, the
provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment are as follows:
SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
1" See United States v. Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 117-34 (1978) (S 5 applies to all entities
having power over any aspect of electoral process).
11 42 U.S.C. S 1973b(b) (1976) (S 4(b) of Act).
42 U.S.C. S 1973c (1976) (S 5 of Act). In Allen v. State Board of Elections, the Supreme
Court analyzed the legislative history to support the view "that Congress intended to reach
any State enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor
way." 393 U.S. 544, 566 (1976). Section 5 now provides in relevant part:
Whenever a State or political subdivision ... [covered under S 4] ... shall
enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in
force or effect on ... [the applicable date of comparison: i.e., November 1, 1964
for jurisdictions covered in 1965; November 1, 1968 for those covered in 1970;
and November 1, 1972 for those covered in 1975] ... such State or subdivision
may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the ef-
[Vol. 40:1347
VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS
Department or to the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia
to assure that the proposed change did not discriminate against covered
minorities."5 The "preclearance" requirement suggested that pre-existing
standards and practices that discriminated against minorities were not
subject to federal approval unless altered. The Act contained no affir-
mative language requiring jurisdictions to review and discard practices,
such as the election of candidates on an at-large basis, because of their
possible impact on the weight of the minority vote.
The only means of escape for jurisdictions covered by preclearance
was through a little-used process commonly known as "bailout". Under
section 4(a) of the Act, a covered state or political subdivision could bailout
only if it could prove, to the satisfaction of the Federal Court for the
District of Columbia, that it had not used a discriminatory test or device
for a specified period of years prior to the filing of a declaratory judge-
ment petition. At first, the applicable period of years lasted from 1965
until 1970, or five years. Then, with the extension of the Act until 1975,
the time period was similarly extended to ten years. In 1975, when the
Act was extended a second time for seven additional years, the time period
became seventeen years, once again reaching back to 1965. Few jurisdic-
tions that came under the original coverage of section 4(a), therefore, could
qualify for bailout. Those jurisdictions which qualified for bailout were
required to establish that, while they may have maintained a prohibited
test or device in 1964, they did not operate it in a discriminatory manner
within the prescribed period. 8 Since subdivisions of states were ineligi-
ble for bailout until the states themselves became eligible," no legislative
fect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in [S 4(f)(2), protecting language minorities],
and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied
the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, stan-
dard, practice or procedure: Provided, That such qualification ... has been sub-
mitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or sub-
division to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed
an objection within sixty days after such submission .... Any action under this
section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance
with the provisions of section 2248 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the
Supreme -Court.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1976).
S 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1976).
"8 Since the last extension of the Act in 1975, several jurisdictions have been able
to bail out. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States, No. 76-1250 (D.D.C. May 12, 1978) (Choctaw
and McCurtain Counties); New Mexico v. United States, No. 76-0067 (D.D.C. July 30,1976)
(Curry, McKinley, and Otero Counties); and Maine v. United States, No. 75-2125 (D.D.C.
Nov. 25,1975) (eighteen municipalities in Maine).
17 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). In City of Rome, the Supreme
Court observed that:
[Tithe city [of Rome, Georgia] comes within the Act because it is part of a
covered State. Under the plain language of the statute, then, it appears that any
bailout action to exempt the city must be filed by, and seek to exempt all of,
the State of Georgia.
Id. at 167.
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incentive existed for positive change to local election practices. Many
covered jurisdictions, while quick to complain about the onus of submit-
ting their election changes to federal scrutiny, nevertheless were content
to retain the status quo.
The first major shift in the focus of the Act took place in 1975 when
Hispanics, Asian-Americans, Native Alaskans, and Native Americans (In-
dians), formed a coalition with black civil rights organizations to be in-
cluded under the umbrella of the Act.18 Since Hispanics were often the
objects of discriminatory voting tactics, they properly argued that the
formulas that triggered administrative preclearance for blacks should pro-
tect them as well. The thrust of the 1975 amendments, however, went
18 42 U.S.C. S 1973b(b) (1976). The inclusion of Hispanics, and other similarly situated
"language minorities," was not based on Fifteenth Amendment considerations, as were the
Act's original provisions, but rather flowed from equal protection considerations under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section 4(f) of the Act provides:
(f)(1) The Congress finds that voting discrimination against citizens of language
minorities is pervasive and national in scope. Such minority citizens are from en-
vironments in which the dominant language is other than English. In addition
they have been denied equal educational opportunities by State and local govern-
ments, resulting in severe disabilities and continuing illiteracy in the English
language. The Congress further finds that, where State and local officials conduct
elections only in English, language minority citizens are excluded from participating
in the electoral process. In many areas of the country, this exclusion is aggravated
by acts of physical, economic, and political intimidation. The Congress declares
that, in order to enforce the guarantees of the [Flourteenth and [Flifteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution, it is necessary to eliminate such discrimina-
tion by prohibiting English-only elections, and by prescribing other remedial
devices.
"(2) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote because
he is a member of a language minority group.
(3) In addition to the meaning given the term under subsection (c) of this
section, the term "test or device" shall also mean any practice or requirement
by which any State or political subdivision provided any registration or voting
notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating
to the electoral process, including ballots, only in the English language, where
the Director of the Census determines that more than five per centum of the
citizens of voting age residing in such State or political subdivision are members
of a single language minority. With respect to subsection (b) of this section, the
term "test or device," as defined in this subsection, shall be employed only in
making the determinations under the third sentence of that subsection.
(4) Whenever any State or political subdivision subject to the prohibitions
of the second sentence of subsection (a) of this section provides any registration
or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or informa-
tion, relating to the electoral process, including ballots, it shall provide them in
the language of the applicable language minority group as well as in the English
language: Provided, That where the language of the applicable minority group
is oral or unwritten, the State or political subdivision is only required to furnish
oral instructions, assistance, or other information relating to registration and voting.
[Vol. 40:1347
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well beyond addressing the Hispanics' demands. A new Title II broadened
the sweep of the Act to establish a nationwide requirement that entire
states and local governments provide bilingual "registration of voting
notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials of information
relating to the electoral process, including ballots."1 9 Eligibility for special
bilingual treatment essentially was based on the heritage of the voter,
and not on his or her inability to speak or read English.0 In 1965, no one
group was specifically identified. Journalist Theodore H. White describ-
ed the expansion of civil rights objectives during the subsequent decade
as "the explosive renascence of the idea of equality that transformed
American politics .... 21
As the expiration date for the preclearance provisions neared, groups
within the institutional civil rights community began to organize for what
they anticipated would be a difficult political fight. The Leadership Con-
ference on Civil Rights, to which 165 organizations belonged, hired its
first full-time executive director in preparation for the legislative cam-
paign which lay ahead.' Moreover, elements of the Leadership Conference,
most notably the National Urban League, began to mobilize their local
affiliates for the purpose of contacting congressional offices in affected
states and applying political and media pressure designed to achieved a
voting majority on the House and Senate floors.' Seventy-five percent
of all League affiliates did so during 1981-82.24
19 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b) (1976) (S 203(b) of Act).
Id. The trigger under which this requirement operated was a determination by the
director of the census that more than five percent of the citizens of voting age in the jurisdic-
tion in question were members of a single language minority and that the illiteracy rate
of such persons as a group was higher than the nation at large. The underlying presump-
tion at work here was the belief that failure to complete the fifth grade, which defined
illiteracy in the Act, was caused by a language deficiency or, that illiteracy in English im-
plied that the voter was literate in another tongue. The definition of "single language minor-
ity," contained in § 203(e) does not, however, mention language, saying only that the term
encompasses "persons who are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or of
Spanish heritage." (emphasis added) 42 U.S.C. S 1973aa-la(e) (1976).
21 WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF 103 (1982). White enumerated several aspects
of this expansion of civil rights goals, emphasizing that:
[0]ld phrases only dimly recall the transformation of the times: "Liberation," "Par-
ticipation," "Affirmative Action," "Outreach," "Goals and Timetables." And all
of them added up to a paradox. What began as a quest to expand the definition
of freedom was to end in the centralization of federal controls on a scale never
envisioned by those who dreamed the dreams of the early sixties and still
remembered John F. Kennedy calling, "I say this country must move again." New
words like "quotas," "entitlements," and the officialese "protected classes" replaced
older words, changing the nature of the American government.
Id.
Pinderhughes, Interest Groups and the Extension of the Voting Rights Act in 1982,
Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago,
Illinois, September 1-4, 1983, at 13 [hereinafter cited as Pinderhughes Paper].
I Id. at 14. See also infra note 61.
u Id.
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Two other members of the conference, the National Education Associa-
tion (NEA) and the NAACP, would become instrumental in transmitting
local sentiment to the Congress. For this purpose, the NEA organized
mailings to two contact members in each of the country's 435 congres-
sional districts,' and the NAACP set up telephone banks so that local
members could notify their representatives of their feelings. These banks
were set up for a week prior to action in the House subcommittee, full
committee, and on the floor.26 In all, the banks were available to local
members for nearly nine months."
II. Mobile v. Bolden
The portion of the Act that generated the most intense interest dur-
ing congressional consideration of the 1982 amendments was section 2,
a little-used provision that tracked the language of the Fifteenth
Amendment.28 The nationwide applicability of section 2 was originally
designed to appease Southerners who felt that their constituencies were
being singled out for extraordinary federal action. Section 2, however,
' Id. at 15.
"6 Id. at 16.
7 Id.
As originally enacted, § 2 provided:
Sec. 2. No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivi-
sion to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section
4(f) (2).
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
In his plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehn-
quist (Justices Blackmun and Stevens filed separate opinions concurring in the result), Justice
Stewart concluded that:
[A]ssuming, for present purposes, that there exists a private right of action
to enforce this statutory provision, it is apparent that the language of 5 2 no more
than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the sparse legislative
history of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no different
from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.
Section 2 was an uncontroversial provision in proposed legislation whose other
provisions engendered protracted dispute. The House Report on the bill simply
recited that § 2 "grants . .. a right to be free from enactment or enforcement
of voting qualifications ... or practices which deny or abridge the right to vote
on account of race or color." H.R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1965).
See also S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3 at 19-20 (1965). The view that
this section simply restated the prohibitions already contained in the Fifteenth
Amendment was expressed without contradiction during the Senate hearings.
Senator Dirksen indicated at one point that all states, whether or not covered
by the preclearance provisions of §5 of the proposed legislation, were prohibited
from discriminating against Negro voters by §2, which he termed "almost a rephras-
ing of the [Fifteenth] [A]mendment." Attorney General Katzenbach agreed. See
Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 208 (1965).
[Vol. 40:1347
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had never been successfully used as the basis for litigation. 9 When the
Supreme Court issued its 1980 plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden," nine
months preceeding the start of the 97th Congress, new and important
issues surrounding the Act came into focus for the first time.
In three separate opinions which agreed on the holding, the Mobile
Court ruled that a jurisdiction such as Mobile, Alabama, though possessed
of a significant minority population,3 could not be found to have violated
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment (or section 2) unless its election
machinery, including the procedures which accompanied it, were conceived
or operated with a discriminatory intent or purpose.2 In Mobile, the
governing body was a city commission composed of three members elected
at-large. Since 1911, when the city created the commission under authoriza-
tion from the Alabama legislature,' no black had ever been elected under
the at-large system, and until 1973, none had tried. 4
The suit in Mobile was originally brought as a class action "on behalf
of all Negro citizens of Mobile." The complaint alleged that the at-large
election process "unfairly diluted the voting strength of Negroes in viola-
tion of 52 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and of the Fifteenth Amendment.""5 The plaintiffs prevailed in both
the district court and upon appeal before the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The Fifth Circuit, though, like the Supreme Court, 6 found the
statutory claim "at best problematic," since no successful dilution claim
expressly founded on section 2 had been made previously. 7
The Supreme Court reversed the holdings of both lower courts. The
plurality found that it did not have to go back to 1911 to determine Mobile's
original purpose. The district court had already held that, since the
Alabama Constitution had officially disenfranchised blacks in 1901, the
city's adoption of an at-large system of elections in 1911 occurred in a
I Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980). See Mobile v. Bolden, 571 F.2d 238, 243
(5th Cir. 1978). The Fifth Circuit held against Mobile on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
Id. See generally Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1965) (discussion of constitutionality of Act's unique provisions); Derfner, Racial
Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VANi. L. REV. 523 (1973); Thernstrom, The OddEvolu-
tion of the Voting Rights Act, 55 PUB. INTEREST 49 (1979) (comments on Act's history and pre-
sent effect).
3 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
' Id. at 58 n. 1. The Mobile Court found that the city's population was 35.4% black. Id.
See id. at 70 (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1970).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 73 n. 19.
Id. at 58.
See supra note 29.
* See Bolden v. Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1978). Dilution claims are based
on the charge that electoral procedures, such as at-large systems in which one candidate
is elected by a majority of those voting, may be used to "dilute," or to break down the
voting power of a racial or ethnic minority. Id. at 243 n. 3.
1983] 1353
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"race-proof' environment and, therefore, "on its face was neutral" on the
issue of discriminatory purpose 8
The Supreme Court then examined whether Mobile's at-large system
was being operated for a discriminatory purpose. The Justices began by
noting that multimember districts such as Mobile's never have been un-
constitutional per se39 and that no official obstacles were present to pre-
vent blacks from becoming candidates. 41 Moreover, the Court found that
blacks voted and registered without hindrance41 and that blacks comprised
the only active slating organization in the city. 42 Lastly, the Court quoted
the district court's finding that the only black candidates who had run
for election to the commission "were young, inexperienced, and mounted
extremely limited campaigns," receiving only "modest support from the
black community."4 The district court's findings led the Justices to the
conclusion that, while black candidates had been defeated in their only
attempt to gain membership to the city commission, the plaintiffs had
failed in their argument that racial prejudice was the motivating cause.4
The Court's decision in Mobile4 reaffirmed its 1976 decision in
Washington v. Davis4 and reversed the view, previously held only in the
Fifth Circuit, that Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment violations could
be proven under an "effects" test. The effects test was articulated in
the Fifth Circuit's pre-Washington opinion in Zimmer v. McKeithen.4' The
plaintiffs in Mobile had hoped to have the effects test, proven principally
through the use of statistical evidence, applied nationally. In order to
bolster their position, they contended that the Court's 1973 decision in
White v. Regeste4 9 had given license to the effects interpretation contained
in Zimmer.
" Bolden v. Mobile, 423 F.Supp. 384, 397 (1976). See Bolden v. Mobile, 571 F.2d 238,
245 (5th Cir. 1978).
3 Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
40 Id. at 73.
41 Id.
42 Id.
" Id. at 73 n. 19.
" Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 73 n.19 (1980).
45 See Note, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 500 (1982) (more complete discussion of case law
surrounding Mobile and dilution controversies generally).
41 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Although Washington was not a voting dilution case, the Supreme
Court nevertheless held that Washington's requirement that Fourteenth Amendment viola-
tions be proved by a showing of discriminatory purpose "applies to claims of racial discrimina-
tion affecting voting just as it does to other claims of racial discrimination." Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 67 (180). See 426 U.S. at 240.
'" Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71 (1980).
8 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en blanc), affd on other grounds sub nom, East Carroll
Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). Zimmer was approved by the Supreme
Court "without approval of the constitutional view expressed" by the Fifth Circuit. Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, at n. 16 (1980) (citing East Carroll, supra, at 638).
4 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). White pre-dated the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Zimmer and led to what the Supreme Court in Mobile labeled a "misunderstanding" of
the law. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71 (1980).
[Vol. 40:1347
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The Supreme Court, however, rejected the effects test, noting that
previous decisions clarified that state action "that is racially neutral on
its face violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if motivated by a
discriminatory purpose."' The Mobile Court also stated that dilution claims
brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were valid only if the purpose of the state action was "invidiously
to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic
minorities. ' 51 In his dissent, Justice White, who authored the Court's
holding in White v. Regester, similarly pronounced that the intent test was
indeed the proper standard.52 Justice White differed with the plurality,
not in the test to be applied, but in ther conclusions and in their applica-
tion of the test to the facts.
The Supreme Court's decision in Mobile produced an avalanche of
criticism, both in the media and within the civil rights community. The
Washington Post's coverage described Mobile as a "major defeat for blacks
and other minorities fighting electoral schemes that exclude them from
office." The New York Times similarly expressed concern, quoting the
remarks of the plaintiffs attorney, James Blackshear, that the opinion
represented "the biggest step backward in civil rights to come from the
Nixon court."'
Five days after the Mobile decision, on April 28, the Post took an
editorial position which directly contradicted its news coverage, saying
that:
[I[t is not at all clear that what the [J]ustices did was, from
the legal point of view, wrong or even that their decision
represented a serious setback to civil rights.
By opting for intent, or something close to it, a majority of
the [C]ourt has cut down dozens, perhaps hundreds, of
legalchallenges that would have been made against existing
systems or government or multimember districts. It has also
avoided the logical terminal point of those challenges: that election
district lines must be drawn to give proportional representation
to minorities."5
During the next few years, Blacksher's charge that Mobile was a step back
" Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980).
"' Id. at 66.
1 Id. at 101. In Mobile, Justice White stated:
[A] plurality of the Court agreed with the lower courts "that maintainence of
Mobile's at-large system for election of City Commissioners violates the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments only if it is motivated by a racially discriminatory
purpose.
Id.
Washington Post, Apr. 23, 1980, § A, at 5.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1980, S A, at 22.
Washington Post, Apr. 28, 1980, § A, at 16 (emphasis added) (entitled, The Mobile
Decision).
1983] 1355
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in civil rights enforcement and the Post's assertion that the Court's fear
of the potential for proportional representation was well taken,' would
come to summarize the divergent sides of a hotly contested political con-
flict. Eventually, the Post reversed its position, without explanation, in
favor of the political position held by most of the civil rights spokesmen.
Throughout consideration in the House of Representatives of amendments
designed to alter section 2, the Reagan Administration was silent, as it
had been during the 1980 campaign. As the Senate pondered the issues,
the Administration became outspoken in support of a position rejected
by the House. The amendments to section 2 ultimately became law, along
with other changes in the Act, though many remain uncertain of their
actual meaning.
II. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONSIDERATION
A. The Subcommittee
On April 7, 1982, Congressman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., the longtime
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced a bill (H.E. 3112)
designed to implement substantive changes in the Voting Rights Act sup-
ported by the leadership of the civil rights community. The first of the
bill's three sections again extended the number of years in which a jurisdic-
tion covered by the preclearance provisions of section 5 would have to
establish that it had not discriminatorily used a prohibited test or device.
Under the 1975 amendments, the qualifying period had been seventeen
years, or from August 6, 1965 until August 6, 1982. The Rodino bill pro-
posed to extend the period of another ten years, or until August 6, 1992,
for a total of twenty-seven years. The second section of H.R. 3112 similar-
ly proposed extension of the bilingual requirements of Title II from August
6, 1985 until August 6, 1992, to coincide with the expiration of the
preclearance qualifying period.51 The third section of H.R. 3112 contained
an amendment to section 2 of the Act. If adopted, it would have deleted
the words "to deny or abridge" from the existing Act, substituting in their
place "in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of." As
amended, section 2 would read:
' See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75-76 (1980). The Mobile Court answered what
the plurality believed to be Justice Marshall's quest for a federal constitutional right to
elect candidates in proportion to its numbers by saying that "[w]hatever appeal the dissent-
ing opinion's view may have as a matter of political theory, it is not the law. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require proportional representa-
tion as an imperative of political organization." Id.
11 H.R. 6219, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). In 1975, the House bill, H.R. 6219 extended
the qualifying period for preclearance under 5 5 for ten years, and created the bilingual
requirements of title II, giving them the same expiration date. Id. The Senate bill, S. 1279,
likewise extended the qualifying period for preclearance, though only for a five year period.
S. 1279, 94 Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The conferees compromised on the preclearance period,
settling at seven years, or until August 6, 1982. The bilingual provisions, however, remained
at the House-passed term of ten years.
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No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees
set forth in section 4(f)(2).5
Shortly after introduction, H.R. 3112 was referred to the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, the Subcom-
mittee that reviewed the earlier amendments. The chairman was Con-
gressman Don Edwards of California. The Democrats on the Subcommit-
tee were Congressmen Robert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, a senior
member who, like Edwards, had supported the original Act as well as
the 1970 and 1975 amendments; Patricia Schroeder of Colorado, not yet
senior enough to chair a subcommittee like Edwards and Kastenmeier,
but a veteran of the 1975 amendments which she had endorsed; and Harold
Washington of Chicago, Illinois, the Subcommittee's only black member,
serving his first term in Congress. The minority, or Republican side on
the House, 9 had three members on the Subcommittee. The senior minori-
ty representative, or Ranking Member, was Henry J. Hyde, also of
Chicago, a conservative fourth-term representative who had first en-
countered the Act during consideration of the 1975 amendments, and had
voted for their adoption despite concern over section 5. The other
Republicans were two members who had never been recorded on the Act
while in the Congress: F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. of Wisconsin, and
Dan Lungren, of California, both in their second terms.
Two days after H.R. 3112 was introduced, Congressman Hyde sub-
mitted what he called a compromise bill (H.R. 3198). H.R. 3198 proposed
a nationwide plan that would give any aggrieved party, as well as the
Attorney General of the United States, the right to bring suit against
jurisdictions then covered by the Act, for the purpose of instituting judicial
preclearance to penalize a pattern or practice of voting rights abuse. 0
On May 6, 1982, the first of eighteen days of hearings before the Sub-
committee began. The tone of the debate was immediately clear. Chair-
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, S 2, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(1982) (emphasis added to designate new language). See supra note 22 (discussion of S 2
in Mobile).
" In the Senate, the Republicans had seized majority control with Ronald Reagan's
victory in the 1980 Presidential elections. In the House, Republicans remained a minority
party. As of June 20, 1981, when the Voting Rights Act Amendments were nearing full
Judiciary Committee consideration, there were 242 Democrats and 190 Republicans (with
three vacancies) in the House, and 53 Republicans and 47 Democrats in the Senate.
H.R. 3198, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). In addition to the Hyde and Rodino bills,
three others were referred to the Subcommittee: H.R. 1407, introduced on January 28, 1981,
by Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. (R-Cal.); H.R. 1731, introduced on February 5, 1981, by Robert
MeClory (R-Ill.); and H.R. 2942, introduced on March 31, 1981, by William M. Thomas (R-
Cal.), et al. All three bills involved changes to the bilingual ballot provisions of titles I and II.
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man Edwards' opening statement noted that, prior to the passage of the
Act in 1965, only twenty-nine percent of the eligible blacks were registered
to vote in states covered by the preclearance provisions of section 5, while
seventy-three percent of their white counterparts were registered. He
compared those statistics with the 1980 figures, which estimated that fifty-
seven percent of black voters had become registered." Citing similar
statistics in Texas, a state drawn under preclearance by the 1975 amend-
ments, Chairman Edwards sought to demonstrate that the progress had
been made over the seven-year life of its experience under the Act. 2
Congressman Hyde's opening statement focused on preclearance, a
departure from the traditional constitutional allocation of electoral respon-
sibilities to the states. Preclearance was a precedent that had also bothered
him in 1975. While endorsing the Act's record, he called for a middle ground
between the Rodino bill and a total abolition of preclearance, a position
favored by some Senators.' Congressman Washington was next to speak.
The issue, he explained, "is not whether the law should be extended for
all time, but whether it should be extended for a mere ten years."" Con-
" Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I at 1-2 (1981)[hereinafter cited as
House Hearings].
According to Ms. Pinderhughes, supra, note 22, the lobbying campaign in favor of
H.R. 3112 was orchestrated principally by 25 groups known as the "Voting Rights Act Steer-
ing Committee." The Steering Committee was chaired by the Leadership Conference's newly
appointed executive director, Ralph Neas (see supra text accompanying notes 22-24) and
its members met each Friday for several hours throughout the sixteen months of congres-
sional consideration. Id. at 18. The Steering Committee "worked very hard to control the
testimony" before the Edwards Subcommittee and, according to one participant, both
Edwards and Rodino cooperated. Id. at 19. See infra text accompanying note 293.
Id. Although President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the original Act in 1965, the
preclearance formula was drafted in a fashion that effectively excluded Texas.
Id. Congressman Hyde explained his position on the compromise as a proposal:
[T]o substitute for the mandatory preclearance imposed on a few States a
new requirement which would permit the Attorney General, or an aggrieved private
party, to bring an action in any Federal court, not only the District Court for
the District of Columbia, as present law requires, and, if a pattern or practice
of voting rights abuses can by shown, impose preclearance for a maximum of 4
[additional] years.
This sanction would apply to all areas of the country where such activity
can be shown. The salutary effect of my bill would be that all States would be
treated equally, and would recognize the fact that voting rights abuses in those
previously selected jurisdictions are no better or worse than the rest of the country.
It would, in effect, grant parole to States and localities which have sought
to rehabilitate themselves, because improvements have occurred, and recogni-
tion of this is overdue.
My bill also permits the intervention by the Attorney General in any private
voting rights suit anywhere in the country, It prospectively broadens the nation-
wide definition of voting rights abuse beyond just intent, attaching to the rest
of the country the same effects test which has applied selectively since 1965.
Id. at 2-3; see infra note 114.
" House Hearings, supra note 61, at 4.
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gressman Sensenbrenner expressed no apprehensions about preclearance,
but did state his concern about applying bilingual provisions in jurisdic-
tions in which little demand existed for ballots in a language other than
English. 5 Congressman Lungren, the only remaining member present, en-
dorsed the Hyde proposal, saying that it should be used as a vehicle for
discussion. Moreover, Lungren noted that the bilingual provisions of the
Act did not expire until 1985 and suggested that an extension in 1982
might be premature.'
Witnesses appearing that first day, and for several days thereafter,
represented virtually every component of a political coalition that called
itself the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. This was the umbrella
group that had become largely responsible for the articulation of civil rights
policy before the Congress and the public. Vernon Jordan was the first
to appear before the Subcommittee, on behalf of the National Urban
League. Jordan immediately raised the point that in 1965, "none of the
106 Congressmen from the 11 Southern States [which the Act subsequently
covered] voted for final passage" and that one, South Carolina Senator
Strom Thurmond, "was opposed to the Voting Rights Act in 1965 ...
[and] is opposed to it now." 7 Although everyone knew, Jordan did not
mention that Senator Thurmond was then the new Chairman of the House
Judiciary's sister committee in the Senate, through which the 1982 amend-
ments would inevitably have to pass before becoming law.
Elaine Jones, appearing with Jordan, represented the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, and argued against the Hyde proposal in response to a
question from Majority counsel. "Mr. Hyde's bill," she said, would mean
that, in order to apply preclearance, "you would have to go into court
on a case-by-case basis and engage in long, protracted litigation, costing
a lot of money."68 Under the administrative process then operative in sec-
tion 5, the burden of proof lay upon the covered jurisdictions, and the
federal government provided the legal expertise. Hyde replied that Jones'
statement was fair concerning the difference between his bill and H.R.
3112. Congressman Hyde, however, added that he had "a preference for
court proceedings where the rights and rules of evidence and burdens
of proof have full play." 9
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
6 Id. at 9. States wholly covered by the S 4 trigger in 1965 were Alabama, Alaska,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Virginia. The amendments adopted in
1975 brought the States of Alaska, Arizona and Texas under the preclearance requirements
of section 5. See House Report, supra note 2, at 4-7.
Id. at 14.
Id. Congressman Hyde emphasized that quick justice is available in:
[A]n administrative proceeding with one man sitting behind the desk, but I think
we have a court system to adjudicate rights under the rule of law.
I am for all the rights for all the parties that a court proceeding can provide.
When they are with you, it's great, but when they are against you, you may want
someone more impartial.
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Later that same day, Rolando L. Rios, speaking for the Southwest
Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP), placed the change of the
Rodino bill to section 2 in context. "We would ask," he said, "for an amend-
ment to section 2 in such a way that the effects test would apply similar
to the one the Department of Justice uses [under preclearance in section
5]. ' '7o William Taylor, from the Center for National Policy Review at
Catholic University Law School, later said the change would have an even
broader application." Harvard Law School Professor Archibald Cox,
representing Common Cause, was asked about the potential for mandatory
proportional representation flowing from the adoption of the Rodino
amendments to section 2. Professor Cox replied, "I haven't thought of
that question, to be honest."'72
On May 6, 1982, Congressman Hyde introduced a second bill (H.R.
3473) that made the Rodino amendment to section 2 prospective only. H.R.
3473, therefore, applied to future changes in election laws and procedures
in much the same way that section 5 did, and altered pattern of practice
jurisdiction to allow private plaintiffs to require preclearance for any
jurisdiction for a four-year maximum. The next day, Atlanta Mayor
Maynard Jackson accused Congressman Hyde on national television of
being "anti-black." The charge came in answer to a question about the
Hyde bills when the two appeared together on The MacNeil-Lehrer
Report.7' Hyde's response was delayed by the comments of others, but
just before the program ended, he expressed his view that such charges
were "not helpful" in securing the compromise he felt inevitable if the
Act's preclearance provisions were to be retained after Senate
consideration. 4 Without congressional action most of the jurisdictions
originally covered in 1965 would become eligible for bailout on August
6, 1982.
On June 5, and again a week later, the Subcommittee moved its hear-
ings to Austin, Texas, and Montgomery, Alabama, respectively, as an early
consensus for support for the Act began to emerge. Hyde and Sensen-
70 Id. at 53.
71 Id. at 277. Professor Taylor said that the effects test in the Rodino bill would apply
to "any current practice regardless of when it was originally enacted." Id.
Id. at 190. In a carefully worded letter sent to the Subcommittee two months later,
on July 8, 1981, Professor Cox wrote "that the Rodino proposal would not make propor-
tional representation a per se test of the legality of an electoral arrangement." Id. at Part
3, 2665.
" Transcript, Voting Rights on Trial 6, The MacNeil-Lehrer Report (Air date: May 7,
1981). Jackson accused Hyde, saying:
I think [the Hyde bills are] totally unjustified. The idea, by the way, of killing
the guts of the [A]ct, I think, will achieve exactly what the opponents of the [A]ct
want to achieve, and that is to gut the [Aict, to reduce the growing but still inade-
quate, fair, constitutional, political rights of Afro-Americans. I think the motiva-
tion is anti-black; I believe it is discriminatorily intended, and I think it stinks.
Id. (emphasis added).
" Id. at 7. See infra text accompanying notes 186-97.
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brenner accompanied Edwards and Washington to Austin, where all-day
hearings produced a legion of support for H.R. 3112 from within the
Hispanic community. Joaquin Avila, Associate Counsel to the Mexican-
American Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), argued that Texas
still needed administrative preclearance under section 5. Avila cited a case
involving Medina County (Texas) as an example of the expense and dif-
ficulty MALDEF had repeatedly encountered. In Medina County, white
county officials had tried to restrict Hispanic political influence through
gerrymandering efforts, not once but four times in the seven years since
the Act was amended to include the State.75 Alfredo Arriola, the next
witness, outlined similar difficulties encountered in Jim Wells County
(Texas), in which after three attempts, the county commissioners still had
not adopted a redistricting plan that could pass muster with the Depart-
ment of Justice.
78
Though the principal focus of the Austin hearing was on section 5,
most of the witnesses also endorsed the Rodino language on section 2.
The lone exception was University of Texas Law School Professor William
H. White. Speaking for himself and Former Texas Congressman and
Ambassador-at-Large Robert Krueger, Professor White answered a query
by Congressman Sensenbrenner, saying that he was against the proposed
language, principally because of the difficulty of applying a "results" test
nationwide. Professor White equated the results language with the ef-
fects standard in section 5.
7
1
When the Subcommittee met in Montgoniery on June 12, rumors ex-
isted about the possibility of a demonstration orchestrated by local
chapters of the Ku Klux Klan that might be held outside the United States
Courthouse where the hearings were scheduled. Though no demonstra-
tion ever materialized, the presence of the Subcommittee in the capital
of Alabama, which had been the destination of Dr. Martin Luther King's
famous Selma march for voting rights in 1965, added dramatic flavor to
the occasion. As the testimony unfolded in a packed courtroom, allega-
tions of ongoing voting rights abuses within the State of Alabama began
to surface.
The first witness, Montgomery Mayor Emory Folmar, was immediately
put on the defensive by Congressman Washington. 8 The subject was
"reidentification," a sometimes selectively applied procedure under which
voters must re-register in order to allow registrars to purge the registra-
tion rolls of those who are deceased, have moved to another jurisdiction,
or are otherwise inelgible to vote. Noting that the number of registered
7 See House Hearings, supra note 61, at Part 2, 932.
7' Id. at 1183-85.
" Id. at 923. See infra text accompanying notes 239-93.
7, Mayor Folmar was the Republican nominee for Governor of Alabama in November,
1982, losing to his Democratic opponent, former Governor George C. Wallace. Congressman
Washington, meanwhile, was elected the first black mayor of Chicago, Illinois on that same
date.
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blacks often seemed to fall following re-identification, Washington asked
how Mayor Folmar could account for the disproportionate reduction in
the number of black registrants.79 Mayor Folmar denied that he was ap-
pearing as a supporter for re-identification or that any "chicanery" was
involved in the scheme. Chairman Edwards broke in, however, emphasiz-
ing the "hardship" to working blacks caused by registration hours limited
to 9:00a.m. to 4:00p.m. 80
The testimony of another witness, Dr. Joe Reed, Chairman of the
Alabama Democratic Conference, seemed to have an immediate impact
on Congressman Hyde. Dr. Reed complained that, though a 1978 Alabama
law permitted "each county Board of Registrars to appoint deputy
registrars to assist the county in the registration process," only a dozen
had done so." Moreover, polling places were often located "in white private
establishments such as stores, churches and other private businesses."
The locations, he argued, had a chilling effect on black participation and
the distance which black voters had to travel in order to vote often re-
quired that they have transportation.' Congressman Hyde, who had hinted
at a shift in position in Austin, erupted, embracing Dr. Reed's and Chair-
man Edwards' concerns.'
" See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); House Hearings, supra note 61, at Part 2.
'o House Hearings, supra note 61, at 1521-22. Chairman Edwards further challenged
Mayor Folmar, saying:
In Choctaw County, in Alabama, how do you explain this? In Choctaw County
the re-registration bill that was passed by the legislature puts the burden on the
voter to register to vote from the hours of 9 to 4.
Now, this is when a poor black is working, perhaps out in the field, 30, 40
miles from home. He or she has to find his or her way 20, 30, 40 miles and re-
identify or re-register or something like that when it is very easy for most white
p~ople in Choctaw County to reregister.
They have much better transportation and so forth.
How can we sitting up here look at that in any way and say that it is designed
and does not reduce the number of black people who can vote?
Id.
81 Id. at 1530.
' Id. at 1531.
Id. at 1584. Congressman Hyde stated:
I want to say that I have listened with great interest and concern, and I
will tell you, registration hours from 9 to 4 [are] outrageous. It is absolutely designed
to keep people who are working and who have difficulty in traveling from
registering.
If that persists and exists, it is more than wrong ....
The lack of deputy registrars, only 12 counties have them, demonstrates a
clear lack of enthusiasm for getting people registered, obviously.
The location of voting places, if what Mr. Reed says is true-and I don't doubt
that it is-is a subtle intimidation of black people and is also wrong.
The lack of blacks working as polling officials is wrong.
On assistance voting, I have very mixed feelings because I can tell you that
[it] is very abused up in my area [Chicago] where the polling worker does the
voting for the voter [and] makes sure they vote for the right party. [Now], we
have heard where it is all done on the table; there is no privacy.
[Vol. 40:1347
VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS
Maggie Bozeman, from Aliceville, Alabama, next spoke of white
policemen stationed inside polling places, taking pictures of people who
assist blacks. Again, Hyde exploded, "Taking pictures is outrageous! That
is nonsense!" He asked whether the secret ballot existed in Pickens
County, Alabama: "You vote on a table in front of everybody?"
"Yes," Bozeman replied, "Open house. Just like here now."
"Does that still go on?" asked Hyde.
"1980."
"Everybody sees how you vote?"
"Yes."
"No booths, no curtains, nothing like that?"
"In one precinct where there were the Justice Department, the last
election, the Presidential election, they had little curtains in Aliceville,
but in other parts of the county, still open house in 1980."
"How widespread is that?" Hyde continued. "How many polling places
does that occur in?"
"Give or take, about 15."
The testimony continued in much the same vein for the balance of
the morning and throughout the afternoon, when witnesses from nearby
Mississippi appeared. On June 17, five days later, Congressman Hyde in-
troduced a third bill (H.R. 3948) this time moving still further toward the
position of Rodino and the Leadership Conference.
8 5
That is outrageous, absolutely outrageous.
Id. at Part 2, 1584. See id. at Part 2, 1196-97 (exchange between Minority Counsel and Texas
State Representative Al Edwards).
Id. at 1585-87.
Id. at Part 3, 1815-17.
In a hearing that same day, Congressman Hyde explained why he had adopted his
new position:
Mr. Chairman, during the past 2 months, two things have become very clear
to me about the Voting Rights Act.
First, there are some jurisdictions which deserve to remain covered, both
because there are persistent vestiges of discrimination present in their electoral
system and because no constructive steps have been taken to alter that fact.
Second, the bailout provision which is contained in the law now serves as
a disincentive to progressive change, while locking in those jurisdictions which
have tried to improve conditions and which have been [covered] by the law for
nearly 17 years.
I intend to submit a new proposal, pursuant to an evolutionary process which
my thinking has undergone during these hearings. My bill would extend the admin-
istrative preclearance provision indefinitely, subject to a possibility for a jurisdiction
to bailout, effective immediately.
In my judgement, this new proposal would strengthen the [Alct, not weaken
it, by providing incentives for jurisdictions now covered to do more than main-
tain the status quo presently required under the 1965 [A]ct.
Under my proposal, a covered jurisdiction, be it a State or political subdivi-
sion thereof, will be eligible to file for a bailout if it can show to the satisfaction
of the local Federal court that:
One, it has not discriminated by way of a test or device for 10 years preceding
the filing of the action.
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Throughout the hearings, the Department of Justice had declined to
appear before the Subcommittee to express its views on any of the bills
being considered. Publicly, the reason given was the pending nomination
before the Senate of the Civil Rights Division's new chief, William Brad-
ford Reynolds. Privately, some sources reportedly feared that Reynolds
might say something that would endanger his confirmation.86 On June 15,
as if to delay taking a position even further, President Reagan sent a
letter to Attorney General William French Smith asking for comprehen-
sive recommendations by October 1' On June 30, reporters quoted Justice
Department spokesman Kenneth Starr as saying that the Hyde bailout
outlined in H.R. 3948 was among the alternatives the Attorney General
was considering." In the New York Times, columnist Tom Wicker categor-
ized the Hyde proposal as "reasonable" and urged the President to em-
brace it.' The editorial page of the Washington Star also endorsed the
Hyde proposal.8 When the President subsequently addressed the
NAACP's annual convention on June 29 in Denver, Colorado, he simply
Two, that it has not had a substantial objection during that same 10-year
period.
And three, that it submitted all proposals which it was legally obligated to
submit.
My bill would also require one last category. It would require that a local
Federal court be satisfied that the covered jurisdiction applying for bailout had
made constructive efforts to enhance minority participation in the electoral pro-
cess. Such efforts could include the lengthening of registration hours, the lengthen-
ing of voting hours, creating of same-day registration, a shift from at-large to
single-member districts and the like. This provision is designed to encourage
jurisdictions to [re-levaluate their existing practices with an eye toward making
the electoral system more accessible to all eligible voters.
My bill also provides that the court granting bailout would retain jurisdic-
tion for 5 years and that the case could be reopened upon notice of the Attorney
General or an aggrieved party should any backsliding occur ...
I think we must, in fairness, recognize progress and compliance with the let-
ter and the spirit of the law where it has occurred and provide an incentive for
jurisdictions to comply, while retaining administrative preclearance for those areas
as yet recalcitrant.
Id.
, Babcock, White House Delays Taking Stand on Voting Rights Act, Washington Post,
June 30, 1981, S A, at 7.
8 Broder,... And the Voting Act, Washington Post, July 1, 1981, S A, at 25. David
S. Broder explained the President's political problem as a controversy that:
has divided Reagan's own Republican Party. Some Republicans favor a straight
extension of the law as it stands. Others seek to remove the regional onus by
making the same pre-clearance requirements apply nationwide. And still others
seek to make it easier for the covered areas to bail out of federal supervision
by demonstrating their recent adherence to non-discriminatory practices.
Id.
8Id.
88 Wicker, No Ambiguity Justified, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1981, S A, at 15.
Washington Star, June 30, 1981, S A, at II (entitled, Devious Strategy on Voting Rights).
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referred to the report he had requested from the Justice Department.9
On June 24, the Subcommittee gathered for the only day of hearings
devoted exclusively to the section 2 issueY In preparation for this day,
" See Public Papers, supra note 1, at 699 (Administration of Ronald Reagan). President
Reagan told the NAACP that:
Until a decision is announced, you should know this: I regard voting as the
most sacred right of free men and women. We have not sacrificed and fought
and toiled to protect that right so that now we can sit back and permit a barrier
to come between a secret ballot and any citizen who makes a choice to cast it.
Nothing-nothing will change that as long as I am in a position to uphold the
Constitution of the United States.
Id-
, See House Hearings, supra note 61, at Part 3, 1981-2067. Congressman Hyde later
said that an "intimidating" style of lobbying on the part of the civil rights lobby "lmit[ed]
serious debate" on such issues in the House. He cited as an example the experience of
a black witness who supported an alternative to the Rodino/Leadership Conference approach.
See Keady & Cochran, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Time for Revision, 69 Ky. L. J.
4(1981). See also Hearings on the Voting Rights Act Before the Senate Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 342-66 [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings].
When he appeared before the Subcommittee, Mr. Wilbur 0. Colom, an attorney from
Columbus, Mississippi, engaged in the following exchange with Hyde:
MR. HYDE: Now, Mr. Colom, if I may make a statement. I think it took some
courage on your part to come up here today and differ with the views that we
have repeatedly heard that no reasonable person would wish to alter the existing
act because nothing has changed in the covered jurisdictions.
Since you decided to testify, have you encountered any pressure not to testify?
MR. COLOM: I think I called up and I talked to the [M]inority counsel. It
stopped being pressure and started being intimidation at some point. Apparently,
someone called most of my colleagues in Mississippi and I found my friends, my
black friends in the Republican Party, calling me up asking if I was coming up
here to testify against the Voting Rights Act. They just simply didn't believe
it, and even went so far, that my father - who's cochairman of the Democratic
Party in one county-said that he had [never] heard such vicious things about
his son.
MR. HYDE: You were getting calls trying to persuade you not to come and
testify?
MR. COLOM: Yes. They were calls of disbelief. Actually, that's the reason
it was so interesting. I mean, I do a great deal of controversial litigation. I'm
an ACLU attorney.
MR. HYDE: You're what we call a civil rights type.
MR. COLOM: I do a great deal of civil rights litigation, but it was offensive
to me when friends of mine called me and told me such things. It would be like
someone, to use an example, a John Bircher having one of his friends call him
up and say I understand you are Communist.
MR. HYDE: That's the way you felt?
MR. COLOM: That's the way I felt. I consider myself a strong advocate of
civil rights. I think people are operating off of labels.
I'm also offended by this premise that blacks must be uniform, that we must
all march to the same drummer, that when someone blows the horn up in New
York or Washington or Atlanta, that we must all line up like ants and not say
a word, contrary to what's being put forth as "the national black view:'
MR. HYDE: These attempts were made to discourage you from coming up
here and testifying?
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Mr. Edwards requested that Chairman Rodino and Congressman Hyde
state their positions on section 2 before the witnesses appeared. Hyde's
response, dated June 23, supported the intent standard articulated in
Mobile, contending that it was totally consistent with the Court's earlier
ruling in White v. Regester 3 Congressman Hyde also endorsed the White
requirement that the political process be "equally open" to all and sug-
gested a disclaimer which "specifically states that proportional represen-
tation is not necessarily required as a result of statistical imbalance and
polarized voting."94 Rodino's original letter, in response to Edwards' re-
quest, was shelved in favor of another, dated July 14, after the Hyde sub-
mission and after the June 24 testimony. Chairman Rodino again claimed
that what Congress had intended in 1965 was a broader standard than
the Court had interpreted in Mobile. Rodino argued that the test for iden-
tifying discrimination in section 2 should be governed by the extent to
which racial and language minority groups are denied "access" to the
political process "through vote dilution and other discriminatory devices
and practices.
'95
Dr. C. Vann Woodward of Yale University and Dr. J. Morgan Kousser
of the California Institute of Technology opened with largely historical
analyses before the Subcommittee. James Blacksher, who had argued
Mobile v. Bolden before the Supreme Court, and David Walbert, who was
scheduled to argue another Fourteenth Amendment case before the Court
(Rogers v. Lodge),98 then appeared with Armand Derfner, coordinator for
the Voting Rights Act Project for the Joint Center for Political Studies
in Washington, D.C. Blacksher stated that the amended section 2 in the
Rodino Bill would restore to black Southerners the right to challenge alleg-
ed discriminatory election schemes which were developing before Mobile.'
Walbert suggested that, notwithstanding the Court's claim to the con-
trary in Mobile, the intent test first became a constitutional standard in
1976 with Washington v. Davis, an employment case.9
MR. COLOM: I'm kind of a hard knocker. The talk made me more determined
than ever.
MR. HYDE: Did you get calls from any political figures?
MR. COLOM: No political figures.
House Hearings, supra note 61, at 2102-103.
Mr. Colom later represented the prevailing party before the Supreme Court in Missis-
sippi University for Women v. Hogan. 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982). Hogan, in which Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, stands for the proposition that gender-based
classifications require "an exceedingly persuasive-justification" to sustain their constitu-
tionality. Id.
9' See supra note 49.
9, Letter from Henry J. Hyde to Don Edwards (June 23, 1981); see House Hearings,
supra note 61, at Part 3, 2045-46 (text of letter).
's Letter from Peter W. Rodino, Jr. to Don Edwards (July 14, 1981); see House Hear-
ings, supra note 61, at Part 3, 2046-47.
458 U.S. 613 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 403-21.
9 See House Hearings, supra note 61, at Part 3, 2038.
9 Id. at 2029. See also supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
[Vol. 40:1347
VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS
The focus of much of the testimony was on the meaning of the Court's
1973 decision in White v. Regester. Justice White, who authored the opin-
ion in White, wrote in Mobile that White had been governed by an intent
test. The plurality of six justices agreed 9
White v. Regester, the case that was endorsed by both sides in Mobile,
actually contained two decisions. The first involved Dallas County, Texas,
with a black minority population, and the second centered on Bexar Coun-
ty, Texas, with an Hispanic minority. The case came about as a result
of an attempt to reapportion each county into a multimember district,
allegedly diluting the voting strength of the resident racial and ethnic
minorities. ' In White, no requirement proscribed that candidates reside
in subdistricts or wards within Dallas County, therefore permitting all
candidates to be selected from outside the black residential area."' As
recently as 1970, the same year that White arose, the Dallas Committee
for Responsible Government (DCRG), a white-dominated organization, ef-
fectively controlled Democratic Party candidate slating and relied on
"racial campaign tactics in white precincts to defeat candidates who had
the overwhelming support of the black community."'0 2 The White Court
sustained the district court's decision to break the Dallas County multi-
member districts into single member districts.'0 '
In Bexar County, the facts were less clear. Justice White, however,
writing for a six-member majority including five members of the plural-
ity in Mobile, concluded that the "totality of the circumstances" operated
to "invidiously excluden Mexican-Americans from effective participation
in political life [in Bexar County]."'' 4 Justice White placed the burden of
proof on the plaintiffs to:
[P]roduce evidence to support findings that the political pro-
cesses leading to nomination and election were not equally open
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,101-102 (1980). In Mobile, Justice White's dissent seemed
founded on his concern that although:
[T]he plurality.., apparently reaffirms the vitality of White v. Regester and
Whitcomb v. Chavis, .. . [it] nonetheless casts aside the meticulous application
of ... these cases by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals by con-
cluding that the evidence they relied upon "fell far short of showing" purposeful
discrimination.
Id.
He subsequently observed that:
Although the plurality does acknowledge that the presence of the indicia relied
on in Zimmer may afford some evidence of a discriminatory purpose, it concludes
that the evidence relied upon by the court below was most assuredly insufficient
to prove an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose in the present case.
Id.
' White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 759 (1973).
101 Id. at 766, 766 n. 10.
Id. at 766-67.
103 Id. at 767.
10' Id. at 769.
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to participation by the group in question [and] that its members
had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their
choice. '05
The Subcommittee's final hearing took place in Washington on July
13. By then, over one hundred witnesses had been heard and two field
hearings had taken place. The Administration still had not testified. In
a personal memorandum, sent directly to the President on July 20, Con-
gressman Hyde urged President Reagan to support extension of
preclearance and bilingual procedures. In the final paragraph of his
memorandum, Hyde noted that the President should consider the black
"I Id. at 766 (emphasis added) (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971).
In testimony before the Subcommittee on June 24, Armand Derfner had the following ex-
change with Minority counsel:
COUNSEL: [T]here's some concern on this side [of the aisle] as to what the
Rodino bill purports to say and what it ultimately will be interpreted to say.
Mr. Derfner, you quoted the test in White v. Regester, which was set forth
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall and also by reference in the plural-
ity opinion in Mobile. Do you have any problem with that burden of proof?.
MR. DERFNER: No; again, except for the one issue that did come into a
number of cases, which was the issue of responsiveness. And for the reason we
discussed, I think responsiveness is just a kind of murky, subjective standard
which does put the courts at sea. Apart from that, the White standard, I think,
was a manageable standard.
COUNSEL: Why shouldn't the subcommittee adopt that, then, in statutory
form?
MR. DERFNER: I'd have to look again at the exact language, but that might
well be a promising approach.
COUNSEL: Let me read it to you. It says:
It is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has
not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiff's burden
is to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading
to nomination and election were not equally open-
And I underscore this language for my own purposes of emphasis -
Equally open to participation by the group in question; that its members had
less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political
processes and to elect legislators of their choice.
MR. DERFNER: I think that's a good definition. Again, there is one caveat.
Some people have argued that "equally open" has reference to former barriers,
such as white primaries or such as formal or legal obstructions. I think that argu-
ment is not proper and has not been accepted in general. If there is no problem
about that caveat, then I think that standard is good.
COUNSEL: That can take the form of report language, could it not?
MR. DERFNER: Quite properly so.
COUNSEL: That's just a clarification?
MR. DERFNER: I think so.
Id. at 2052-53.
The "equally open" language in White v. Regester, which was the subject of their discussion,
though ultimately a part of the bill (see infra text accompanying notes 328-36), was never
integrated into the House bill.
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perspective."8 Following completion of the hearings, negotiations on a bill
that could garner bipartisan support immediately began in earnest be-
tween the three Republican and four Democratic members of the Sub-
committee. On July 21, while talks were still in progress, the seven
members unanimously reported H.R. 3112 by voice vote to the full
Judiciary Committee.07
B. The Full Committee
During the week following the Subcommittee's action, daily meetings
to achieve an acceptable compromise took place, often continuing well in-
to the night. The thrust of the Hyde proposal, in which he was joined
by Congressman Lungren, seemed to be acceptable to the Democratic
leadership,' but efforts to amend the Hyde bailout by requiring a sixty
percent minority voter registration and participation level as a precondi-
tion to bailout eligibility, combined with vague language suggesting man-
datory financial assistance for minority candidates, soon created a
deadlock.' A persistent flood of proposals and counterproposals continued
until the full Committee began "markup," or consideration, of H.R. 3112.
' Memorandum from Congressman Henry J. Hyde to the President, at 8 (July 20,
1981). Hyde advised Reagan that:
If you move quickly, you may be able to broaden your constituency by
eliminating a fear which plagues the black community most: that the time will
soon return when they [are] literally unable to vote, or in the alternative, made
to feel that they have no meaningful impact whatsoever on their destiny.
Id.
107 House Report, supra note 2, at 3.
1" Id. at 37. See supra note 85 (description of Hyde bailout).
' Staff Files, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives.
The actual language, in relevant part, of the Rodino counterproposal reads as follows, with
particularly controversial portions in italics:
VOTING RIGHTS
"OUTLINE OF A PROPOSAL ON A BALLOT PROVISION"
Propose to amend Rodino bill on Voting Rights to appear substantially as
follows:
Section 1 - [Elnacting clause
Section 2 - Would replace the current bailout procedure with a new bailout for-
mula based on the approach described by Rep. Hyde but largely based on the
Butler-Hyde "bailout" proposal of 1975.
-The operation of the new bailout would be delayed 5 years to give jurisdic-
tions incentive to do better.
- Bailout suit or request for declaratory relief would be maintained in the
District of Columbia. There is a formula for measuring voter participation-require
that a jurisdiction show that no fewer than 60% of its minority citizens register
and vote as measured by most recent Presidential or Congressional election.
- Showing of a good record of compliance by covered jurisdiction:
- no discrimination in voting
- no judgement of voting rights violations
- no Section 5 violations
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During opening statements, hope for a bipartisan compromise still re-
mained high. When the meeting was recessed at ten o'clock so that
Democratic members could attend a party caucus, the Committee expected
to reconvene at seven o'clock that evening. As it turned out, both that
session and another on the next day were cancelled while negotiations
between the two sides continued. Late in the evening of July 29, a dramatic
meeting took place in the office of Chairman Rodino. Staff from both sides
were present along with principals and representatives -from the Leader-
ship Conference. An agreement was reached and all present were per-
sonally polled. The next morning, the New York Times reported the event:
The compromise, negotiated by Representatives Don Edwards,
Democrat of California, and Henry J. Hyde, Republican of Illinois,
would allow counties within covered states to escape the
[preclearance] requirement if they can prove that they have com-
plied with the letter and spirit of the Voting Rights Act for 10
years."'
When the Committee finally met again at 1:45 on the afternoon of
July 30, the compromise had collapsed, and frustration at a failure to reach
a settlement was evident. During a five-minute speech, Tom Railsback,
a moderate Republican from Illinois, expressed the hope that the Com-
- no Federal examiners or observers
- Some affirmative requirements to show that covered jurisdictions have
provided:
- access to polling places
- fair apportionment
- no financial barriers to minority candidates
- inclusion of minorities as election officials
- discouragement of at-large elections
- Court retains jurisdiction for 10 years
Section 3 - Same as original Rodino bill "results" test
Section 4 - Same as original Rodino bill extends minority language provisions
Section 5 - New section to offset possibility of political non-use of objections
under Section 5 in anticipation of a bailout.
Id.
Some question arose as to what "fair apportionment" meant as well as what a covered
jurisdiction must do to "discourageo ... at-large elections." Id.
11 Pear, Accord Reported on Extending Voting Rights Act, N. Y. Times, July 30, 1981,
S A, at 14, col. 1. Robert Pear, who had covered the Act from the beginning, reported that:
Mr. Edwards and Mr. Hyde said they had reached the agreement last night after
more than five hours of consultations with members of the Congressional Black
Caucus and other interested groups.
The compromise appeared to be fragile. Civil rights groups that support a
continuation of present law and conservative members of Congress who oppose
an extension said they would seek amendments to the proposals ....
Civil rights advocates who have been lobbying for continuation of the law
in its present form were skeptical because they felt the plan makes exemptions
easier to obtain.
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mittee could achieve a compromise before Congress recessed for its early
August break, an interlude that might allow interest groups on both sides
to unravel agreements which remained unratified. His words acknowledged
the good faith of the participants, particularly Chairman Edwards, Con-
gressman Sensenbrenner and Congressman Lungren. Congressman
Railsback, however, reserved his most pointed praise for Congressman
Hyde, whose support he felt was crucial to success. He noted Hyde's con-
version from apprehension over, to acceptance of, administrative
preclearance, together with Hyde's creation of an entirely new bailout
mechanism. This bailout mechanism went further than the existing Act
by requiring adjustments to pre-1965 electoral practices as a precondi-
tion to eligibility. Railsback concluded with a plea for Hyde and the others
to persevere."
General debate concluded at 2:40 P.M. on the 30th, and the Commit-
tee recessed subject to call of the Chair. Edwards then announced that
the agreement of the previous night had fallen through. According to Ed-
wards, the failure not only involved a misunderstanding among the par-
ticipants, a defect which can often be repaired, but a fundamental substan-
tive difference also had surfaced that endangered the entire negotiation."'
This disagreement between the parties involved the threshold for bailout
eligibility. The issue was whether state legislatures, which by state law
were often prohibited from affecting the voting laws of localities, could
escape administrative preclearance as separate entities so long as they
independently met the qualifying criteria."' Edwards felt that states should
remain covered by preclearance until all subdivisions within their bound-
aries had bailed out. Hyde believed that, since section 5 coverage was
made permanent by his amendment, requiring state legislatures to preclear
their laws with Washington indefinitely would be unfair if the subdivi-
sions themselves refused to take the affirmative steps necessary in order
to qualify for bailout.
At seven o'clock on the evening of the 30th, Hyde sent word to Chair-
man Rodino indicating that he felt he had gone as far as he could. When
the message was received, the majority of the Leadership Conference's
Steering Committee, then ensconced in Edwards' office, continued to prefer
a compromise that would include Hyde's support. According to an account
that subsequently appeared in the New Republic, a splinter group, which
III Unofficial Transcript, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Represen-
tatives, at 8-10 (July 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Unofficial Transcript].
'1 Id. at 34.
"' See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states general
powers such as authority to enact laws which are "not delegated to the United States."
Id- See supra text accompanying note 63.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court upheld the. constitutionality of
the Voting Rights Act, noting, inter atia, that "[a]s against the reserved powers of the States,
Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibitions of racial
discrimination in voting." 383 U.S. 301,324 (1966). Arguably, the same would be true of states.
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some felt was more concerned with the purity of its position than com-
promising with Hyde, already had prepared a press release taking excep-
tion with any compromise agreement. In the heated moments that fol-
lowed, four members of the Subcommittee's majority staff, feeling that
forces outside the Congress had taken control of the bill, walked out in
protest.
Those who remained worked until four o'clock in the morning on July
31st to draft an entirely new section."4 Approximately six hours later,
the full Committee met to vote on the new compromise. When the Com-
mittee reconvened, two Republicans, New York Representative Hamilton
Fish, Jr., a long-time supporter of the Act, and James Sensenbrenner,
who ranked behind Hyde on the Subcommittee, joined Chairman Edwards
in co-sponsoring a substitute compromise amendment. Following a lengthy
debate on the differences between the new amendment and various drafts
that had preceded it, the bill was adopted by a recorded vote of twenty-
three to one, including all members of the Subcommittee."'
As reported by the full Committee, H.R. 3112 tracked what originally
had been the Hyde format for bailout with alterations of the requisite
eligibility criteria. For example, the Edwards-Fish-Sensenbrenner
substitute amendment rendered a jurisdiction ineligible for bailout if, for
a period of seventeen years prior to the filing of a petition for a declaratory
judgment granting bailout, and during its pendency (1) a consent decree,
settlement or agreement resulting in the abandonment of allegedly
discriminatory practices had been entered into between the parties; (2)
an action alleging a denial of voting rights was pending; or (3) voting prac-
tices that inhibited or diluted "equal access" to electoral processes had
not been eliminated.
Congressman Lungren opposed the presence of a pending case as a
bar to bailout because an allegation establishes no fault. He expressed
concern that "a $15.00 filing fee alone can effectively deny bailout to an
otherwise deserving jurisdiction."'16 Moreover, Lungren and Hyde ex-
pressed the view that, if enacted onto law in the present form, a bailout
which did not allow reasonable escape might jeopardize the constitutionali-
ty of the entire Act."7
114 See generally Gellman, The New Old Movement, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 6,1982, at
10-13.115 See House Report, supra note 2, at 3; e.g., id. at 39-45 (language of new compromise).
1. House Report, supra note 2, at 57. See Unofficial Transcript, supra note 111, at 39
(July 31, 1981); Supplemental Views of Hon. Henry J. Hyde and Hon. Dan Lungren, House
Report, supra note 2, at 54-58 (outline of concessions made during the bargaining process).
117 House Report, supra note 2, at 57-58. In their Supplemental Views, Lungren and
Hyde outlined the reasons for their fears:
[We] say this because the Act's constitutionality was upheld in the 1966 deci-
sion of Katzenbach v. South Carolina, and last year in City of Rome, Georgia v.
United States, on the presence of certain unique factors. One was the belief that
the 1965 departure from historical tenets of federalism was only "temporary",
but necessary based on pre-1965 conduct in the covered jurisdictions. A great
many things have changed in the South since 1965, as our hearings demonstrated,
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On the subject of section 2, the Edwards-Fish-Sensenbrenner amend-
ment added a disclaimer to the original Rodino language. The disclaimer
provided that "[tihe fact that members of a minority group have not been
elected in numbers equal to the group's proportion of the population shall
not, in and of itself, constitute a violation of this section." ' The new
language was intended to cool apprehensions about the use of proportional
representation as a remedy for section 2 violations.
Despite the fact that only one member of the Committee, Virginia
Congressman M. Caldwell Butler, voted against the bill, headlines in the
next day's papers suggested continuing friction. The Washington Post pro-
claimed that the "Voting Rights Bill Advances in Anger." ' Congressman
Railsback was quoted in the New York Times as saying that he had "never
seen the [C]ommittee in the shape it's now in." 2 Arnolado S. Torres of
the League of United Latin American Citizens summarized the passage
of H.R. 3112 as a "hollow victory. 121
As passed by the full Committee, the Edwards-Fish-Sensenbrenner
amendment made numerous changes to the existing Act. First, the amend-
ment extended the present threshold of eligibility for bailout until August
5, 1984, or roughly two years beyond the current seventeen-year require-
ment. The House Report explained the extension by saying that the addi-
tional wait was "essential to allow the Justice Department sufficient time
to prepare for the expected increase in bailout litigation."" Second, the
amendment inserted new language into section 4 that enabled subdivi-
sions of covered states to independently file for bailout in 1984, thus
and new, more progressive racial attitudes have begun to replace the cultural
bias of the past. This change is, as [we] have said, far from complete. It is suffi-
cient, though, to effectively dilute the force of the showing before the court in 1966.
Moreover, the language [we] have discussed, together with other limitations
on bailout incorporated into the amendment adopted by the Committee would
make its availability highly unlikely, as a practical matter, thereby changing the
temporary status of the Act to a more constitutionally suspect permanent condi-
tion. In [our] judgement, such a change can only survive constitutional scrutiny
if the method of escape is reasonably achievable. What was reported by the Com-
mittee cannot possibly satisfy that test.
Id.
"8 Id. at 45. The disclaimer addresses the burden of proof required to prevail, not the
remedy. See infra text accompanying notes 264-72.
19 Lyons, Voting Rights Bill Advances in Anger, Washington Post, Aug. 1, 1981, S A,
at 3. The Post continued:
[Wihen [the original compromise] failed after several tentative agreements col-
lapsed, the Democratic majority pushed the bill through committee yesterday to
keep to its timetable of House passage this year, thus allowing time to get it
through the more conservative Senate by next August, when the preclearance
provision would expire.
Id.
12 Pear, New Split Loorns on Voting Rights, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1981, 5 A, at 6, col. 1.
121 Id.
'= House Report, supra note 2, at 39. Hyde later stated that "the Department [of Justice]
would be ready to administer this [A]ct whenever it is amended:' See 127 CONG. REc. H6974
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Hyde).
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creating a liberalization of current law." In order to qualify for bailout,
however, every unit of government within the petitioning jurisdiction must
have been able to meet the new criteria.24
As for the bailout requirements themselves, the new amendment pro-
vided that a declaratory judgement freeing the petitioning jurisdiction
from mandatory preclearance could issue only upon a decision by a three
judge federal court located in the District of Columbia." The amendment
required that the federal court find that, for ten years prior to the filing
of the petition, and during the pendency of the action (1) no test or device,
as defined in section 4(c) of the Act,18 had been used within the jurisdic-
tion with either the purpose or the effect of discriminating on the basis
of race, color or language minority;"27 (2) no federal court had determined
that covered voting discrimination had occured anywhere within the ter-
ritory of the petitioning jurisdiction, whether by final judgement or by
a consent decree that called for the abandonment of practices alleged to
be discriminatory;" (3) no federal examiners had been sent to the peti-
tioning jurisdiction;129 (4) the petitioning jurisdiction and all governmen-
tal units within its territory had complied with the preclearance re-
quirements of section 5 of the Act, including restructuring their voting
practices or procedures following an objection by the Department of
Justice or by the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia;"
(5) no objection had been issued with respect to a required submission
under section 5, and none were pending;"' and (6) the petitioning jurisdic-
tion and all governmental units within its territory had taken affirmative
steps to integrate racial and language minorities into their political struc-
ture. These affirmative steps, or "constructive" efforts, included the
elimination of voter intimidation and harassment, the expansion of minority
registration opportunities, the appointment of minority election officials
throughout the jurisdiction for all phases of the election and registration
process, and, most controversially, the elimination of voting procedures
1 See supra note 17.
14 See supra note 17.
I See supra note 17.
"6 See 42 U.S.C. S 1973c(c) (1976).
" House Report, supra note 2, at 50.
1 Id. The second provision prohibited the issuance of a declaratory judgment while
a case charging voting discrimination was pending. IM
'1 Id. Section 6 of the Act (42 U.S.C. S 1973d (1976)) provides for the presence of federal
examiners by order of a court or following certification by the United States Attorney
General that, inter alia, the appointment of federal examiners is "necessary to enforce the
guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendment ...2". Id.
" Id. Several witnesses before the Subcommittee, among them Operation PUSH Presi-
dent Jesse L. Jackson, charged that many southern jurisdictions, including Edgefield Coun-
ty, South Carolina, the home of Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond,
had made changes in their political process without preclearance from the Department of
Justice as required under S 5. House Hearings, supra note 61, at 172.
"I House Report, supra note 2, at 51.
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and methods of election that frustrate "equal access" to the electoral
process.3 ' If the jurisdiction is granted a declaratory judgement for satis-
fying these criteria, the amendment mandated that the reviewing court
retain jurisdiction for an additional ten year "parole" period. The review-
ing court may reopen the case if a motion filed by the Attorney General
or any aggrieved person alleges that any discriminatory act occurred dur-
ing the parole period. The conduct must have violated the new criteria
if it had happened during the ten-year eligibility period."'
As Congress left Washington for its August break, a major grass roots
lobbying campaign accelerated in congressional districts throughout the
country. One of the most effective was organized by the NAACP. "Opera-
tion Network,"" as it was called, was designed to:
[G]et people more consciously aware of the lobbying process. Peo-
ple commit themselves to the fact that when they get a call from
us, they will contact their legislators and feed back what the
legislator said in response .... [W]e also make sure a commit-
ment is followed up .... We kept worksheets ... and break the
bil (sic) down into components. We call the legislator and get de-
tailed information about their (sic) position at national and grass
roots levels. We follow that up with contacts to find out if the
legislator needs any more information to help him/her make a deci-
sion about voting."'
This procedure would prove remarkably effective, as the floor vote
later would demonstrate.
C. The Floor
On September 17, 1981, following the August recess, the House Rules
Committee outlined the procedures by which the amended H.R. 3112 would
be put before the entire membership of the House for a vote.136 Under
the rules adopted by the Committee, two hours of debate (one hour for
each side) were allowed, followed by an unrestricted amendment period.
Throughout the early part of the month of September, a quiet dialogue
had persisted between Congressman Hyde, Congressman Railsback, and
representatives of the civil rights leadership. This dialogue also had in-
cluded a conservative forty-one year old South Carolina Congressman, Car-
roll A. Campbell. His state was covered by the preclearance requirements
of section 5, a fact not popular with local officials. On July 23, however,
Campbell had broken with his long-time friend and mentor, Senator Thur-
13 Id. See supra text accompanying notes 72-105.
1 House Report, supra note 2, at 52.
13 See Pinderhughes Paper, supra note 22, at 16.
13Isd.
:3 H. R. Res. 222, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
127 CONG. REC. H4820 (daily ed. July 23, 1981).
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mond, lending his public support to the Act." Present in the House balcony
that day had been Armand Derfner, himself a South Carolinian, and Althea
Simmons, legislative coordinator for the NAACP. Both had been surprised
and pleased by Campbell's new position, and quickly had gone to his of-
fice to obtain a copy of his statement. Each member of this group wished
to avoid a possible filibuster in the Senate and further argument over
the proposed amendments. Their best hope was to continue a search for
mutually acceptable language.
On September 17, Congressman Railsback introduced Campbell to
representatives of the Leadership Conference gathered in his office. That
afternoon, principals and staff huddled around a conference table in the
Rayburn House Office Building and pored over the issues once again. Dur-
ing the two-week period that followed before consideration on the House
floor, numerous private meetings took place, both in the office of Minor-
ity Whip Trent Lott of Mississippi, in the Capitol, and in the Speaker's
Lobby just outside the doors to the floor. On September 30, however,
any possibility for a last-minute settlement disappeared when a letter
signed by Chairman Edwards was circulated to the 435 members of the
House. In its final paragraph, Edwards warned against floor amendments
to H.R. 3112 as reported by the Judiciary Committee. "Each amendment
to be offered by Republicans," Edwards wrote, "would do serious damage
to the bill. Please vote them all down."'
'
General debate commenced on October 2, a day after Attorney General
Smith privately forwarded his recommendations on the Act to the Presi-
dent. Each member of the Subcommittee and several from outside the
Judiciary Committee took the well"' and spoke of the genesis of the Act,4 '
its accomplishments,"" and the need for the specific changes that H.R.
3112 made to the existing Act.4  Congressman McClory offered cor-
respondence that he had solicited from state and local jurisdictions regard-
ing the expense resulting from the bilingual ballot provisions of Title II."'
Congressman Campbell, despite his support for the Act, indicated that
he planned an amendment that would allow bailout for state legislatures
if two-thirds of the jurisdictions within a covered state had successfully
pursued bailout.' When the Committee finally rose"' concluding general
1 Letter from Congressman Don Edwards to "Dear Colleague" (Sept. 30, 1981).
13 The term "well" refers to a podium, facing the House Membership, and located on
the House floor below the Speaker's Chair.
1 127 CONG. REC. H6850-51 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Fish). See id. at
H6863-66 (remarks of Rep. Collins).
1 Id. at H6849 (remarks of Rep. Washington).
m Id. at H6841-42 (remarks of Rep. Rodino).
141 Id. at H6852-61.
144 Id. at H6819.
141 Id. at H6878. The technical motion concluding consideration under the rule allowing
two hours of general debate was "that the Committee [of the Whole House on the State
of the Union] do now rise." Id. (remarks of Rep. Edwards). When considering the text of
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debate, the amendment process was set to begin the following Monday,
October 5.
Over the weekend, the civil rights leadership engaged in vigorous ef-
forts to eliminate language that could spell trouble for H.R. 3112 in the
forthcoming Senate debate or in the courts. Accordingly, on Monday morn-
ing when the House resolved itself into committee, a new amendment of-
fered by Chairman Edwards lay at the Clerk's desk. By permitting bailout
notwithstanding the pendency of a complaint, this new amendment dealt
with the problem of pending cases that was first raised by Congressmen
Hyde and Lungren at full Committee. The new proposal allowed the
reviewing court to re-open the case if the outcome of the pending case
ultimately went against the jurisdiction.4 ' The approach of the Edwards
amendment was praised by Hyde as an improvement over its
predecessor,147 but still unresponsive to the fact that consent decrees, which
remained a bar to eligibility for bailout even though they contained no
finding of liability, were often entered into "to buy peace." 4 ' However,
Hyde did not object to Edwards' amendment and it was agreed to by voice
vote.149
Several additional attempts to amend H.R. 3112 followed. Congressman
Hyde offered an amendment-aimed at encouraging settlements and con-
sent decrees. He argued, as he had earlier, that consent decrees should
be subject to review, but should not constitute an absolute bar to bailout.15
Congressman Sensenbrenner, taking the floor in opposition to Hyde's
amendment, argued that half of all voting rights cases are resolved through
consent decrees, settlements or agreements. Sensenbrenner suggested that
if a jurisdiction "really feels that it is not guilty of discriminatory voting
practices, then [it] ought to try the suit in court."15' When a recorded vote
was taken, the Hyde amendment failed by ninety-two to 285, with fifty-
six members not voting.",2
Next, Congressman Butler offered an amendment that would have
permitted bailout cases to be reviewed in local federal courts, not simply
in federal courts within the District of Columbia. Butler's amendment also
a bill, the House once again becomes a Committee of the Whole House for purposes of
debating and amending the legislation. The actual motion, made by the Majority Floor Leader,
in this instance, Chairman Edwards, was that the "House resolve itself into the Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.
R. 3112) ... :' Id. at H6937.
46 Id. at H6939 (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
147 Id.
" Id. "[itt seems to me:' Hyde commented, "that the court hearing the bailout ought
to have discretion to look at the consent decree to see what led to it," but not be automatically
bound by it. Id. What Hyde wanted was tantamount to a "rule of reason," in contrast to
a "per se" standard. Id.
"I Id- at H6945.
Id.
Ill Id. at H6946.
15 Id. at H6948.
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failed, though by a closer margin than did Hyde's amendment." The prom-
ised Campbell amendment seeking to create a two-thirds threshold for
state bailout eligibility similarly failed, ninety-five to 313, with twenty-
five members not voting.15
Six more amendments were offered, including three by Congressman
Butler."' Congressman Thomas Bliley of Virginia then offered a proposal
to strike the Committee amendment to section 2. Congressman Barney
Frank of Massachusetts instantly charged that adoption of the Bliley
amendment would "gut the bill fairly effectively."'"" Congressman Sensen-
brenner opposed the Bliley amendment on similar grounds, arguing that
the Rodino amendment to section 2 was necessary in order to clarify the
standard of proof required in order to establish violations of the Act.'57
Chairman Edwards also opposed the amendment, claiming that the in-
tent standard represented an "impossible" burden." In the end, the Bliley
amendment, like the rest, was overwhelmingly rejected.159 The issue raised
by his proposal, however, became the central question raised in the Senate
debate.
Congressman McClory subsequently attempted to alter the bilingual
ballot requirements of Title II, citing the costs reflected by correspondence
he had received from state and local officials. McClory stated that in
California, officials reported that $645,754.23 was spent in thirty-eight coun-
ties for this purpose, and a similar amount in the primaries, for a total
of more than $1.2 million in 1980. In San Francisco alone, McClory claimed,
the cost for printing Chinese ballots was $40,542.1' In Wyoming, the bi-
lingual ballot provisions of the Act allegedly doubled the printing costs
to the State.'61 Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, allegedly spent $17,673.26
in the 1980 primary and $16,044.68 in the general election to print ballots
See generally id. at H6948-66. The vote on the Butler amendment was 132-277, with
24 members not voting.
See generally id. at H6966-73.
Id. at H6973. See generally id. at 6974 (amendment offered by Congressman Lungren
to remove two-year delay in effective date of Act); id. at H6975-78 (amendment offered
by Congressman Hartnett(South Carolina) to extend preclearance provisions of S 5 nation-
wide); id. at 6979-81 (two amendments offered by Congressman Butler, one of which would
have eliminated from definition of "objection" under bailout criterion those objections
withdrawn by Attorney General; other would have allowed all *objections to be cured); id.
at H6981-82 (amendment offered by Congressman Collins (Texas) to shift burden of proof
on bailout petitions from states to federal government); id. at H6982 (third amendment
offered by Congressman Butler, which would require that "voting procedures which inhibit
or dilute ... equal access" must first be identified by federal government before being
corrected).
I' Id. at H6983.
157 Id.
" Id. at H6985.
159 Id.
"0 Id. at H6986.
101 Id.
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which no one ever requested.16' Congresswoman Schroeder referred to
McClory's argument as a "myth" designed to hobble the minority language
provisions,'" even though McClory was supported by Congressman Paul
'Pete' McCloskey, a liberal Republican from California who hoped to
become a United States Senator in November of 1982. McCloskey's posi-
tion was that dependence on a language other than English constituted
a "trap and a delusion" that inevitably would bar minorities from cultural
integration.1 " McCloskey's charge was rebuffed by Congressmen Garcia
and Leland, who represented large Hispanic constituencies. Garcia created
a light moment by delivering his opposition in Spanish.115 The final vote,
however, was 128 to 284 against the McClory amendment, with twenty-
one members not voting.66
The size of the vote against the McClory amendment discouraged any
further amendments, some members fearing that their probable defeat
would create negative legislative history. A short while later, Congressman
Butler's motion to recommit the bill to the Judiciary Committee was
defeated by voice vote. H.R. 3112 then was passed by the House of
Representatives by the one-sided vote of 389 to twenty-four, with thirty
members not voting. 7
The extraordinary efforts of the civil rights lobby had achieYed its
purpose. The long hours of planning and congressional contact had borne
fruit. As one NAACP representative said:
Whatever I asked for that I needed I got: money, executive direc-
tor's and staff time .... We normally have a variety of issues
we work on, but in this case I had all my staff working on it. 68
Said another:
[A]s long as I have been in Washington, this [has been] one of the
most amazing, most historical events of my career .... It was
beautiful, rm happy I had the chance to participate and be in-
strumental in this; I'll never forget this in my life, never .... 169
IV. THE SENATE
A. Pre-Committee
Following final House approval of H.R. 3112, the Senate was faced
with an amended Voting Rights Act proposal that, from the perspective
" Id. See House Hearings, supra note 61, at 1957-66.
13 127 CONG. REC. H6986-87 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1981).
' Id. at H6991.
16 Id. at H6995. Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey complimented Gar-
cia on his speech, responding first in Spanish, then in Italian.
16 Id. at H6998.
1 Id. at H7011.
16 See Pinderhughes Paper, supra note 22, at 16.
19 Id. at 25.
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of the conservative leadership of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was
far worse than anything anticipated.' In addition, the House had adopted
the measure and rejected alternative amendments by an overwhelming
margin, providing H.R. 3112 with a substantial amount of momentum. The
Senate strategy had been to let the House act first, a decision some con-
servatives would later question.
The Senate bill (S. 895) was introduced by Senator Edward M. Ken-
nedy of Massachusetts and Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. of Maryland.
S. 895, introduced on April 7, 1982, had six original co-sponsors 7 and even-
tually attracted nineteen additional co-sponsors by the time of final House
action. 172 The Senate bill was identical to the House bill as it had been
originally introduced on April 7, 1982 by Representative Rodino. 3 S. 895
proposed to extend the preclearance requirement for covered jurisdictions
an additional ten years, conform the expiration date of the bilingual pro-
visions to the preclearance requirements, and establish a results test in
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
7 4
On October 7, only two days after the House had completed action
on H.R. 3112, the sponsors of S. 895 initiated a rarely-used parlimentary
procedure to place the House bill directly on the Senate legislative
calendar. 5 This procedure, authorized by rule XIV of the Senate rules,
permits House-passed bills to be held at the Senate desk, rather than be-
ing referred to the appropriate standing committee. A member of the
Senate must object to referral to committee prior to the official adjourn-
ment of the legislative day in which the bill has been communicated to
the Senate.16 The bill that is the object of the objection is then formally
added to the Senate Calendar. As a result, rule XIV circumvents the nor-
mal legislative sequence and runs the risk of antagonizing Senators whose
committees are denied jurisdiction over bills. Rule XIV is exercised
,71 House Hearings, supra note 61, at 60. Originally the civil rights leadership repeatedly
had spoken in terms of maintaining the Act intact. Id. Now it was the critics of H.R. 3112
who favored this approach.
1 127 CONG. REC. S3539 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1981). In addition to the principle sponsors,
supporting members of the Senate included Joseph Biden (D-Del.), John Chaffee (R-R.I.),
Alan Cranston (D-Cal.), Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), Daniel Moynihan (D-N.Y.), and Lowell
Weicker (R-Conn.). Id&
17 S.895 was ultimately to attract a total of 32 sponsoring Senators, prior to the in-
troduction of S.1992. See infra note 190.
127 CONG. REC. H1382 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1981).
"7 See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
15 127 CONG. REC. S11,334 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1981).
176 Standing Rules of the United States Senate, rule XIV(4). Senate rule XIV(4) states
in relevant part that:
[E]very bill and joint resolution of the House of Representatives which shall
have received a first and second reading without being referred to a committee
shall, if objection be made to further proceeding thereon, be placed on the Calendar.
Id, See Riddick, Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices, S. Doc. No. 2, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 204-205, 930-5, 936-7 (1981) (discussion of history of rule XIV); 126 CONG. REC. S7435-37
(daily ed. June 19, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
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primarily in cases of non-controversial legislation, or, when both the spon-
sors of highly controversial legislation and the Majority Leader of the
Senate wish to bypass the normal committee process.'7 Once a bill is placed
on the legislative calendar by this method, the Majority Leader must con-
sent before consideration on the Senate floor.
While Senator Howard Baker, the recently elevated Majority Leader,
did not actively lend encouragement to circumventing the Judiciary Com-
mittee, the supporters of H.R. 3112 were concerned about possible delay-
ing tactics in committee and wished to initiate an alternative legislative
process that would be available if necessary.'78 Throughout Senate con-
sideration, the House bill remained a major factor to be considered by
the Senate Judiciary Committee leadership. Although Baker appeared will-
ing to rely on normal committee procedures, those who expressed doubt
about H.R. 3112 nevertheless were made aware that an alternative was
available. Even in the event that legislation moved expeditiously through
the committee, proponents of H.R. 3112 were assured by the fact that
the undiluted House bill was available for consideration on the Senate
floor in the event of significant changes in committee." 9
Senator Baker wished to avoid prolonged and bitter debate on exten-
sion. He proposed to key members that a simple ten-year extension of
the existing Act be approved:'s Baker's suggestion was quickly rejected,
principally by supporters of H.R. 3112 who remained dissatisfied with the
Supreme Court's decision in Mobile.' They were joined in an unusual
alliance by critics of H.R. 3112 who wished to see a more effective bailout
mechanism established for covered jurisdictions." In early December of
1981, it had become clear that a significant portion of the ninety-seventh
Congress would be devoted to consideration of the Voting Rights Act
extension.
See, e.g., 103 CONG. REC. 9257-93 (1957) (debate over use of rule XIV in context of Civil
Rights Act of 1957, June 17, 1957); 110 CONG. REC. 3693-3719 (1964) (debate over use of rule
XIV in context of Civil Rights Act of 1964, February 26, 1964). See also CONG. REC. (daily
ed. Jan. 25, 1979) (use of rule XIV to expedite consideration of proposed constitutional amend-
ment relating to direct election of President and Vice-President); CONG. REC. S1654 (daily
ed. Feb. 22, 1979) (same).
178 39 CONG. Q. 2028, 2028 (1981).
1 127 CONG. REC. S11,344 (daily ed. Oct. 14 ,1981) (H. R. 3112 ordered on Senate calendar).
1 N. Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1981, § A, at 18. Senator Baker stated, "I would like to see
us simply extend the existing language for ten years and do it this year:' Id.
"' Washington Post, Dec. 4, 1981, S A, at 4. "Kennedy and civil rights groups wanted
the law clarified to assure that the government doesn't have to prove discriminatory in-
tent, as well as discriminatory effects, in voting rights cases:' Id.
1 Id. The Post reported that:
Senator Thurmond reportedly wanted to make it easier for States and localities
to get out from under enforcement provision of the law.
Id.
Senator Baker, in response to Thurmond's objections to simple extension, as well as
those put forth by Senator Kennedy (supra note 181), remarked that his proposal represented
"one of the shortest trial balloons in history." Id.
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Apart from the principal sponsors of S. 895, Senator Kennedy and
Mathias, the key participants in the extension debate were conservative
Senators, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Orrin Hatch of Utah.
Both occupied leadership positions on the Judiciary Committee, with Thur-
mond serving as Chairman of the Committee and Hatch serving as Chair-
man of the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitutiop. S. 895 and related
voting rights legislation had been referred to this Committee.1"
The civil rights records of Thurmond and Hatch differed considerably
from those of Kennedy and Mathias. Senator Thurmond had only ascended
to the chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee at the beginning of the
year when the Republicans won control of the Senate. However, he had
been in the Senate for nearly three decades and had developed a reputa-
tion in some quarters as an opponent of most federal civil rights legisla-
tion, although more recently he had cast a critical vote in support of a
constitutional amendment providing for voting representation in Congress
for the predominantly minority population of the District of Columbia."
As one of the most dedicated advocates of the doctrine of state's rights,
the South Carolinian had voted against the passage of the original Voting
Rights Act in 1965, as well as the 1970 and 1975 amendments."' Senator
Hatch, in his first term of office, had never before cast a vote on the Voting
Rights Act but already had acquired a reputation as an articulate critic
of many of the initiatives of the civil rights leadership.18 He had been
the leading congressional critic of "affirmative action" and racial quota
programs on constitutional grounds, and had led a successful filibuster
during the ninety-sixth Congress, that blocked efforts to expand Title VIII
of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. His objection had been to efforts to
establish a standard of defining housing discrimination that focused upon
the statistical "effects" of an allegedly discriminatory action rather than
127 CONG. REC. SINo (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981); 127 CONG. REC. S11,850 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1981). Other bills on the subject of voting rights that had been referred to the Subcommit-
tee on the Constitution by the time that H.R. 3112 secured final approval were S.53, spon-
sored by Senator S. I. Hayakawa R-Cal.), which proposed to repeal the bilingual election
requirements of SS 4 and 203 of the Voting Rights Act (127 CONG. REC. S100 (daily ed. Jan.
6, 1981), and S.1761, sponsored by Senator Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), which proposed to establish
a procedure by which the Justice Department would be empowered to administratively
review changes in election laws and procedures on a national basis. 127 CONG. REC. 811,850
(daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981). In large part, S.1761 was based upon recommendations made by
Judge William Keady and Professor George Cochran. See supra note 92; see also Senate
Hearings, supra note 92, at 342-66. (testimony of Professor Cochran).
1" See THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 6,1980, at 11; TIME MAG., May 11, 1981, at 24. Thurmond's
reputation was sharply at odds with the attitude toward him by many minority-group
members in his home state where he had often secured significant support from the black
community in his election efforts.
18a Il CONG. REC. 811,466 (daily ed. May 25,1965) (cloture); 111 CONG. REC. S11,752 (daily
ed. May 26, 1965) (Senate passage); 111 CONG. REC. S19,378 (daily ed. Aug. 4,1965) (conference);
116 CONG. REC. S7336 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1970); 121 CONG. REC. 824,211 (daily ed. July 23,
1975)(cloture); 121 CONG. REC. S24,780 (daily ed. July 24, 1975) (Senate passage).
1 See 39 CONG. Q. 1953, 1953 (1981).
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upon the motivation of the alleged discriminator." Kennedy and Mathias,
on the other hand, had each been in Congress for approximately twenty
years and had cast "aye" votes on the original Voting Rights Act and
both extensions.188 Both consistently endorsed the legislative objectives
of the civil rights leadership and often had led fights on their behalf.189
Following final House action on H.R. 3112, the strategies of both sides
began to emerge. The supporters' principle objective was the perpetua-
tion of the momentum that had been built up in the House. They attemp-
ted to sustain the momentum by pressing the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee to hold expedited hearings." By resorting to rule XIV and to public
pressure for hearings prior to the end of the first session, supporters of
H.R. 3112 hoped to continue to ride the crest of their first impressive,
bipartisan victory on the other side of Capitol Hill.
On December 16, proponents re-introduced extension legislation in the
Senate, identical to the version of H.R. 3112 that had been adopted by
the House. 8 ' Replacing S.895 as the focus of Senate efforts, S. 1992, again
introduced by Senators Kennedy and Mathias, permanently extended the
preclearance obligations of covered jurisdictions, established a complex
bailout formula for such jurisdictions, and sought to overturn the Supreme
Court's Mobile decision by establishing a new test in section 2 of the Act."
The most significant fact about S. 1992, however, was that it was co-
sponsored by sixty-one Senators.'93
I87 See, e.g., Hearings on Affirmative Action and Equal Protection Before the Subcommit-
tee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (May
4, June 11, June 18, July 16, 1981) Hatch's objections to the Fair Housing Act (S.506, 96th
Cong.) were largely predicated upon his objections to an "effects" standard of discrimina-
tion which had been incorporated into the Act by a number of lower Federal Courts. 127
CONG. REC. S15,191-200 (daily ed. Dec. 1,1980). See 126 CONG. REC. S 11,807-919 (daily ed. Sept.
3, 1980).
18 See supra note 185.
18 In addition to their efforts on the Voting Rights Act during the 98th Congress, Mathias
and Kennedy were also among the legislative floor leaders on such issues as the Fair Hous-
ing Act Amendments during the 97th Congress (S.506 supra note 187) and a proposed con-
stitutional amendment during the 96th Congress to provide the District of Columbia with
voting representation in Congress, the latter perceived as a "civil rights" issue by some
because of the large black population in the District of Columbia. H. J. Res. 554, 96th Cong.
(1980).
"' See 39 CONG. Q. 2028, 2028 (1981); see infra note 211.
1 127 CONG. REC. S15,694 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981).
"3 Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1981, § A, at 4. In announcing the bilrs introduction, Ken-
nedy observed that "the impressive rise in voter registration [that has occurred since the
original Voting Rights Act] is threatened in some States by highly questionable re-registration
techniques." Id.
"I In addition to the nine co-sponsors of S. 895, (see supra note 171), the members of
the Senate co-sponsoring S.1992 included Mark Andrews (R-N.D.), Max Baucus (D-Mont.),
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.), David Boren (D-Okla.), Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.), Bill Bradley (D-
N.J.), Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.), Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.), Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), Howard
Cannon (D-Nev.), Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.), William Cohen (R-Me.), John Danforth (R-Mo.), Dennis
DeConcini (D-Ariz.), Alan Dixon (D-Ill.), Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.), Pete Domenici (R-N.M.),
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Among the co-sponsors were twenty-one Republican Senators, in-
cluding conservatives Dan Quayle of Indiana, Paula Hawkins of Florida,
and William Roth of Delaware, as well as eight Southern Democrats. The
sixty-one co-sponsors not only represented a number well in excess of a
majority of the Senate, but more importantly, one more than the number
necessary to invoke cloture or terminate debate in case of a filibuster.'1
The coalition was the product of a week-long grass roots campaign, com-
bined with personal lobbying by Senators such as Kennedy, Mathias, and
Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio, to secure the co-sponsorship of Senators
for the House bill. Supporters of S. 1992 hoped to demonstrate, not only
that ultimate passage of an extension measure was a foregone conclusion,
but that, in all likelihood, the Senate-passed bill would closely resemble
H.R. 3112.
In the meantime, the strategy of those who had misgivings about H.R.
3112 included the enlistment of active participation by the Administra-
tion in the form of support for an alternative. They attempted to slow
down the legislative process so that they could inform their colleagues
about what they perceived as difficulties with the House version. To a
far greater extent than is normally the case with congressional hearings,
the Senate hearings on S. 1992 seemed designed to highlight defects in
the legislation through debate between some of the most articulate civil
rights academics and lawyers in the country.
Critics of H.R. 3112 were nearly as successful in achieving their short-
term objectives prior to the outset of Senate hearings as were proponents.
They could not match the stunning political achievement reflected by the
support behind S. 1992, but they did succeed in postponing the start of
Subcommittee hearings to the early days of the second session when a
minimum of conflicting legislative hearings would be occurring before the
Congress. Most important, critics succeeded in involving the Adminis-
tration.
The Administration had played virtually no role in House delibera-
tions on the extension of the Voting Rights Act, to the consternation of
a number of House members engaged in the difficult task of attempting
to formulate a "reasonable alternative" to section 5.19 5 The President had
David Durenburger, (R-Minn.), Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.), Wendell Ford (D-Ky.), John Glenn
(D-Ohio), Gary Hart (D-Col.), Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.), Paula Hawkins, (R-Fla.), John Heinz
(R-Pa.), Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.), Daniel Inouye (D-Haw.), Henry
Jackson (D-Wash.), Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.), Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Carl Levin (D-Mich.),
Russell Long (D-La.), Spark Matsunaga (D-Haw.), George Mitchell (D-Me.), Robert Packwood
(R-Ore.), Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), Charles Percy (R-Ill.), Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), William Prox-
mire (D-Wis.), David Pryor (D-Ark.), Dan Quayle (R-Ind.), Donald Riegle (D-Mich.), William
Roth (R-Del.), Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), James Sasser (D-Tenn.), Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), Robert
Stafford (R-Vt.), Paul (D-Mass.), Harrison Williams (D-N.J.), Bennett Johnston (D-La.), Ted
Stevens (R-Alas.), and John Melcher (D-Mont.).
19, Standing Rules of the United States Senate, rule XXII(2). An absolute number of
60 Senators is necessary to invoke cloture on a filibuster. I&
195 See supra text accompanying note 106.
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indicated originally that he was sympathetic to the nationwide extension
of section 5,11 an approach favored by Senator Thurmond."7 Later
statements made as H.R. 3112 wended its way through the House Judiciary
Committee tended to indicate that Reagan was more flexible on the sub-
ject of extension. 198 On June 16, prior to final Subcommittee action in the
House, the President announced that he had commissioned the Justice
Department to prepare an analysis of possible options on extension and
to report back to him by October 1.'
On October 2, three days before the House vote, Attorney General
William French Smith forwarded a private report to the President sum-
marizing the development of the Voting Rights Act and setting forth five
alternatives for consideration."0 ' In retrospect, the most striking aspect
19 Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1980, S A, at 1 (entitled, Reagan Assures Blacks He'll De-
fend Civil Rights); Washington Post, May 9,1981, § A, at 8 (entitled, Administration is Undecid-
ed on Voting Rights Act Provision).
197 127 CONG. REC. 86903 (daily ed. June 24, 1981); U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Mar. 23,
1981, at 42; TEE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 6, 1980, at 11.
998 See, e.g., Washington Post, July 25, 1981, S A, at 6; Washington Post, July 11, 1981,
A, at 6; N. Y. Times, June 4, 1981, § A, at 15; Washington Post, May 9, 1981, S A, at 8.
1 Washington Post, June 16, 1981, S A, at 1.
Report to the President from the Attorney General of the United States Concerning
Amending the Voting Rights Act (Oct. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Report to President].
The first alternative proposed a substantial modification of the Act to permit covered
jurisdictions with a record of compliance with the Act (for a period of between five and
seven years) to bailout. Following bailout, such jurisdictions could again be placed under
the preclearance obligation following a showing of a subsequent violation within a specified
period of time. An optional adjunct of this alternative was the termination of the preclearance
mechanism for all jurisdictions at some designated date. Id. at 7.
By "compliance with the Act," the report stated that a covered jurisdiction would have
to demonstrate (a) the absence of S 5 objections during the specified period of time by the
Attorney General, except for those which were subsequently withdrawn, those which subse-
quently received judicial preclearance, and those relating to redistricting that were not
submitted with an intent to discriminate and that were capable of being cured, (b the absence
of "unjustified" implementation of voting changes that had not been precleared, (c) the absence
of constitutional or 5 2 violations, (d) the absence of the use of a prohibited "test or device,"
and (e) the absence of violations of registration practices or conduct of elections covered
by § 2 or the Constitution. Id. at 10.
Under this alternative, as under each of the other proposed alternatives, jurisdictions
would also be permitted to bailout from S 5 preclearance in the event of minority popula-
tions of less than 3000, or 5% of the total population. Special election districts, such as
utility districts, would also be permitted to bailout automatically. Id. at 9-10. In addition,
under this alternative, covered counties would be able to bail out independently of their
states. Cf. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, (1980). All bailout applicants would
be able to petition their local federal district court, rather than only being able to bring
such petitions before the District Court for the District of Columbia, 5 4(a). Report to Presi-
dent, supra, at 7.
The second alternative was similar to the first except that the bailout criteria would
be made more stringent. Covered jurisdictions would be required not only to comply with
the provisions of existing law, but would be required to have made no changes in voting
laws or procedures that violated the Constitution or that evidenced some discriminatory
intent or purpose. Id. at 12. This alternative would not treat as fatal for purposes of bailout
13851983]
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of the recommendations, which were prepared in close collaboration with
the office of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, William Brad-
ford Reynolds, was its cursory reference to the issue of section 2. Under
the heading "Other Considerations", a single paragraph in the twenty-
one page report addressed the section 2 controversy. Most significantly,
it concluded "we are opposed to including in the Administration proposal
any amendment of 5 2 that suggests the incorporation of an 'effects' test." 1
The report focused almost exclusively on the issue of bailout.
On November 6, following more than a month of debate within the
White House, President Reagan issued a highly ambiguous statement. The
statement expressed support for a ten-year extension, "either through
a direct extension of the Act or through a modified version of the new
bill recently passed by the House of Representatives."2 °2 Without detail-
ing the extent to which the House bill satisfied this criteria, Reagan also
endorsed amendments "which incorporate reasonable bailout provisions
for States and other political subdivisions." ' In addition, the President
preferred the extension of the bilingual coverage provisions in section
203, making them concurrent with the expiration date of the special pro-
visions of sections 4 and 5.204 Finally, Reagan stated that the Act should
lack of full compliance with the procedural requirements of 5 5, or objections to 5 5 submis-
sions by the Attorney General, so long as the jurisdiction could overcome the burden of
demonstrating that no purposeful discrimination had been at work in this process. Id. at 12-13.
The third alternative would have provided for an additional extension of the existing
provisions of §5 4 and 5, perhaps for five years, with jurisdictions possessing low minority
population or high minority voter registration automatically allowed to bailout. Id. at 14.
Those jurisdictions in which the minority population below 3000 or 5% of the population,
and those in which the voter registration rate among minorities was in excess of 65% and
equal to or greater than the white voter registration rate, would be automatically eligible
for bailout. Since voter registration normally is conducted only at the county or city level,
no state would be likely to avail itself of this bailout procedure. Id.
The fourth alternative, described by Smith as an "unattractive one", proposed another
simple, straight extension of the current Act for a period of 3 to 5 years. Id. at 16. "Covered
jurisdictions with a commendable voting record in recent years . . . have ample reason
to complain about a proposed flat extension of the Act's present provisions." Id.
The final alternative, described as having serious legal and practical questions proposed
to extend the Act nationwide as favored by Senator Thurmond and, at one time, by the
President. Id. at 18. The Report described this alternative as likely to place a "tremendous
administrative burden" upon the Department of Justice. Id..
"1 Report to President, supra note 200, at 19.
212 Statement by the President, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1223-24. See Washington
Post, Nov. 6, 1981, S A, at 1. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1981, S A, at 22 (entitled, Voting Rights
Backers Assail Reagan's Stand); Los Angeles Times, Nov. 8, 1981, 5 A, at I (entitled, Rights
Groups Say Voting Act Shift Makes Extension Meaningless); Los Angeles Times, Nov. 8, 1981,
S A, at 1 (record of some of political maneuvering within White House prior to President
Reagan's announcement, entitled, An Angry Smith Won Voting Voting Act Concession). Ac-
cording to the Los Angeles Times, President Reagan had concluded that he would support
the House-approved measure until being persuaded at the last minute by Attorney General
Smith to reverse his decision. Id.
20 Statement by the President, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1223-24.
Id. Despite early indications to the contrary, such as the introduction of S.53 (127
CONG. REC. S.100-101 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981)), the issue of bilingualism received little serious
[Vol. 40:1347
VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS
retain the intent test rather than incorporating a "new and untested" ef-
fects or results standard. °-
The President's announcement served as a beacon for Senate skep-
tics of the House legislation, most of whom had been urging opposition
to H.R. 3112, in its various forms, for many months. Critics quickly ac-
celerated efforts to build a case in favor of alternatives to the House
measure and to communicate them to their collegues. Well before hear-
ings even had been scheduled, large amounts of literature were distributed
to Senate offices by both sides.
An imbalance in lobbying resources characterized the entire Senate
debate on the Voting Rights Act much as it had in the House. On the
proponents' side, an impressive array of organizations such as MALDEF,
the NAACP, and the ACLU, coordinated efforts to secure Senate adop-
tion of the House bill. Spearheaded by the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights, supporters of the House bill included virtually all significant civil
rights, labor, civil liberties, public interest, and religious organizations."'
These organizations were effective in lobbying Senators, just as they had
been in the House, communicating to them strong civil rights support for
adoption of a mirror image of H.R. 3112.
On the other side, the effectiveness of arguments against the House
bill suffered from a nearly total absence of outside allies. Since the early
Sixties, civil rights organizations had learned the value of being well
organized and intense in their support of legislation. In contrast, opponents
tended to be dispersed and far less effective. Organizations of officials
from covered jurisdictions, who would have had an interest in the ques-
tion of bailout, were nowhere to be seen during debate in either House.2 7
In addition, the level of concern about the Voting Rights Act within
covered jurisdictions had sharply subsided over the years. Most, including
Southerners, had learned to tolerate the Act and applied virtually no
pressure upon their elected officials to repeal or seriously weaken it. The
only persons who still seemed to maintain an intense concern about the
Act were black Southerners who continued to view it as the foundation
for their progress over the past generation. Because of the success of the
Act, southern politicians found themselves confronted with a political equa-
tion similar to that of their colleagues outside the South. The only consti-
tuents who expressed an interest in the fate of the Act were those strongly
legislative attention in either house of Congress. The only witness in the Senate to testify
in opposition to extension of § 203(b) of the Act, relating to the provision of bilingual registra-
tion and election materials, was the author of S.53, Senator Hayakawa. See Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 92, at 848-53. Among witnesses urging retention of the provision were
Vilma Martinez, Executive Director, MALDEF (see Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 289-92),
and William Clements, Governor, State of Texas (see Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 870).
Statement by the President, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1223-24.
See generally Gellman, The New Old Movement, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 6,1982, at 10.
See infra note 332 and accompanying text. One lobbyist, supporting H.R3112, observed
that the Act "is not the target of any well-organized, well-financed lobby:' 39 CONG. Q. 1111
(1981).
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supportive of the House measure. In a sense, the success of H.R. 3112
seemed to be directly related to the achievements of the Voting Rights
Act itself over the past seventeen years in sharply altering the nature
of the southern electorate. 8 The imbalance in lobbying resources was more
apparent in the context of these amendments than in any major civil rights
legislation to come before the Congress in recent years. The Administra-
tion proved not only to be the most valuable ally of those with apprehen-
sions about the House bill, but virtually their only ally.
On December 15, shortly before the end of the first session, Senator
Charles Grassley of Iowa, a member of the Subcommittee on the Con-
stitution, introduced a bill (S. 1975) designed to provide an alternative
to the House measure."9 While disclaiming that S. 1975 was an "Ad-
ministration bill," Grassley conceded that he viewed it as a measure that
"squares in most respects" with President Reagan's November 6
announcement.21 S. 1975 proposed to extend the special provisions of the
Voting Rights Act for an additional five years and to establish a bailout
mechanism significantly less stringent than that contained in H.R. 3112.
Under the Grassley proposal, covered jurisdictions would become eligible
for bailout if, during the preceding five years (1) no discriminatory test
or device had been used; (2) all "substantial" submissions for section 5
preclearance had been made; (3) no "unremedied" objections by the At-
torney General under section 5 had occurred; and (4) no court decrees
were issued finding that the jurisdiction had purposely denied or abridged
the right of any individual to vote. In addition, S. 1975 retained the ex-
isting language of section 2 as defined by the Supreme Court in Mobile.
While the Grassley proposal was not the only alternative to the House
measure, sponsorship by such a key member of the Subcommittee with
jurisdiction over the Voting Rights Amendments lent S. 1975 special
credibility.
B. The Subcommittee
On January 27, 1982, shortly after the start of the second session of
Congress, and after several initial delays, 1 the Subcommittee on the Con-
2's See Atlanta Constitution, Oct. 11, 1981, S J, at 1. (entitled, Opposing Voting Rights
for Political Dividends Appears to be as out of Date as Poll Taxes); Washington Post, June
13, 1981, S A, at 8 (entitled, Southern Republicans Back Voting Rights Act).
127 CONG. REC. S15,372 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981).
210 Id.
21 Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1982, S A, at 14 (entitled, Voting Rights Hearings Post-
poned). After the second of two brief delays, the Leadership Conference in a January 19,
1982 telegram to Senator Hatch stated:
[We] are outraged by your announced plan to delay once again the start of
hearings on legislation to extend the Voting Rights Act .... [T]he Reagan Adminis-
tration's plea for additional time in which to submit legislation is no excuse for
delaying hearings which are starting a bare seven months before the scheduled
expiration of the Act ... [Any delay can only be seen as an effort to undermine
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stittion began the first of eight scheduled days of hearings; a ninth was
later added. The opening statement of Chairman Hatch made clear that
the focal point of Senate hearings would be the results test contained in
the amended section 2. In a lengthy statement, Hatch sought to dispel
what he referred to as "myths" surrounding the extension of the Act.
He observed, "The debate beginning in the Senate today will focus upon
a proposed change in the Act that involves one of the most important
constitutional issues ever to come before this body. Involved in this debate
will be the most fundamental issues involving the nature of American
representative democracy, federalism, civil rights, and the separation of
powers." '212 Hatch went on to argue that the proposed change in section
2, from an intent test to a results test, would redefine the concept of
"discrimination" and would "transform the Fifteenth Amendment and the
Voting Rights Act from provisions designed to ensure equal access and
equal opportunity in the electoral process to those designed to ensure
equal outcome and equal success.""21
For the first time during congressional consideration of the Voting
Rights Act extension, the issue of the proposed change to section 2 was
moved to the forefront of debate. In this regard, Senators Thurmond and
Hatch differed in their emphases during committee consideration. Thur-
mond, since he represented a state that had been covered since the incep-
tion of the Act in 1965, was now principally concerned with what he
perceived as a need for a more effective bailout procedure for covered
jurisdictions of the South.2 1 As a result, Senator Thurmond directed his
primary attention toward a reform of section 5. During the opening day
of hearings, he stated that nationwide application of the Act would create
a fairer and more effective Act, and that "a statute must be applied equally
to all citizens of this nation in order to ensure true equal protection under
the law."2 5 Thurmond would often articulate this theme during the balance
of the Subcommittee hearings.
Senator Hatch, though, was preoccupied with section 2. Because of
his involvement with the amendments to Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights
Act, he had become sensitive to the abandonment of intent as a basis for
identifying racial discrimination. His efforts in re-evaluating affirmative
action programs represented similar apprehensions about the recent evolu-
tion of national civil rights policy. 
16
The two leading Senatorial proponents of S. 1992, Mathias and Ken-
nedy, delivered opening statements after Hatch, with Mathias speaking
the voting protections of citizens. Staff Files, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate.
212 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 3.
213 Id.
21, See supra note 185.
211 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 60.
215 See supra note 187.
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from the witness stand rather than from the committee podium. Hatch
closely questioned both Senators.
Senator Mathias chose to concentrate his remarks on the question
of section 2:
The House amendment is needed to clarify the burden of proof
in voting discrimination cases and to remove the uncertainty
caused by the failure of the Supreme Court to articulate a clear
standard in the City of Mobile v. Bolden .... We are not trying
to overrule the Court. The Court seems to be in some error about
what the legislative intent was .... Prior to Bolden, a violation
in voting discrimination cases [could] be shown by reference to
a variety of factors that, when taken together, added up to a find-
ing of illegal discrimination. But in Bolden, the plurality appears
to have abandoned this totality of circumstances approach and to
have replaced it with a requirement of specific evidence of intent
... this is a requirement of a smoking gun, and I think it becomes
a crippling blow to the overall effectiveness of the Act.217
Hatch then initiated a line of questioning that was to be repeated on
a number of occasions throughout the hearings. He requested that Mathias
be more specific concerning the overall objectives of the new section 2 test:
SENATOR MATHIAS: The purpose of the bill is to provide
for fair and just access to the electoral process.
SENATOR HATCH: Is [it] the most fair and just access -if
55% of Baltimore is black that 55% ought to be represented as
sole black districts or at least majority black districts.
SENATOR MATHIAS: A fair and just operation of the elec-
toral process is to give all citizens equal access to vote, run, or
otherwise participate in the process.
SENATOR HATCH: What does "equal access" mean?
SENATOR MATHIAS: You are well aware of what it means.
SENATOR HATCH: I want to know what you think it means,
because I know what it means under the effects test. I think it
means, as the Attorney General of the United States does, pro-
portional representation.
SENATOR MATHIAS: You look at the totality of cir-
cumstances; that is what we have been doing.
SENATOR HATCH: That is what we do under the intent stan-
dard. I am quite confused as to relevance of these circumstances
that you are considering in their totality .... I do not understand
what the question is that the court asks itself in evaluating the
totality of circumstances under the results test? What precisely
does the court ask itself after it has looked to the totality of cir-
217 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 199.
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cumstances and what is the standard for evaluation under the
results test?
SENATOR MATHIAS: Look at the results.
SENATOR HATCH: That is all? And if there was absolutely
no intent to discrimination, as they found in the Mobile case, if
the results looked like discrimination, then would the court be able
to come down on that jurisdiction-on Baltimore, for example?218
Senator Hatch inquired throughout the hearings about the significance
of the "totality of circumstances" description of the proposed results test.
Hatch's chief goal seemed to create a distinction between the scope of
permissible evidence under a test for discrimination and the standard for
evaluating such evidence. The distinction normally was couched in terms
of what threshold question should judges ask in attempting to evaluate
evidence before them in a section 2 proceeding.219 It was not until much
later in the hearing process that proponents of the House bill seemed
prepared to respond to this query. = In Hatch's view, however, a reasonable
and comprehensible response was never forthcoming."'
The intensity of Hatch's position on section 2 became particularly ap-
parent with his subsequent questioning of Senator Kennedy. Hatch raised
questions which related to Kennedy's homestate even more directly than
he had with Mathias. He framed the issue in the form of a hypothetical
situation that might confront a Mayor of Boston. The Senator began:
SENATOR HATCH: [Let us understnad the] specific applica-
tion of the proposed new "results" standard in section 2- suppose,
for example, that we are considering a "hypothetical" new mayor
of Boston. Suppose that Boston has a minority population of ap-
proximately 22.4% And suppose that Boston has a city council of
approximately 11% minorities. This is slightly less than one-half
218 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 200-201.
.19 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 599-600 (questioning by Hatch of Steve
Suitts, Executive Director, Southern Regional Council). See Washington v. Davis 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976). The Washington Court held that invidious discriminatory purpose may often
be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts just as it had been in successful de jure
and de facto busing cases under the Fourteenth Amendment, Keyes v. School District #1,
413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973].
' See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 959. (testimony of Professor Norman
Dorsen, President, American Civil Liberties Union). Admitting that it was "inadequate"
for proponents of S.1992 and H.R. 3112 to define the new "results" test in S 2 in terms
of the "totality of circumstances," Dorsen quoted Justice White in White v. Regester, that
the plaintiff's burden in "results" cases "is to produce evidence to support findings that
the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to par-
ticipation by the [minority] group in question." 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973). White further
described the type of factors considered by the 6th Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485
F.2d. 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), as establishing even "more specific" direction as to the proper
understanding of the "results" test. 412 U.S. at 766.
" Executive Session of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (April 28, 1982), contained
in Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at Vol. II, 21-2.
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of the minorities' representation in the population. Suppose fur-
ther that the city of Boston elected its city council on an at-large
basis . . . . Can you offer assurances-what assurances
specifically-that this new mayor will not have the Justice Depart-
ment or the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights or the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund suing the city of Boston upon passage of the
new "results" test? It is a purely hypothetical thing, of course,
but I would like to have your response.
SENATOR KENNEDY (visibly angry): Supposing you write
it out for me and I will give you a written answer.'
Senator Hatch's questioning of Kennedy reflected an alternative ap-
proach which he pursued during the Subcommittee hearings. Setting forth
a hypothetical "totality of circumstances," Hatch frequently inquired about
the decision-making processes that a court would have to undergo in order
to determine whether such facts constituted a section 2 violation.' If the
response was that the hypothetical situation represented a section 2 viola-
tion, he attempted to establish some guidelines on those jurisdictions likely
to be vulnerable to legal challenge under the new standard. If the response
was that no violation existed, his goals were nevertheless achieved by
establishing some rough parameter of what the new test covered. A
response, however, that a court would have to evaluate the totality of
circumstances on a case-by-case basis, suggested to Hatch the fundamen-
tal difficulty that any community would have in knowing whether its own
electoral procedures were in compliance with the new law.
In other words, Hatch sought to clarify his own position that the
results test was intelligible only to the extent that it approximated a stan-
dard of proportional representation by race. 4 Hatch interpreted propor-
tional representation as minority membership on legislative bodies in
numbers approximately reflecting its population within the relevant
jurisdiction. The remedy for discrimination, defined as lack of proportional
representation, would be the establishment of single-member districts.
To the extent that proponents of the results standard rejected identifica-
tion of the standard with proportional representation, Hatch feared that
the only alternative was that the judicial branch would have unconstrained
discretion in the resolution of section 2 cases. As he later observed dur-
I Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 217.
See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 960-61.
"' Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 3-5. Sen. Hatch accorded little merit to the
"disclaimer" of proportional representation contained in S.1992 and H.R. 3112, arguing that
it was merely a "smokescreen" which would achieve nothing more than require plaintiffs
to identify within a community any one of a multitude of "objective factors" of discrimina-
tion that could be located in virtually any major community in the country in addition to
the absence of proportional representation. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,75 n. 22 (1980)
(plurality opinion rejected similar disclaimer proposed by Justice Marshall in his dissent,
446 U.S. at 111-12 n. 7).
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ing a subsequent day of hearings, "Indeed, the more I think about it, the
more convinced that I am that the real distinction between the intent
standard and the results standard is even greater than the issue of pro-
portional representation. The real issue is whether or not we're going
to define civil rights in this country by a clear, determinable standard-
through the rule of law, as it were- or by a standard that literally no one
can articulate."'
The harsh exchange between Kennedy and Hatch was not the only
friction present in the hearing room. Indeed, it was a foreshadowing of
the entire Senate debate on the Voting Rights Act. Attorney General
Smith, representing the Administration before the Congress for the first
time on this issue, also exchanged discordant words with Senator Ken-
nedy. The Attorney General surveyed the achievements of the 1965 Act
and presented the recommendations contained in his October report to
the President. 6 Smith felt that the Voting Rights Act had "worked well"
and that the need for its special protection continued." The Attorney
General then recommended the President's position as originally expressed
on November 7, calling for a ten-year extension of the Act which he in-
dicated would be "longer than any previous extension voted by Congress,"
a "workable and fair" bailout, and deletion of the results test contained
in H.R. 3112 and in S. 1992.' Although Smith avoided recommending a
specific set of bailout criteria, he offered to work with the Subcommittee
in the development of a mutually satisfactory bailout.' Emphasizing the
unique nature of the original temporary preclearance mechanism, he em-
phasized the Administration's strong opposition to the permanent nature
of the extension provided for in H.R. 3112.10
With respect to the proposed change from an intent to a results test
in section 2, the Attorney General placed the Administration strongly on
the side of Senator Hatch. Smith called the results standard a "dramatic"
change from current law and one that Congress should not endorse without
"compelling and demonstrable" reasons." He echoed the concern about
' Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 340.
2' See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
227 See Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 69.
2m Id. at 70-71.
= Id.
Id. at 69. Attorney General Smith stated that:
[]n the same breath that we speak of an extension of the [Alct, we must also
underscore its exceptional character. It vests extraordinary powers in the Na-
tional Government over matters that, consistent with the values of federalism,
have traditionally rested within the province of States and local control .... [Tihe
Supreme Court in sustaining the constitutionality of the act took care to note
the temporary nature of the special provisions.
Id.
231 Id. at 70-71. Attorney General'Smith explained that:
The inclusion in section 2 of [a results] test would call into question the validity
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proportional representation by race that had been raised in the context
of the proposed change. Smith remarked that "[u]nder the nationwide ef-
fects test, any voting law or procedure in the country that failed to mir-
ror the population makeup in a particular community would be vulnerable
to legal challenge under [s]ection 2.""2
Following questioning of the Attorney General by Hatch, Senator Ken-
nedy delivered a lengthy critique of the Administration's overall record
on civil rights, concluding that the Attorney General's statement reflected
the same "casual" attitude on civil rights matters. He observed further,
"How can a significant group of Americans, whose skin is not white, have
very much confidence that these alterations and changes that you are sug-
gesting to us here today in terms of voting rights are really going to fulfill
our national committment?"2 In addition, Kennedy called into question
the accuracy of the Attorney General's statement that the civil rights
leadership had earlier endorsed a simple ten-year extension of the Voting
Rights Act.m Accusing Senator Kennedy of "political rhetoric" and
of State and local election laws and systems that have long been in existence,
not just in the South, but in all of America.
Id. at 71. Hatch repeatedly questioned witnesses on the nature of the voting rights prob-
lem outside the covered jurisdictions that purportedly justified the need for the amended
S 2. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1174 (exchange between Hatch and Dr.
Arthur Fleming, Chairman, United States Civil Rights Commission). Virtually no substan-
tial evidence was introduced during the hearings relating to voting rights problems out-
side such jurisdictions. See 128 CONG. REC. S6642 (daily ed. June 10, 1982).
1 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 70-71. The Attorney General continued by stating
that:
Historic political systems incorporating at-large elections and multi-member
districts, which had never before been questioned under either the Act or the
Constitution would suddenly be subject to attack. So too would be many redistrict-
ing and reapportionment plans.
Id.
Id. at 76-77. Among the Administration's civil rights policies condemned by Senator
Kennedy was its recent decision to argue on behalf of tax exemptions for racially segregated
private schools. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 4593 (May 24, 1983).
Other criticized policies included the Administration's decision to fire the long-serving Chair-
man of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Dr. Arthur Fleming, its critique
of affirmative action policies, appointments of allegedly unqualified individuals to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and economic policies which have produced
what he called the "heaviest burdens" upon minority youths. Senate Hearings, supra note
92, at 76-77. There is little question that the growing perception of the Administration as
being hostile to civil rights, reflected particularly by the controversy surrounding its handling
of the Bob Jones case, contributed significantly to its political difficulties on the voting rights
issue. See, e.g., 1982 CONG. Q. Almanac 397-99; Evans & Novak, Who Hid Reagan's Memo?,
Washington Post, Jan. 22, 1982, SA, at 15; Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1982, § A, at 1 (entitled,
Reagan Played Direct Role on Tax Exemptions). See generally CONG. Q. 171 (1982) (summariz-
ing criticisms of Justice Department action on the Voting Rights Act by the civil rights
leadership).
m Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 71. The Attorney General testified that civil rights
groups with whom he had met during the past year "were unwavering in their praise of
the existing legislation" and that their "strongly held view at that time was, 'If it isn't
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"misstatements", the Attorney General reiterated the Administration's
position and labelled as "major distortions", much of Senator Kennedy's
criticism.1
5
The interchange between Kennedy and the Attorney General reflected
another recurrent theme raised by critics of S. 1992. Although they were
aware that a ten-year extension of the existing statute did not now repre-
sent an ideal outcome for the civil rights leadership after their impressive
House victory, the critics of S. 1992 were still surprised at the intensity
of the opposition to a straight extension of the law. After all, Hatch and
the others believed that the Voting Rights Act had consistently been
described as "the most successful civil rights act in the history of the
Nation" by those in the civil rights leadership."6 They did not yet fully
realize the extent to which the civil rights leadership's expectations had
been raised by the final House action.
In addition to the Attorney General and the Senate sponsors of S.
1992, other witnesses testifying at the opening day of hearings were in-
dividuals representing the major outside support organizations for the
Voting Rights Act extension. They included Benjamin Hooks, President
of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Vilma Martinez, Executive
broke, don't fix it'." Id. Smith also remarked that, "every civil rights group representative
that I talked to in the spring, summer, and fall subscribed to exactly the position that the
President is [now] taking." Id. at 79-80. Cf. Correspondence of Benjamin Hooks, Chairman,
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, to the Attorney General of the United States, William
French Smith (February 9, 1982), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1089-90.
While no witnesses from the organized civil rights community rejected the proposed change
in S 2 effected by H.R. 3112, several seemed to confuse the House measure with a simple
extension of existing law. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 61, at 60. Benjamin Hooks
stated that:
The Voting Rights Act is the single most effective legislation drafted in the last
two decades ... I have not seen any changes that were anything but changes
for changes sake. I do not understand it. It is our position that since it is working
well those of us who proposed it and were the sufferers and forebearers are not
coming in at this time suggesting that there be changes. It would be best to ex-
tend it is its present form.
Id. Ralph Abernathy, former Executive Director, Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC), similarly stated, "We need to continue the bill in its present form for the next
ten years." House Hearings, supra note 61, at 101.
235Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 78.
' See Executive Session of the Subcommittee on the Constitution (March 24, 1982),
contained in Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at Vol. II, 9. Further confusion was evidenced
in the events surrounding the testimony of Texas Governor, William Clements, who refer-
red to the "unprecedented" coalition within Texas by civil rights groups-including the
League of United Latin-American Citizens, the Texas NAACP, and the Texas League of
Women Voters-in support of a "10-year extension of the act as presently constituted"
Id. at 869, 874-75. This claim was subsequently rejected by each of these organizations.
See Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1611, 1615-17. (testimony of Arnoldo Torres, Ex-
ecutive Director, League of United Latin-American Citizens (LULAC}). Telegram from Texas
League of Women Voters to Senator Orrin Hatch (February 4,1982); Telegram from Texas
League of Woman Voters to Texas NAACP (February 5, 1982).
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Director of MALDEF, and Ruth Hinerfeld, President of the League of
Women Voters. Dr. Walter Berns of the American Enterprise Institute
also testified as an academic critic of the proportional representation which
he felt was the necessary outcome of an amended section 2.13
The themes highlighted by Hatch, as well as by proponents of the
House measure, were restated frequently during the remaining eight days
of hearings. Although occasional discussion of the merits of the new bail-
out standard relating to section 5 occurred,n8 the consistent focus of the
hearings remained upon the meaning and wisdom of the proposed results
test in section 2. The principle elements of controversy regarding section
2 were as follows:
(1) Whether the results standard was reflective of the law existing prior
to the Mobile decision. This question was important in determining whether
Hatch's predictions of proportional representation were credible.39 If the
results standard merely reflected the understanding of the law prior to
Mobile, Hatch would have difficulty demonstrating that an explicit re-
statement of the results standard in section 2 to overturn Mobile would
lead to proportional representation. While Hatch occassionally argued that
some of the decisions interpreting the effects standard of section 5
established a remedy of proportional representation, 4' his principal argu-
ment was that the law on section 2, prior to Mobile, had never been anything
other than an intent standard."' Thus, the absence of proportional
representation requirements in the past was largely irrelevant. In this
regard, Hatch frequently quoted Justice Stewart's comments in Mobile.
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 231. See Berns, Voting Rights and Wrongs, COM-
MENTARY. March 1982, at 31.
' See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 394-99 (testimony of Rep. Henry Hyde);
id. at 605-608 (Steve Suitts, Executive Director, Southern Regional Council); id. at 749-53
(Abigail Turner, Attorney, Mobile, Alabama); id. at 1368-72 (Drew Days, Professor, Yale
Law School).
-9 Id. at 4-5, 516, 644, 1645. Hatch generally was careful to state that, in his view,
proportional representation would likely serve as a limit, or as a standard by which the
achievements of a particular community in electing minority representatives would be judged,
and that whether or not such a community had accorded minorities a truly "effective" or
"undiluted" vote would ultimately depend upon its movement in the direction of propor-
tional representation. Id. His position was not that the new test would suddenly impose
proportional representation throughout the country.
20 Hatch often cited City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1970); Kirksey
v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 528 F.2d. 536 (5th Cir. 1976); Zimmer v. McKeithen,
485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973); City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F.Supp. 987 (D.D.C.
1981); City ofPetersburg v. U.S., 354 F.Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 410 U.S.
962 (1973).
24 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 515. Sen. Hatch stated:
I do not believe that the Mobile v. Bolden case represents a departure from
the law existing prior to the case. I do not believe that there is any section 2
case or any [Fifteenth] Amendment case where the Supreme Court did not re-
quire a finding of purposeful discrimination.
Id. See id. at 914-18 (testimony of E. Freeman Leverett, Attorney, Elberton, Georgia).
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[I]t is apparent that the language of section 2 no more than
elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the sparse
legislative history of section 2 makes clear that it was intended
to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment itself .... While other of the Court's Fifteenth Amendment
decisions have dealt with different issues, none has questioned
the necessity of showing purposeful discrimination in order to show
a Fifteenth Amendment violation. 2
To the extent that Hatch was successful in demonstrating that the results
test represented a new test, one that had not existed prior to the Mobile
decision, he was far more likely to be credible in suggesting that the im-
pact of this test would be unwise public policy or, at best, uncertain.
In contrast, supporters of H.R. 3112 took issue with both Hatch and
Justice Stewart. Laughlin McDonald, the Director of the Southern Regional
Office of the American Civil Liberties Union, argued that Mobile required
proof of intent and, therefore, was a "change in the law." McDonald con-
tinued, "Prior to Mobile, it was understood by lawyers trying these cases
and by the judges who were hearing them that a violation of voting rights
could be made out upon proof of a bad purpose or effect.... Mobile had
a dramatic effect on our cases. '243 McDonald, as well as a number of other
advocates of H.R. 3112, offered as an illustration the decision of United
States District Court Judge Robert Chapman in a case involving Edgefield
County, South Carolina. The decision included vacating a judgement for
plaintiffs in a vote dilution case several days following the Mobile decisionm "
Immediately prior to Mobile, Judge Chapman had ordered a judgement
for the plaintiffs on the basis of an effects or results standard.
(2) Whether the results standard would inevitably lead to proportional
representation. Although virtually all witnesses on both sides of the debate
claimed to reject the notion of proportional representation as desirable
public policy,2 5 the critical issue in the entire debate was whether the
242 Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61, 63 (1980).
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 369. See Nevett v. Sides, 571 U.S. 209 (5th Cir. 1978).
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 369-70. See id. at 1130 (testimony of Thomas C.
McCain, Chairman, Democratic Party, Edgefield County, S.C.); id. at 1622 (testimony of
Charles W. Coleman, City Attorney, Edgefield County, S.C.). Senator Thurmond also spoke
passionately on the Edgefield situation. Id. at 1135-38. See also Bruck, Strom Thurmond's
Roots, THE NEw REPUBLIC, March 3, 1982, at 15.
"4 Not only did critics of H.R. 3112 and S. 1992 condemn "proportional representation"
as public policy (see, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 717-21 (testimony of Michael
Levin, Professor, City College of New York)), but so did every proponent of these measures.
See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 956 (testimony of Norman Dorsen, President,
American Civil Liberties Union). The difference between the two sides, however, was primar-
ily a matter of definition. See Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 252-54 (exchange between
Hatch and Benjamin Hooks, and exchange between Chief Counsel of Subcommittee and
Professor Drew Days); id. at 1375-76.
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results test would lead to a political regime in which proportional represen-
tation of racial and ethnic groups became the standard on which voting
rights violations would be predicated.246 Critics of H.R. 3112 repeatedly
attacked the results test as one which could lead to such a situation. 7
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Reynolds remarked that the
proposed amendment to section 2 might lead to the use of "quotas" in
the election process, and that local units of government would be required
to "present compelling justification for any voting system which does not
lead to proportional representation. '" 8 Dr. Berns similarly concluded that
the amendment would reverse Mobile and authorize "[f]ederal courts to
require States to change their laws to ensure that minorities will be elected
in proportion to their numbers.
249
Defenders of the amendment assumed that the results test represented
a restatement of the law prior to Mobile. They argued that proportional
representation had not resulted from federal court decisions during this
period. As McDonald observed,
I cannot.., think of a single case in which we have won, in which
we have settled, in which the courts have ruled for us under the
Constitution or under section 2 ... which have resulted in propor-




To a large extent, the common rejection of proportional representation
by proponents and critics of H.R. 3112 masked more fundamental prob-
lems of definition.
251
(3) What was meant by the results test if not proportional representa-
tion. Hatch argued that the test either would lead to proportional represen-
tation or that the test had no comprehensible meaning. u2 If the test had
246 See Appendix to Additional Views, by Senator Hatch, S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 186-87 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report](summary of remarks by various
witnesses on the theme of "proportional representation").
247 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 71. The Attorney General stated:
Under [the new test], any voting law or procedure in the country which pro-
duces election results that fail to mirror the population's make-up in a particular
community would be vulnerable to legal challenge.., if carried to its logical con-
clusion, proportional representation or quotas would be the end result.
Id.
248 Id. at 1660-61.
249 Id. at 229. See id. at 905-40 (statement of E. Freeman Leverett, Attorney, Elberton,
Georgia).
' Id. at 372. See id. at 1216-26 (summary of § 2 cases placed in hearing record by
Frank Parker, Director, Voting Rights Project, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights). This
list of cases was designed to demonstrate that the results test, allegedly extant in the law
prior to Mobile, had not led to any requirements of proportional representation. Id.
251 See supra note 239; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 991 (testimony of
Rolando Rios, Legal Director, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project). Rios
distinguished between proportional representation as a substantive right and as a remedy. Id.
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 339-41.
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no such meaning, he felt it was likely to invest the federal courts with
sharply enhanced authority to substitute their own policy preferences on
voting practices and electoral structures for the policies of state
legislatures and local elected bodies.'
Hatch asked of witnesses what the "core value" was of the results
test.' In the absence of any clearly defined value, Hatch argued that the
totality of circumstances response, relied on by proponents of the House
measure, was "unsatisfactory." To speak of the scope of permissible
evidence in the context of the totality of circumstances missed the point,
in his judgement. Any test, including the intent test, encouraged considera-
tion of the totality of circumstances. The crucial inquiry involved deter-
mining the threshold question asked by a court in evaluating evidence;
in other words, the standard by which the totality of circumstances would
be judged. As the Subcommittee report later concluded:
[T]here is no core value under the results test except for the
value of equal electoral results for defined minority groups, or
proportional representation. There is no other ultimate or
threshold criterion by which a fact-finder can evaluate the evidence
before it. 5
' See Senate Report, supra note 246, at 136-39 (Additional Views of Senator Hatch).
"In the absence of such standards, the 'results' test affords virtually no guidance what-
soever to communities in evaluating the legality and constitutionality of their governmen-
tal arrangements (if they lack proportional representation) and it affords no guidance to
courts in deciding suits (if there is lack of proportional representation)." Id. See also Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980). "Mr. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion would discard
these fixed principles [of law] in favor of a judicial inventiveness that would go far toward
making this Court a super-legislature ... We are not free to do so." Id.
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1340.
Report of the Subcommittee on the Constitution to the Committee on the Judiciary on
the Voting Rights Act, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Committee Print, April 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Subcommittee Report). The Subcommittee Report is contained in large part in the Senate
Report, supra note 246, at 137. Critics of the results test in S 2 compared it unfavorably
to the effects test in § 5 in this regard. In the context of S 5 where only changes in voting
law or procedure are scrutinized, a standard of "non-retrogression" (see Beer v. United States,
425 U.S. 130 (1976)), affords some guidance to jurisdictions seeking preclearance of their
submissions. In the context of S 2, however, where not only changes in law would be evaluated,
but also existing electoral arrangements, the 'non-retrogression' principle is inapplicable.
Senate Report supra note 246, at 137. In the view of most critics of the proposed "results"
test, no alternative standard-except for proportional representation-made sense in the
context of S 2. Id. In their view, no alternative standard exists short of comparing actual
representation of minorities to the representation that they would be ideally "entitled"
under a structure of proportional representation. Id. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note
92, at Vol. II, 131-32 (letter from Timothy G. O'Rourke, Assistant Professor, University
of Virginia, to the Subcommittee on the Constitution). O'Rourke stated that:
A challenge to an at-large system of necessity must be predicated on a com-
parison between electoral opportunity under the existing plan and the opportu-
nity which would or might prevail under one or more alternatives. If the alter-
natives need not be limited to those that fit within the existing structure of govern-
ment or the current size of the local governing body, then there is little to pre-
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The report further complained that efforts to elicit greater guidance on
the meaning of the test had degenerated into "wholly uninstructive
statements of the sort that 'you know discrimination when you 
see it,'"
or else "increasingly explicit references to the numerical and statistical
comparisons that are tools of proportional representation."'
Initial difficulties on the part of supporters in either understanding
or responding to inquiries about the "core value" of the results test soon
changed. Supporters responded to such inquiries by referring either to
the specific factors outlined by the Court in White v. Regester or by the
lower federal courts in Zimmer v. McKeithen. 57 Professor Norman Dorsen,
of the New York University School of Law and President of the American
Civil Liberties Union, was among the first to concede that the totality
of circumstances description of the results test was inadequate.M He relied
on Justice White's remarks in White to provide a more useful description
of the new test. In White, Justice White stated that "[tihe plaintiffs burden
is to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation
by the group in question."' Justice White's language eventually was
debated in the context of the compromise offered as an alternative to the
House language after the completion of Senate hearings.26
(4) Whether the disclaimer of proportional representation contained in
the House proposal was effective. Supporters of H.R. 3112 constantly argued
that the amendment would not result in proportional representation
because of the "disclaimer" in the new section 2.2"1 The relevant language,
appended at the end of the proposed results test, read:
vent the consideration of porportional representation as the model against which
the current system could be evaluated.
Id.
" See Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 253. (statement of Benjamin Hooks, Executive
Director, NAACP)
I See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 564 (testimony of Joaquin Avila, Associate
Counsel, MALDEF); id. at 959 (testimony of Professor Norman Dorsen, President, American
Civil Liberties Union).
Id. at 959.
" See supra note 104.
26 See Senate Report, supra note 246, at 194-95. (Additional Views of Senator Robert
Dole). Senator Dole observed that language eventually adopted as part of S. 1992:
codifies the legal standard articulated in White v. Regester ... the standard is
whether the political processes are equally "open" in that members of a protected
class have the same opportunity as others to participate in the political processes
and to elect candidates of their choice.
Id. at 194. See also supra note 105.
2 See House Report, supra note 2, at 30. Several illustrations of reliance upon the
disclaimer as effectively precluding policies of proportional representation can be identified.
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1418 (testimony of Professor Archibald Cox, Harvard
Law School, representing Common Cause); id. at 1599 (testimony of David Brink, Presi-
dent, American Bar Association); id. at 878 (Congressman James Sensenbrenner).
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The fact that members of a minority group have not been
elected in numbers equal to the group's proportion of the popula-
tion shall not, in and of itself, constitute a violation of this section.
2
Critics of the test were concerned that the disclaimer posed no serious
barrier to a mandate of proportional representation. They, however, also
recognized the internal political difficulties that the disclaimer posed. A
casual observer of these amendments, several Senators noted, could not
help but assume that the disclaimer language established at least some
significant obstacle to the judicial transformation of the results test into
a test of proportional representation. 63
There were at least five separate interpretations of the disclaimer
which critics of H.R. 3112 believed rendered it no more than a
"smokescreen", as a serious impediment to the establishment of a propor-
tional representation principle, however faithfully the provision was to
be enforced. (1) The first interpretation accorded the disclaimer related
to the "objective factors" argument of proponents. Critics pointed to the
House Report as outlining a theory by which certain voting and electoral
practices were characterized as "objective factors of discrimination.""4
Section 3, H.R. 1992 as passed by the House of Representatives, October 7, 1981;
S. 1992, as introduced. The disclaimer would have immediately followed the proposed results
test, which read:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or pro-
cedure shall be im- or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in the denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees
set forth in section 4(f)(2).
See supra text accompanying note 52.
I See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. S6964-65 (daily ed. June 17,1982) (remarks of Senator Howell
Heflin); 128 CONG. REC. S7107-109 (daily ed. June 18,1982) (remarks of Senator Paul Tsongas);
128 CONG. REC. S7115 (daily ed. June 18,1982); (remarks of Senator Joseph Biden); 128 CONG.
REC. S7115-16 (daily ed. June 18, 1982) (remarks of Senator George Mitchell).
' House Report, supra note 2, at 30. Among the aggregate of "objective factors" to
be considered in conjunction with the results test, according to the House report, were:
[A] history of discrimination affecting the right to vote, racially polarity voting
(sic) which impedes the election opportunities of minority group members,
discriminatory elements of the electoral system such as at-large elections, a ma-
jority vote requirement, a prohibition on single shot voting, and numbered posts
which enhance the opportunity for discrimination, and discriminatory slating of
the failure of minorities to win party nomination.
Id In addition to these factors, the Subcommittee Report (supra note 255) suggested the
following additional "objective factors": a history of "dual" school systems, cancellation of
registration for failure to vote, residency requirements for voters, special election re-
quirements for third-party or independent candidates, off-year elections, substantial can-
didate cost requirements, staggered terms of office, high economic costs associated with
registration, disparity in voter registration by race, history of lack of proportional represen-
tation, disparity in literacy rates by race, evidence of racial bloc voting, history of English-
only ballots, history of poll taxes, disparity in distribution of public services by race, and
numbered electoral posts. House Report, supra note 2, at 143-44.
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These practices included at-large voting systems, registration purging re-
quirements for failure to vote, and anti-single shot balloting requirements.
The proponents of H.R.3112 believed that such enumerated practices com-
monly characterized political jurisdictions that were not "equally open"
to minority group members. The existance of an at-large voting systems,
for example, was considered to be an "objective factor of discrimination"
because it tended to result in the establishment of larger voting districts
and hence fewer districts with majorities of minority group members."5
Critics of H.R. 3112, focusing upon the "in and of itself" language in the
disclaimer, argued that the disclaimer could lead to a situation in which
an absence of proportional representation, although insufficient to trigger
a violation of section 2 by itself, would be sufficient if accompanied by
the existence of one or more objective factors of discrimination.26 The
broad scope of "objective factors,""2 7 combined with what critics believed
would be the ease of identifying one or more such factors within a given
jurisdiction, seemed to make a proportional representation standard in-
evitable. As the Subcommittee Report was later to conclude, "The courts
and the Justice Department ... have already identified so many such
factors that one or more would be available to fully establish a § 2 claim
in virtually any political subdivision having an identifiable minority
group." '268 Critics, therefore, argued that the disclaimer could be fully
satisfied where a section 2 violation was identified, not on the basis of
lack of proportional representation "in and of itself," but on the basis of
such a finding combined with one or more objective factors purporting
to explain the absence of proportional representation.269 Identification of
"I See generally O'Rourke, The Legal Status of Local At-Large Elections: Racial
Discrimination and the Remedy of "Affirmative Representation", Speech prepared for delivery
at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, reprinted in
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at Vol. II, 464-94; Davidson and Korbel, At-Large Elections
and Minority Group Representation, 43 J. POLITICS 982 (1981); E. BANFIELD AND J. WILSON.
CITY POLITICS 151 (1963); Jewell, Local Systems ofRepresentatiow Political Consequences and
Judicial Choices, 36 GEO. WASH. L REV. 790 (1968); M. SEASONGOOD, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES (1933); Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 802-803 (testimony of Armand
Derfner, Joint Center for Political Studies). An alleged distinction has been suggested bet-
ween minority "representation" and minority "influence". See id. at 542-46 (testimony of
Prof. Susan McManus, University of Houston); Executive Session, Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, id. at Vol. II, 26-27 (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
I' Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 516. The somewhat mechanistic understanding
of the operation of the results test was given at least some impetus by the explicit rejec-
tion in the House Report of consideration of "highly subjective factors such as responsiveness
of elected officials to the minority community." House Report, supra note 2, at 30. Cf. Zim-
mer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1978) (lack of responsiveness was listed
as one of several factors to be considered by courts under White v. Regester standard).
27 See supra note 264. Neither the listing in the House report nor the Senate Subcom-
mittee report purported to be comprehensive.
Senate Report, supra note 246, at 143; Subcommittee Report, supra note 255, at 36.
29 Senate Report, supra note 246, at 144-45; Subcommittee Report, supra note 255, at
38. The Subcommittee report states, "such 'objective factors of discrimination' largely con-
sist of electoral procedures or mechanisms that purportedly pose barriers to full participa-
tion by minorities in the electoral process. Given the existence of one or more of these
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an objective factor would then become a largely mechanical and perfunc-
tory process.
(2) The second interpretation accorded the disclaimer was the
"remedial" argument. Critics of the disclaimer suggested that even if a
lack of proportional representation would not suffice to establish a substan-
tive violation of section 2, the disclaimer did not rule out proportional
representation as a remedy for the violation.7
(3) The third interpretation accorded the disclaimer was the "minor-
ity advantage" argument. Critics suggested that the effect of the disclaimer
might be to impose upon jurisdictions an absolute obligation to dismantle
"objective factors of discrimination", such as at-large systems, which were
inconsistent with the pursuit of proportional representation. They claimed
that the disclaimer would protect communities lacking proportional
representation only to the extent minorities clearly had failed to take
advantage of existing electoral arrangements compatible with the concept
of proportional representation.' In other words, although proportional
representation "in and of itself' would not be required, an affirmative
obligation would exist to eliminate any electoral or structural barriers
to the achievement of proportional representation.2
(4) The final interpretation accorded the disclaimer was the "textual"
argument. Critics argued that even if the disclaimer was interpreted in
good faith by the courts, it would not serve as a bulwark against propor-
tional representation because it was syntactically confused and
meaningless."' Only voting "practices or procedures" could, by definition,
constitute violations of section 2, not the racial composition of a represen-
tative body as suggested by the disclaimer. 4
factors with the lack of proportional representation, the new test in S 2 operates on the
premise that the existence of the 'objective factor' explains the lack of proportional represen-
tation. Thus, in a technical tense, the disclaimer would be satisfied. It would not be the
absence of proportional representation in and of itself that would constitute the dispositive
element of the violation but rather the objective factor." Id.
270 Senate Report, supra note 246, at 97; Subcommittee Report, supra note 255, at 36.
The Subcommittee report states, "there is little doubt that many proponents of the results
test, in fact, are adamantly determined not to preclude the use of proportional representa-
tion as a basis for fashioning remedies for violations of section 2." Id See Senate Hearings,
supra note 92, at 991 (testimony of Rolando Rios, Legal Director, Southwest Voter Educa-
tion Project). See also infra text accompanying note 355.
21 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1660-61. The principle proponent of this theory
was Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Reynolds. He described a number of
municipalities throughout the country that would be vulnerable under the new results stan-
dard despite the language of the disclaimer. Id. at 1661-63. See Memorandum from Robert
A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Strom Thur-
mond (February 25, 1982), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at Vol. II, 406, 414.
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1660-61.
See id. at 1409. Former Professor Irving Younger, a national authority on evidence
and a Washington attorney, articulated this view: "the purported saving sentence of pro-
posed section 2 in fact saves nothing . .. . [1It is simply incoherent." Id.
21 Id Professor Younger stated, "If the draftsmen of proposed section 2 wished to
see to it that the racial makeup of an elected body would not be taken as evidence of a
violation, they have failed to say so in their moving sentence. If enacted, that saving sentence
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(5) The meaning of the intent test. Just as critics and proponents dif-
fered on the proper meaning of the proposed results test, the two sides
in the Voting Rights Amendments debate repeatedly disagreed about the
meaning of the intent test, which Hatch, Thurmond and the Reagan Ad-
ministration wished to preserve. Proponents of the results test repeatedly
characterized the intent standard as requiring direct evidence of
discriminatory purpose or intent,"8 such as overt statements of bigotry"
or evidence of a "smoking gun. '277 Proponents also felt that the intent
test required courts to "mind read"27 in order to discern the intentions
of "long-dead" legislators."' Dr. Arthur Fleming, Chairman of the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, and an outspoken opponent of the in-
tent test, contended that "inquiries [into intent] can only be divisive,
threatening to destroy any existing racial progress in a community. It
is the intent test, not the results test, that would make it necessary to
brand individuals as racist in order to obtain judicial relief."'
Advocates of the intent test responded that opponents' opinions belied
a misunderstanding of the standard. They claimed that the intent stan-
dard permitted consideration of evidence concerning the totality of the
circumstances,2 8' including any direct or indirect evidence. 2 Both the
results and intent tests, they felt, permitted evidence of disparate impact
upon minority groups. The latter, however, accorded such evidence the
weight that the fact-finder believed it merited, rather than raising a
presumption of a section 2 violation.283 Professor Irving Younger outlined
the burden of proof that the intent test placed on the plaintiff:
will either be rewritten by the courts or ignored, in either event debasing Congress' respon-
sibility to write the Nation's laws." See Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 230-31 (testimony
of Professor Walter Berns, American Enterprise Institute, on matter of courts ignoring
altogether intent of drafters of disclaimer). Professor Berns compared the disclaimer to
the disclaimer of racial preferences in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2j)); Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 230-31; see United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
27 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 304 (testimony of Vilma Martinez).
Id. at 249. (testimony of Mayor Henry Marsh, Richmond, Virginia).
See Memorandum from Ralph Neas, Executive Director, Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, on Amending Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (January 26, 1982), reprinted
in Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 282, 286 [hereinafter cited as Leadership Memorandum].
28 See supra note 275; Parker, Saving Voting Rights, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5,1982, § 3, at 1.
See Leadership Memorandum, supra note 277, at 462. The Birmingham (Ala.) Post-
Herald noted in an editorial supporting the House-passed 5 2 provision, "It would quite
a trick for anyone to subpoena [legislators] from their graves for testimony about their
racial motivations." Cf. Senate Hearings, supra note 92 at 1413-14 (testimony of Younger).
I Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1181 (testimony of Dr. Arthur Fleming, Chair-
man, U.S. Commission On Civil Rights). Dr. Fleming spoke at least partially in response
to Senator Hatch's criticism of "branding" someone a "racist" persuant to a "results" test.
Id, See Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 974-75 (colloquoy between Hatch and Joseph Rauh,
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights).
28 See Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 516 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch); Senate
Hearings, supra note 92, at 1414 (colloquoy between Hatch and Professor Younger).
I See supra note 281 (testimony cited).
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Opposition to the intent test has been practical. To enact it, the
argument goes, is to make it more difficult or even impossible
to prove a violation. A practical objection to be sure but one which
suggests to me that its makers lack practical experience in the
conduct of litigation. Spend a few hours in any criminal court in
the land. What is the stuff on trial? Almost always a question of
intent .... In nearly all criminal litigation and in much civil litiga-
tion, a party must prove the other's intent. So far as I know, ex-
cept for the matter before this Subcommittee there has been no
serious contention that it is an unduly difficult or impossible thing
to do .... Lawyers and judges are familiar with the intent test
.... and juries have no particular trouble in applying it.'
An even more fundamental difference, however, than whether the in-
tent standard was an "inordinately difficult burden" for plaintiff's,m related
to the propriety of the standard. Senator Mathias was subsequently to
observe about the intent standard, ". .. simply put, [it] asks the wrong
question .... If [minorities] are denied-a fair opportunity to participate
... the system should be changed, regardless of what may or may not
be proveable about events which took place decades ago." 8 To Hatch,
as with Mathias, the fundamental question involved more than simply the
degree of difficulty in satisfying the standard- "Most importantly, it is
the right standard in the sense that neither an individual nor a commun-
ity.., ought to be considered quilty of discrimination in the absence of
intent or purpose to discriminate. To speak of 'discrimination' in any other
terms-to treat it as equivalent to a showing of disparate impact-is to
transform the meaning of the concept beyond all recognition . . .".1
(6) What was Congress' original intent in passing section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. The final major issue related to whether Congress' intent in
1965 was compatible with the newly proposed results test. Critics of the
test argued that even if the lower federal courts had adopted a results
test in their pre-Mobile interpretation of section 2 (which they declined
to concede), the original intent of Congress had been the establishment
of a test in section 2 premised upon the traditional standard of intent
or purpose." The Subcommittee Report found it particularly persuasive
that Congress chose not to utilize the effects language in section 2 that
Congress had expressly incorporated into sections 4 and 5.19 Congress
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1414.
Id. at 1409.
21 Senate Report, supra, note 246, at 36.
2W8 Id.
2 Id. at 135. "An appropriate standard should [not] be fashioned on the basis of what
best facilitates successful legal actions against States and municipalities." Id.
Id. at 128-29 (Subcommittee Report at 22-23).
Id. at 128 (Subcommittee Report at 22). The Subcommittee Report stated, "In sec-
tions 4 and 5 of the Act, Congress established an explicit, although highly limited use of
[the results or effects] test. The fact that such language was omitted from section 2 is con-
spicuous and telling." Id.
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also had exhaustively debated the concept of an effects standard in the
context of sections 4 and 5, but had not in the context of section 2."°
Proponents of the results test responded by pointing to the sparse
legislative history existing on the meaning of section 2. Relying upon
statements by former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, they con-
cluded that Congress was aware of the competing definitions of
"discrimination" and intended that section 2 cover voting rights violations
established under either."' Ironically, critics of the results test also relied
upon the former Attorney General's remarks in 1965 to establish their
case as to the original legislative intent. 2
The Senate and House hearings were primarily distinguished, apart
from their substantive focus, by the extent to which the Senate debates
involved a greater diversity of expert witnesses. Senate critics of H.R.
3112 complained that the hearings conducted by the House were imbal-
anced and one-sided. In an unusual display of criticism directed at another
congressional subcommittee, the Senate Subcommittee Report discussed
the "total lack of opportunity for individuals opposed to these changes
in the law to testify before the House Judiciary Committee." 3 In con-
trast, the Sentate hearings involved a roughly equal balance between sup-
porters and critics of the House measure, including academicians, litigators,
and political figures on both sides. Only in the area of organizational
representatives did the House imbalance carry over into the Senate panel.
Virtually no group or organization could be found to testify in opposition
to the House-proposed changes.
Id. at 129 (Subcommittee Report at 23).
21 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1372-73 (colloquoy between Sen. Mathias
and Professor Days); Senate Report, supra note 246, at 17 n. 50-51. Attorney General Katzen-
bach responded to a question from Senator Fong relating to the meaning of the term "pro-
cedure" in S 2 of the original Act, and whether the term was broad enough to encompass
restrictive registration hours by a jurisdiction. Katzenbach replied, ". . . I had thought of
the word 'procedure' as including any kind of practice of that kind if its purpose or effect
was to deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race or color." Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Voting Rights Act, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1965).
Cf. Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 129 n. 70.
' Senate Report, supra note 246, at 129. Critics of the results test focused upon the
immediately preceding remarks of Attorney General Katzenbach in which he suggested
that the hypothetical situation described by Senator Fong would be within the scope of
S 2 "if it had that purpose," i.e. to discriminate. See supra Hearing before the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary on the Voting Rights Act, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1965). In response
to a later question from Senator Fong, the Attorney General responded that the element
of intent required was "the same intent that is normally required in a criminal statute."
Id. at 192-93.
' See Senate Report, supra note 246, at 125 (Subcommittee Report at 18). "During the
eighteen days of hearings that took place in the House, on the extension of the Voting
Rights Act, the Judiciary Committee heard 156 witnesses testify on this issue. Of these,
only thirteen expressed any reservations about the House measure and some of these were
of a relatively trivial nature." Id. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 403404 (testimony
of Congressman Henry Hyde).
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While the section 2 issue dominated the Senate hearings, much as
the discussion on bailout had dominated the House, at least one full day
(February 11) was devoted to the issue of the proposed reforms to the
section 4 bailout criteria. Hatch introduced the hearings by describing
five "misconceptions" about the bailout procedures that, in his view,
previously had characterized the debate on the Voting Rights Act
Amendments.24 (1) The first "misconception" involved the expiration date
of August 6, 1982. He emphasized that the Voting Rights Act was a per-
manent piece of legislation. The significance of the August date was simply
that a large number of covered jurisdictions would have satisfied their
obligations under the existing Act and would have been authorized to
petition for bailout.
2
(2) The second "misconception" related to whether the House bill
represented a "relaxation" of existing criteria. Hatch pointed out that ex-
isting bailout criteria consisted of nothing more than demonstrating to
a district court that a jurisdiction had not employed a discriminatory test
or device for the requisite period of time.2 9 The proposed criteria in H.R.
3112 and S. 1992 maintained the original requirement and added an addi-
tional obligation. Nevertheless, Hatch recognized that the new bailout
criteria represented a relaxation, if the assumption was that the requisite
time period would again be extended beyond the possible reach of covered
jurisdictions. He emphasized, however, that in the absence of such the
assumption, the new criteria did not represent a relaxation or liberaliza-
tion of existing criteria.
(3) The third "misconception" questioned whether the House bailout
simply represented a third extension of the time period during which a
covered jurisdiction must maintain "clean hands" in order to to be eligi-
ble for bailout. He emphasized that the extension approved by the House
was permanent, not a mere five or seven year extension as it had been
' Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1083-87. The misconceptions were frequently
reiterated by critics of H.R. 3112 and S.1992. Allegations of "misconceptions" were fre-
quently made during the Voting Rights Act debate. See 128 CONG. REC. S56501-50 (daily ed.
June 9, 1982) (Senator Jesse Helms).
1 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1083. Proponents of the House version of the
Voting Rights Act extension were sometimes casual in their description of the significance
of the August 6 deadline. Nothing in the Act was scheduled to "expire" on that date. What
was important about the date was that a number of jurisdictions "covered" under the original
Voting Rights Act would finally have satisfied the requirements of the Act (as well as of
its subsequent amendments) and have been eligible for bailout from the preclearance re-
quirements. See, e.g., id. at Vol. II, 206 (statement of Council on Church and Race, United
Presbyterian Church in U.S.A.: "The Voting Rights Act will expire in August 1982 unless
extended by Congress."); id. at 225 (statement of Douglas Fraser, President, United
Automobile Workers: ". . . IT]he preclearance provisions of section 5 of the Act are scheduled
to expire after August 6, 1982"); id. at 294 (colloquoy between Senator Orrin Hatch and
Vilma Martinez).
Id. at 1084. See 128 Cong. Rec. S6649-52 (daily ed. June 10, 1982) (colloquoy between
Senator Hatch and Senator Mathias).
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in the case of the 1970 or 1975 Amendments.29 7 He observed that jurisdic-
tions could be required to preclear changes in voting laws and procedures
in perpetuity under the House bill.
(4) The fourth "misconception" suggested that the term of the exten-
sion was not one of substantial significance in view of the establishment of
relaxed bailout provisions. He stressed that the Supreme Court had upheld
the fundamental constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach and City of Rome v. United States, 8 recognizing
what the Court called the "exceptional" conditions existing in the South
at the time and the "temporary" nature of the preclearance provisions.'
A permanent extension, then, could call into question the constitutional-
ity of the Amendments. 00
(5) The final "misconception" involved whether the House bailout
represented the sort of "reasonable" bailout that might suffice to preserve
the constitutionality of the Act despite the permanent nature of the ex-
tension. After briefly discussing the individual criteria for bailout con-
tained in the House bill, Hatch concluded that the bailout provisions as
adopted in H.R. 3112 and S. 1992 were not reasonable. 1 Faced with the
permanent extension of preclearance, Hatch felt that the bailout criteria
increased the probability that covered jurisdictions would become sub-
ject to indefinite coverage.11
2
Supporters of the new bailout made little effort to address Hatch's
points. They seemed to believe that the misconceptions had been addressed
thoroughly during the House hearings. Also, proponents principally were
concerned with establishing a thorough record on the controversy sur-
rounding section 2 .
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1084-85.
2Id.
I South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966); City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156, 182 (1980).
1 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1085. The question of the constitutionality of
the proposed amendments was raised repeatedly by Hatch, both in the context of SS 5 and
2. Subcommittee Report, supra note 255, at 59-67, contained in Senate Report, supra note
246, at 165-73. In the Subcommitee Report, Hatch and the other Subcommittee Republi-
clans argued that the in perpetuity extension of H.R. 3112 was inconsistent with the em-
phasis in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966), upon the "temporary" nature
of the extraordinary preclearance remedy. See also Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 69
(testimony of Attorney General William French Smith); Senate Hearings, supra note 92,
at 946-48 (testimony of E. Freeman Leverett). Even a leading proponent of the House measure
conceded that the "extraordinary conditions that existed at the time of Katzenbach are,
of course, not the conditions that exist today.. .". Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 319
(testimony of Ruth Hinerfeld). The subsequent change in the proposed extension from in-
perpetuity to twenty-five years did not significantly alter the constitutional argument in
Hatch's view. See Senate Report, supra note 246, at 102; contra id. at 61-62 (defense of con-
stitutionality of section 5 as proposed either by House bill or Senate bill as introduced).
See also supra note 117.
21 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1085-87.
Id. at 1087. See id. at 1704-705 (exchange between Senator Hatch and Assistant At-
torney General Reynolds).
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Apart from the Attorney General who had testified on the opening
day of hearings, perhaps the most politically significant witness to ap-
pear before the Subcommittee was Assistant Attorney General Reynolds.
He appeared on March 1 as the only non-congressional -witness during
the final of nine days of hearings. In response to a question concerning
whether the bailout criteria were "reasonable," Reynolds replied that he
did "not see much prospect in the near future for many jurisdictions to
bail out under the standards that the House proposed."3"3 The principle
focus of Reynolds' testimony, however, was section 2.11 He reiterated the
observations made by the Attorney General during his earlier appearance
that the proposed change would be a "dramatic" one that likely could lead
to proportional representation by race." Reynolds specifically identified
several major cities that could be vulnerable under the new standard.
Among these were Pittsburgh, Hartford, Wilmington, and Kansas City
(Kansas)."8 Not coincidentally, three of the four cities were represented
by members on the Judiciary Committee who possibly were perceived
at the time as members who could be persuaded to support retention of
the intent standard in section 2.3"7
When the Subcommittee Report was subsequently published, it went
well beyond Reynolds' testimony in describing several additional com-
munities as possible objects of section 2 litigation under a results stan-
dard. In addition to the communities mentioned by Reynolds, the Report
added Anchorage, Baltimore, Birmingham, Boston, Cincinnati, Dover, Fort
Lauderdale, New York, Norfolk, San Diego, Savannah, and Waterbury.' 8
Although critics of the House proposals engaged in extensive efforts
I Id. at 1707. Cf. Letter from Armand Derfner to Senator Orrin Hatch (March 8, 1982),
reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 830-31.
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1659-63.
= Id. at 1664.
Id. at 1661-62. Contra Senate Report, supra note 246, at 34-35.
Senator Arlen Specter represented Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Senator Joseph Biden
represented Wilmington, Delaware, and Senator Robert Dole represented Kansas City,
Kansas.
"' Senate Report, supra note 246, at 154-57 (Subcommittee Report at 48-52). A typical
description would read as follows:
Cincinnati, Ohio
The Cincinnati City Council is composed of nine members elected at-large. One
member of the council is a member of a minority group (11.1%). The minority
population of Cincinnati is at least 33 percent. This lack of proportionality and
the at-large electoral practices, when weighed in light of the history of segregated
schools in Cincinnati (according to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights), will likely
result in restructuring of the system for electing members of the City Council.
Id. at 155. Contra Senate Report, supra note 246, at 34-35. In addition to listing municipalities
that it believed to be vulnerable under the proposed 5 2 results test, the Subcommittee
Report also listed entire states that it believed could be subject to litigation. Id. at 152-54
(Subcommittee Report at 46-48). This latter analysis was predicated upon the absence of
proportional representation in one or both houses of the state legislature, and the concur-
rent existence of one or more of four listed "objective factors" of discrimination. Id. at
153-54 (Subcommittee Report at 48).
1983] 1409
1410 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
to make the section 2 changes more concrete for the average Senator by
attempting to predict the impact upon particular communities, Senators
from the affected jurisdictions expressed little concern.09 Most members
of the full committee felt that Reynolds' allegations, as well as those of
the Subcommittee Report, "were inconsistent with how the results test
operates, and ignored the track record of cases decided under the results
test."310 Implicit in these views was the fundamental disagreement as to
whether the new test represented a restatement of the law reversed by
Mobile or an entirely new standard."'
The Assistant Attorney General's appearance, as well as that of At-
torney General Smith, was marked by discord between the Administra-
tion and members of the Committee. Reynolds was involved in a dispute
with a member of the Subcommittee, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont,
about whether his testimony on the meaning of the intent test was con-
sistent with a brief recently filed by the Department of Justice in a related
civil rights matter.2 Shortly thereafter, Reynolds also tangled with
Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania on the significance of the Edgefield
County case in relation to his proposition that Mobile had not altered
longstanding interpretations of the law with respect to section 2."11
Concluding the March 1 hearing, as well as the entire sequence of
hearings on Voting Rights Act Amendments, Senator Hatch reaffirmed
his commitment to the idea of nondiscrimination and perhaps in anticipa-
tion of forthcoming legislative events, remarked that:
Whatever the outcome of this debate, I personally hope that we
will be able to say a decade from now that we did what was right;
I personally hope that we will not have to say a decade from now
that no one really appreciated at the time what section 2 was all
about." 4
With the completion of hearings, the three Republican members of
the Subcommittee were confronted with the decision of what measure
' The three Senators, for example, toward whom Assistant Attorney General Reynolds
had targeted his testimony, (supra note 307) all ultimately were supporters of the results
test, although Senator Dole eventually proposed an alteration of the House language. See
infra text accompanying notes 334-40.
3"' Senate Report, supra note 246, at 34. "Specifically, the Committee finds that the
analysis used by the Assistant Attorney General and the Subcommittee were inconsistent
with how the results test operates, and ignored the track record of cases decided under
the results test discussed above." Id.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 23944.
312 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1677-79. The dispute related to briefs filed by
the Department of Justice in the context of school desegregation suits in State of Washington
v. Seattle School District No. 1, 50 U.S.L.W. 4998 (1982), and Crawford v. Board of Education
of City of Los Angeles, 50 U.S.L.W. 5016 (March 22, 1982), concerning what constituted rele-
vant evidence in proving de jure discrimination in these communities.
313 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1683-86.
3" Id. at 1850.
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they should report to the full Committee. While general agreement seemed
to exist on the defects in the House bill, a keen awareness also was pres-
ent of the political difficulties that awaited any attempt they made to
deviate from the House bill. The legislative vehicle approved by the Sub-
committee inevitably would serve as the principle alternative at full Com-
mittee. This reality served to shape the final Subcommittee product.
On March 24, Senator Hatch convened the Subcommittee for the pur-
pose of reporting a bill. With Hatch, Thurmond, and Grassley comprising
a majority of the Subcommittee, there was little doubt that critics of the
House bill would prevail. Any suspense stemmed from uncertainty over
which alternative the Subcommittee would propose.
Opening the session, Senator Hatch proceeded once again to detail
his concerns over the results test in S. 1992. A listing of statements by
academics and others on the dangers of the new test followed. 15 He then
warned that:
[T]he results test is going to effect a transformation in civil rights
policy in this country that few, if any, of us can predict if it is
enacted. It will be a country in which considerations of race and
ethnicity intrude into each and every public policy decision. Rather
than continuing to move toward a constitutional color-blind soci-
ety, we will be moving toward a totally color-conscious society.16
The ranking Democrat, Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona, then
expressed his support for S. 1992, while commending Senator Hatch."1
At the same time, DeConcini commended Senator Hatch for offering all
viewpoints a "full and fair opportunity to be heard."3 8 Suggesting the ex-
tent to which the hearings had focused the debate on the section 2 issue, he
further noted that:
Many questions have been raised regarding the propriety of por-
tions of this bill, especially section 2. Proponents of the bill,
however, have answered each of these questions to my satisfaction.
I am confident as I prepare to vote for S. 1992 that the results
test embodied therein will not lead to a requirement of proportional
representation by race in State and local governments not to any
of the other dire consequences suggested by the bill's opponents."9
Finally, addressing something that had generally been obscured in
the public debate, Senator DeConcini observed that "perhaps the most
important observation regarding these hearings ... is the uniform expres-
315 See Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at Vol. II, 1-12 (Subcommittee executive ses-
sion); id. at Vol. H, 2-4 (listing of statements on alleged dangers of new test).
316 Id. at Vol. II, 4.
Id. at Vol. II, 4-5.
118 Id. at Vol. II, 5.
119 Id.
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sion of support by virtually every witness and by every Senator for the
idea of equality in voting rights."' 20 This point was one that critics of H.R.
3112 had been making since the outset of the Senate debate, though
without visible success. The central issue was not whether to extend the
Act, or whether to provide equal access for all persons to the voting pro-
cess, but related to the merit of the specific provisions of S. 1992 and
H.R. 3112.
Following a decision to mark-up S. 1992,321 the Subcommittee voted
along party lines to approve a bloc of amendments offered by Senator
Grassley. These amendments struck the text of S. 1992 in its entirety
and substituted instead a straight ten-year extension of existing law, in-
cluding the retention of the seventeen-year old language of section 2.1'
The Grassley preclearance extension, although not permanent, represented
the longest extension of the Act in its history. Without debate, the Sub-
committee unanimously voted to report S. 1992, as amended, to the full
Committee.2 The decision was immediately described by civil rights
leaders as one that would "severely jeopardize the voting rights of millions"
of blacks and other minorities.
3
1
Chairman Hatch then did something unusual. He indicated that he
intended to issue a formal Subcommittee report to accompany the bill
to full Committee. This was an extremely rare action since formal bill
reports normally were prepared only subsequent to final full committee
consideration. In an apparent attempt to consolidate his position and plead
his case prior to full Committee action, Hatch promised the report, allow-
ing the Democrats time to prepare and submit "additional views." On April
2, the Subcommittee report was printed and immediately distributed."
C. The Full Committee
During a thirty day hiatus between Subcommittee and full Commit-
tee action, intensive lobbying and negotiations took place within the
Id.
' Id. at 7-8. The decision to mark-up S.1992 rather than Senator Grassley's S.1975
was largely influenced by a desire to make it easier for some of the 63 co-sponsors of S.
1992 to respond favorably to the Subcommittee substitute. Id. at 10-11. Substantial con-
sideration was given, as well, to the parliamentary implications of anticipated full commit-
tee efforts to reverse any Subcommittee action and restore the original text of S. 1992.
Id. at 10-12.
Id. at 6, 8. The subcommittee-adopted amendments also proposed to conform the
bilingual ballot provisions of § 203 with the preclearance provisions of §§ 4 and 5. Id. At
the same time that he offered his substitute, Grassley made clear his continued interest
in attempting to find some further middle ground on the S 2 issue. Id. at 7. His substitute
was being proferred with "the understanding that I will continue to seek the reconciliation
which I have mentioned and reserving the right to modify my vote in the future." Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 10.
3 Washington Post, Mar. 24, 1982, S A, at 5 (entitled, White House Wins Round in
Voting Rights Act Fight).
See supra note 255. In addition to the Majority Views of the Subcommittee, short
Additional Views were filed by Senator DeConcini and Senator Leahy. Id. at 82.
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Judiciary Committee, much as it had in the House, between members and
staff of the Committee and outside organizations, notably the Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights. The Administration and the leadership of the
Judiciary Committee had faced an uphill legislative battle ever since the
announcement of sixty-one Senate co-sponsors 28 had been made in late
December. While they had not obtained a remarkably improved position
in the depth of their Senate support, the critics of S. 1992 nevertheless
clearly had achieved several objectives.
First, the Subcommittee hearings had succeeded in establishing the
section 2 issue as the central element in the Senate debate, a reversal
of the priorities in the House27 Second, they had succeeded in clarifying
that the specific concern over the House amendments to section 2 involved
the alleged inevitability of proportional representation. 28 The original
tendency on the part of proponents of H.R. 3112 had been to ignore
criticism of section 2, as amended. By the time hearings drew to a close,
however, the proponents of H.R. 3112 echoed their own opposition to pro-
portional representation.' Lastly, the hearings had demonstrated that
those who were opposing straight extension of the law were supporters,
not critics, of H.R. 3112 and S. 1992.'o
In brief, the Subcommittee hearings had succeeded in slowing down
some of the momentum which had been generated by final House approval
of H.R. 3112. In addition, another original objective, the enlistment of ac-
tive Administration support, had also been achieved. Both Attorney
General Smith and Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Reynolds
I See supra note 193. The number of Senate co-sponsors stood at 65 following subcom-
mittee mark-up with the addition of Republican Senators Harrison Schmitt (NM); Mack
Mattingly (Ga.); Frank Murkowski (Alaska); and Richard Lugar (Ind.). Id.
I See, e.g., Advocates of Election Rights Say It's Election Results That Matter, NAT'L.
J. 592 (Apr. 3, 1982) ("Whether to approve the House passed language on the results test
has become the dominant issue in the Senate Judiciary Committee."); Intent a Key Issue
in Voting Rights Debate, CONG. Q. 42 (1982; N. Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1982, SA, at 10 (entitled,
Top Justice Officials Join Battle on Voting Rights, "Senator Orrin Hatch, Republican of Utah
and Justice Department officials have succeeded in their effort to focus the Senate hear-
ings on the question of whether blacks and Hispanic Americans must prove intentional
discrimination.. ."). Also active in legislative efforts by the Justice Department was Robert
A. McConnell Assistant Attorney General for Congressional Affairs.
' See, e.g., Wall St. J., May 5, 1982, at 30 (entitled, Voting Rights Imbroglio); NAT'L.
J., 592-94 (Apr. 3, 1982).
See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 5 (statement of Senator DeConcini at
Subcommittee executive session on March 24, "I am confident ... that the results test
embodied [in S.1992] will not lead to proportional representation by race in State and local
governments .• ."); Washington Post, Mar. 20, 1982, § A, at 16, (entitled, Who Wants Quotas,
"No one-not even the most ardent of the bill's supporters-wants [quotas in electoral politics]
... Supporters of the bill should take whatever steps are necessary to reassure undecided
Senators that they could not occur.").
' The opposition by the civil rights community and their supporters in the Senate
to the simple ten-year extension of the existing Act approved by the Subcommittee clarified
this issue somewhat. See Smith, Voting Rights Act: Extend It as It Is, Washington Post,
Mar. 29, 1982, § A, at 11. Contra Letter from Congressman Peter Rodino, Chairman, House
Committee on the Judiciary to the Editor, Washington Post, Apr. 5, 1982, S A, at 14.
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had undertaken extensive efforts to educate members and journalists to
their view that the results test was flawed and should be rejected."
Several areas, however, existed in which the critics had not been suc-
cessful. They had been unable to generate any significant outside organiza-
tional support for their position. Groups that might have been otherwise
expected to be receptive to their arguments, such as the National Con-
ference of State Legislatures, the National Association of Counties, or
the United States Conference of Mayors, actually endorsed H.R. 3112. 2
As final Committee action approached, a general feeling seemed to exist
among members of the Committee that they wished to remain supportive
of the mass of outside organizations lobbying for the House version, while
at the same time responding to the potentially explosive issue of propor-
tional representation and electoral quotas.33
On April 24, Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, one of the few remain-
ing undecided members of the Committee, accorded them this opportun-
ity by proposing a compromise on both sections 2 and 5 that was designed
to reconcile the two competing viewpoints on the Committee. For-
mulated in coordination with representatives of the Leadership Conference,
the new language on section 2 proposed to retain the results language
33 Immediately following Subcommittee action, the Attorney General wrote in the New
York Times that:
Unfortunately, there have been disturbing efforts to derail the dispassionate
consideration by branding anyone who does not support a bill recently passed
by the House of Representatives as opposed to the Voting Rights Act itself. The
House bill, however, is not the Voting Rights Act but something very different
.... The Administration wholeheartedly supports a ten-year extension of the Voting
Rights Act in its present form .... It should be extended as is.
Smith, The Voting Rights Act, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1982, SA, at 23. See supra note 330.
See Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at Vol. II, 217 (National League of Cities); id.
at 380 (National Conference of State Legislatures). Unpublished letter from John J. Gun-
ther, Executive Director, United States Conference of Mayors, to Members of the Senate
(March 24, 1982) (urging approval of S. 1992 as introduced "without change"); see also Voting
Right, NAT'L. J. 77 (Jan. 9, 1982) (lack of outside group opposition to House bill). Despite the
efforts of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, debate over the House version of the Voting
Rights Act increasingly had taken on the tone of a "good government" issue on which a
wide variety of organizations with little direct interest in civil rights announced their for-
mal positions. In addition to the 165 organizations belonging to the Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights (including the National Association of Market Developers, the National
Association of Real Estate Brokers, and the National Funeral Directors Association), con-
spicuous support was lent to the House version by such organizations as the Health In-
surance Association of America (Letter to Senators, May 21, 1982), and such corporate enter-
prises as Aetna Life & Casualty, Atlantic Richfield Co., Exxon Corporation, and RCA Corp.
Washington Post, May 20, 1982, S A, at 28 (advertisement) See 128 CONG. REC. S7123-28
(daily ed. June 18, 1982).
" See N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1982. Senator Robert Dole, for example, one of the critical
undecided members of the Judiciary Committee indicated his opposition to the Subcommit-
tee bill as "too restrictive." Id. "I share the view of the civil rights community that in
some voting cases, it is hard t3 prove intent." Id. Dole also observed, however, that the
House measure and its results test could be made "a little more precise" and that he would
like to state more directly that "it does not condone proportional representation by race." Id.
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of H.R. 3112, but to append a new subsection attempting to describe its
parameters in greater detail:
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading
to nomination or election in the state or political subdivision are
not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less oppor-
tunity to participate in the electoral process and to elect represen-
tatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivi-
sion is one "circumstance" which may be considered provided that
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in
the population.'
The new language in section 5 established a twenty-five year extension
period for the preclearance requirement of covered jurisdictions rather
than the permanent extension provided for by the House.' 5
Since Senator Dole was in a politically critical position in the center
of the Committee, the proposed compromise effectively resolved any re-
maining doubts about the fate of the Voting Rights Act in the Senate
and in the entire Congress. With eighteen members of the Judiciary Com-
mittee, ten Republicans and eight Democrats, the support of nine members
was necessary to retain the Subcommittee amendments to S. 1992. The
support of ten members was necessary to restore the original language
of S. 1992 or undertake other changes. Nine Committee members, two
Republicans and seven Democrats, were already listed as co-sponsors of
S. 1992 as introduced, with seven inclined to support the Subcommittee
version." Publically, only Senator Dole and Senator Howell Heflin of
Alabama had remained uncommitted.
33
1
Since the Dole compromise had been coordinated with leaders of the
civil rights community, it carried with it the support of the original spon-
sors of S. 1992, Senators Kennedy and Mathias. In addition, the Dole com-
promise attracted the support of each of the other Committee co-sponsors
as well as Senator Heflin.s Faced with this show of bipartisan support,
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1976). The compromise was ultimately reflected in S 3(b) of
the Voting Rights Act Amendments. Id.
42 U.S.C. 1973c(8). In addition, Congress was charged with "reconsidering" the pro-
visions of the new bailout at the end of fifteen years (in August, 1997). 42 U.S.C. 1973c(7) (1976).
N.Y. Times, Apr. 28,1982, § A, at 25 (entitled, Panel Delays Action on Voting Rights
as Compromise is Sought); CONG. Q. 1017 (1982).
Id.; see CONG. Q. 1503 (1982).
The hopes of critics of the results test that Senator Heflin might support their posi-
tion had been heightened shortly prior to the full Committee vote when an Alabama District
Court on remand from the Supreme Court had identified Fifteenth Amendment and § 2
violations in Mobile, Alabama under the intent test articulated by the Court in City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). See Bolden v. City of Mobile, Civ. Action No. 75-297-P (S.D.
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several Republican conservatives who had been leaning toward the Sub-
committee version rather than the original also opted for the compromise.
On May 3, one day before the Judiciary Committee was finally to con-
sider S. 1992, the Administration, unsuccessful in brokering alternative
compromises, also joined in support of the compromise. President Reagan
announced then that "the compromise would greatly strengthen the
safeguards against proportional representation while also protecting the
basic right to vote."34' Attorney General Smith and Assistant Attorney
General Reynolds followed with similar statements.
The Dole proposal effectively supplied a political resolution to misgiv-
ings about section 2. It did not, however, put to rest the considerable
confusion over what the compromise ultimately was intended to mean.
During most of the remaining debate in the Senate, each side attempted
to explain the reach of the Dole provision. When the full Committee com-
menced debate on the extension on April 28, Senator Dole explained the
purpose of his language in the following manner:
Ala. 1982); Brown v. Board of Commissioners, Civ. Action No. 75-298-P (S.D. Ala. 1982).
An Eighth Circuit decision was handed down several days later also identifying a violation
of the Fifteenth Amendment under the intent standard. Perkins v. City of West Helena,
81-1516 (8th Cir. 1982). Senator Hatch observed that opponents of the intent standard were
more likely to characterize the standard as "unacceptably difficult" following these cases
rather than "impossible" as they earlier had. See Senate Report, supra note 246, at 98 n. 10.
I The conservatives included most prominently Senator Grassley, the formal sponsor
of the Subcommittee version of S.1992, as well as Senator Alan Simpson (R-Wy.). Although
Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.) subsequently joined in support of the compromise at full Com-
mittee, he never joined as a co-sponsor and indeed authored Additional Views in the final
Committee report that were sharply at variance with the Majority Views. Senate Report,
supra note 246, at 188-92.
" N.Y. Times, May 4, 1982, S A, at 1 (entitled, President Backs Bipartisan Plan on
Voting Law); Washington Post, May 6, 1982, SA, at 3 (entitled, Administration in Mighty
Effort to Avoid Offense on Civil Rights.) During the period between the Subcommittee and
full Committee mark-ups, a large number of proposed compromises either had been cir-
culated or discussed seriously by the members and staff of the Judiciary Committee. Among
the alternative compromise solutions circulated were those (a) establishing bifurcated stan-
dards of identifying violations of the Act depending upon whether an alleged violation related
to "access" to the electoral process (i.e. registration and voting), or to the "structure" of
the process (e.g. "at-large" systems and redistricting), the former would have been judged
by a results standard and the latter by an intent standard; (b) stating explicitly that courts,
utilizing an intent standard, were empowered to consider the "totality of circumstances"
available in evidence and listing illustrative factors; and (c) establishing as an "affirmative
defense" that an action giving rise to a presumptive violation under a results standard
was not undertaken with any discriminatory purpose or objective. With virtually all of
the Committee sponsors of S. 1992 apparently disinclined to support anything other then
the original unamended version, Senators Dole and Heflin were the principal objects of
negotiating efforts to fashion a S 2 compromise. See CONG. Q. 1042 (1982) (Senator Dole's
role in achieving his compromise). Dole was particularly influenced, as were White House
officials, by his wife, Elizabeth, then White House Special Assistant for Public Liason and
currently Secretary of Transportation. See Pinderhughes Paper, supra note 22, at 15.
"I Washington Post, May 4, 1982, at S A at 1 (entitled, Senators Agree on Voting A ct).
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Proponents of the results standard in the Mathias/Kennedy bill
persuasively argue that intentional discrimination is too difficult
to prove to make enforcement of the law effective. Perhaps, more
importantly, they have asked if the right to exercise a franchise
has been denied or abridged, why should plaintiffs have to prove
that the deprivation of this fundamental right was intentional. On
the other hand, many on the Committee have expressed legitimate
concerns that a results standard could be interpreted by the courts
to mandate proportional representation .... The supporters of
this compromise believe that a voting practice or procedure which
is discriminatory in result should not be allowed to stand
regardless of whether there exists a discriminatory purpose or
intent .... However, we also feel that the legislation should be
strengthened with additional language delineating what legal stan-
dard should apply under the results test and clarifying that it is
not a mandate for proportional representation. Thus, our com-
promise adds a new subsection to section 2 which codifies language
from the 1973 Supreme Court decision of White v. Regester.3 42
The compromise was met with sharp criticism from Senator Hatch,
who recognized that the Dole provision inevitably would replace the Sub-
committee language. He raised a number of points designed to demonstrate
that the Dole compromise was largely an "illusory" one, and that the im-
pact of the provision was not likely to be different from the unamended
House provision." Hatch made the following points with regard to the
compromise: (1) the emphasis upon the totality of circumstances
perpetuated the confusion that proponents of the results test had
generated between the scope of the permissible evidence and the stan-
dard by which such evidence would be evaluated in a court;,4 (2) in Hatch's
view, no "core value" existed by which a results test could judge
discriminatory conduct other than by a proportional representation
analysis, and nothing in the compromise language established any
alternative;"5 (3) the compromise also perpetuated confusion between pro-
portional representation as a right and proportional representation as a
remedy; 6 (4) as with the original results language, the flaw was not with
an inadequately strong disclaimer of proportional representation, but with
the central notion itself of a results test;- 7 (5) the concept of an "equally
open" system did nothing to address the problem of legislative guidance
to the courts; 8 and (6) the concept of "protected groups" within the
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at Vol. H, 59-60.





u' Id. at 72-73.
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language of the compromise was inconsistent with the Act's original in-
tent to protect the right of individuals, not groups, to cast their votes.u9
Immediately prior to final Judiciary Committee consideration of
amendments to the Subcommitte bill, Hatch engaged Dole in a series of
questions designed further to draw out Dole's intent in developing the
compromise language.350 (1) In response to a question inquiring whether
he agreed with the House sponsors of H.R.3112 on the identity of the
effects test in section 5 and the results test in section 2, Senator Dole
stated that the test in section 5 was "different" from the results test of
section 2.351 Senator Dole emphasized that "access" and "whether or not
the system is open" were at the heart of his change to section 2.352 (2)
In response to a question inquiring whether Senator Dole agreed with
former Assistant Attorney General Drew Days that predominantly black
neighborhoods would be immune from partisan gerrymandering under the
new section, Dole replied that he did not agree.3 1 (3) When Hatch asked
about the relationship between Dole's compromise and the White v.
Regester test, Senator Dole said that the compromise carried forth the
White v. Regester test. He argued that the White v. Regester test did not
require proportional representation nor did it invalidate at-large election
systems. Dole subsequently reiterated that the existence of an at-large
system would not, in and of itself, give rise to a violation in circumstances
where there would not otherwise have been a violation. 5 ' (4) Finally, in
probably the most ambiguous exchange between the two, Senator Dole
was asked whether the compromise was designed to preclude courts from
imposing proportional representation as a remedy for a section 2 viola-
tion. After first responding that the compromise did not so prohibit a
11 Id. at 73. Hatch also felt that the Dole proposal perpetuated the constitutional defects
of both §§ 2 and 5. Senate Report, supra note 246, at 101-102; contra id. at 39-43.
Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at Vol. II, 79-82.
' Id. at 80. Considerable confusion on this point is evidenced by the fact that most
witnesses who addressed this issue during the House hearings argued that the results test
of S 2 and the effects test of § 5 were similar or identical, while the opposite tact was
taken during Senate Hearings. There are illustrations of posture taken by proponents of
the revised § 2 in the House. See House Hearings, supra note 61, at 229 (testimony of State
Senator Julian Bond of Georgia, "I urge you to make your intentions that relate to that
provision perfectly clear by adopting the effects standard in section 2 . . ."); id. at 369
(testimony of Mayor Henry Marsh, Richmond, Virginia); id. at 1772 (testimony of Dr. Arthur
Fleming, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights). There are several illustrations of
the new posture of the civil rights leadership at Senate hearings. See Senate Hearings, supra
note 92, at 1254 (testimony of Julius Chambers, Executive Director, NAACP Legal Defense
Fund). Counsel: "What is the relationship between the results test in section 2 and the
effects test in section 5?" Chambers: "They are not the same test .... Id. at 1443 (testimony
of Professor Archibald Cox, Harvard Law School).
32 Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at Vol. II, 80.
Id. Cf. Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 1376-77 (Professor Days); id. at 1255-56
(Julius Chambers). The Days-Chambers interpretation of S 2 would seem to impose a direct
legal obligation upon redistricting authorities to maximize the influence of minority vote.
' Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at Vol. II, 81.
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iourt,355 Dole stated that such concerns were unwarranted because "[i]t
is a well established legal principle that remedies must be commensurate
with the violation established." '
On May 4, following three days of debate interspersed with statements
of support and criticism for the proposed compromise, the Judiciary Com-
mittee finally prepared to consider amendments. The first of the amend-
ments, the Dole compromise, was approved by a vote of fourteen to four.
All four negative votes were cast by the Committee's conservative
faction.m A series of amendments were then offered by Senator John East
of North Carolina, one of the four opponents of the Dole compromise."
8
S Id.
Id. See 128 CONG. REC. S6962 (daily ed. June 17,1982) (exchange between Senator Dole
and Senator Thurmond on Senate floor on meaning of the compromise); 128 CONG. REC.
S7119-20 (daily ed. June 18, 1982) (exchange between Dole and Senator Slade Gorton of
Washington).
Voting in opposition to the compromise (and effectively in support of the Subcom-
mittee proposal) were Senators Thurmond, Hatch, John East of North Carolina, and Jeremiah
Denton of Alabama. Shortly prior to offering his compromise, Senator Dole agreed to incor-
porate language proposed by Senator Metzenbaum that added a new 5 208 to the Voting
Rights Act: "Any voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability,
or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter's choice,
other than the voter's employer or agent of that employer." This amendment was prompted
by concerns raised by the National Federation of the Blind. Senate Hearings, supra note
92, at Vol. H, 64-66. The language was subsequently modified by an amendment from Senator
East. See infra note 358, 42 U.S.C. 51973aa-6 (1982).
' Senate Hearings, supra note 92, at 86. The following amendments were offered by
Senator East and rejected by the Judiciary Committee: (1) An amendment to eliminate
illiteracy as a basis for allowing polling booth assistance to be given a voter (defeated 5-13).
Id. (2) An amendment to substitute a new bailout provision in S 5 which would permit bailout
in the event that a jurisdiction had not, for the previous five years, been in violation of
the Constitution or the laws of the United States involving voting rights, except for viola-
tions which were "trivial, promptly corrected, and not repeated" (defeated 6-12). Id. at 94.
(3) An amendment stating that at-large elections do not violate the results standard in the
new § 2 (defeated 5-13). Id. at 97. (4) An amendment adding "sex" as a suspect factor under
the Voting Rights Act (defeated 2-16). Id. at 105. (6) An amendment to shift the burden
of proof to the Attorney General, not the covered jurisdiction, in establishing that a S 5
submission is in violation of the Act (defeated 6-12). Id. at 106. (7) An amendment to eliminate
the exclusivity of venue for preclearance cases in the District Court for the District of
Columbia (defeated 6-12). Id. at 109. The issue of venue was one that was subject to relatively
little discussion during the Senate hearings. But see id. at 1173-74 (testimony of Dr. Arthur
Fleming, Chairman, U.S. Commission of Civil Rights); id. at 125 (statement of the Former
Attorney General of the United States, Griffin Bell, "It is a departure from the equal pro-
tection of the law and a disparagement which stigmatized judges in the regions covered
by the Act to require that relief be sought only from judges in the District of Columbia.").
(8) An amendment to concentrate the venue in all § 2 cases, as well as S 5 cases, in the
District Court for the District of Columbia (defeated 4-14). Id. at 111. (9) An amendment
to extend the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act on a nationwide basis
(defeated 5-13). Id. at 115. The only amendment offered successfully by Senator East clarified
that the polling assistance to be offered handicapped or illiterate individuals was not to
be provided by "an officer or agent of the voter's union," in addition to the voter's employer.
This amendment was approved 9-7. Id. at 92; see Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Amend-
ments, 42 U.S.C. 1973aa-6 (1982Y, supra note 357.
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By this time, both of the major critics of the House measure, as well as
of the Dole language measure, Senators Hatch and Thurmond, conceded
that, with an excess of seventy co-sponsors, there was no longer any ques-
tion that the compromise would be approved overwhelmingly by bipar-
tisan majorities on the Senate Floor.
Finally, in mid-afternoon on May 4, the Committee voted seventeen
to one to report S. 1992, as amended by Senator Dole, to the full Senate.
Only Senator East, calling it a "slap in the face to the South," voted against
the bill."9 Both Hatch and Thurmond reiterated their fears about the
language of the Dole compromise, but nevertheless indicated that they
supported the overall objectives of the Act and did not wish to cast a
vote which could be misinterpreted as opposition to the Act itself. Hatch
predicted the measure would pass overwhelmingly on the floor and in-
dicated his unwillingness to join in any proposed filibuster. 60
On May 25, a final report was issued on the Committee version of
S. 1992.361 The Committee views filed by Senator Mathias described the
measure as "one of the most significant issues to come before this
Congress""36 and detailed at considerable length the arguments in behalf
of the changes to sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. An unusually
large number of "Additional Views" followed from Senators who were
formally part of the Committee majority: Thurmond, Hatch, Laxalt, Dole,
Grassley, and Denton. 3 Senator East filed "Minority Views." While the
full range of views about S. 1992 was expressed by one or more Senators
in this Report, most noteworthy was its length364 and the extent to which
the Report seemed to be directed, not toward Senators, but toward federal
judges who almost certainly would be called upon in the future to inter-
pret the language of the new proposal. 65
' CONG. Q. 1043 (1982)
m N.Y. Times, May 5, 1982, S A, at 5 (entitled, Voting Law Compromise Clears Senate
Panel).
' See supra note 246.
Senate Report, supra note 246, at 1.
Id. at 88, et. seq. Probably the most novel of these Additional Views came from Senator
Laxalt, id. at 188-92, and posited what he called an "objective design" standard. According
to Laxalt, this standard "looks to the 'totality of circumstances' surrounding a voting prac-
tice, including the impact of that practice, to determine if a reasonable observer could con-
clude that the practice results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account
of race." Id. at 190. The "objective design" standard, which Laxalt likened in some respects
to the standard set forth by Justice Stevens in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83
(1980) was explicitly rejected in the Majority Views of the Senate Report. Senate Report,
supra note 246, at 28 n. 11.
I' While the 239 page length of the Senate Report was far longer than the average
Senate report, on even highly controversial legislation, it was by no means an unprece-
dently long report. Most remarkable about its length, however, was that it related entirely
to a legislative measure of less than ten pages. Most Senate reports that have been lengthier
than S. Rep. 97-417 have related to far lengthier legislative proposals. For sheer volume
of legislative analysis, as opposed to simple legislative description, probably few Senate
reports have been as detailed than this one.
"I See, e.g., Senate Report, supra note 246, at 104 n.24 (Additional Views of Senator
Hatch); id. at 193-96 (Additional Views of Senator Dole); id. at 12 n. 31 (Majority Views sub-
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D. The Floor
Two weeks after S. 1992, as amended, was reported by the Judiciary
Committee and placed on the Senate Calendar, debate began on the floor
of the Senate. By June 9, the number of Senate co-sponsors had swelled
to seventy-seven. Despite a half-hearted filibuster led by North Carolina
Senators East and Helms, action on the Senate floor was largely anti-
climactic. Both Thurmond and Hatch had supported final Committee
passage of S. 1992 and now largely occupied themselves reiterating their
concerns as part of the legislative and historical records.6 Despite his
apprehensions, Hatch served as the floor manager for the Voting Rights
Amendments on the Republican side of the debate while Senator Ken-
nedy served as the Democratic floor manager. 8 '
Senator Helms, who had indicated several days earlier his intention
to filibuster the amendments "until the cows come home," '68 led off the
debate by suggesting that he saw "no urgency to move" to consider the
legislation. 9 Emphasizing what he viewed as a misunderstanding that
the Voting Rights Act was due to expire on August 6, Helms suggested
that there were "priority" legislative issues that first ought to be con-
sidered by the Senate.7 0 Helms focused on the fact that portions of his
State of North Carolina would continue to be subject to the preclearance
requirements of the Act despite an absence of a finding of voting rights
mitted by Senator Mathias). Senator Mathias stated that "it is intended that a section 5
objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section
2." Id. at 12 n. 31. Nothing is present in the hearings of either the House or Senate that
would suggest that changes to S 5 were ever considered by the Judiciary Committees of
either body or that this statement reflected the stated position of any member. In fact,
the following exchange between Congressmen Edwards and Elliot Levites of Georgia, dur-
ing final House consideration of the Senate amendments to H.R. 3112, reinforces this view.
Levites: [I inquire of] the gentleman from California whether there is any portion of this
legislation that changes S 5 of the Act... or changes the tests contained therein. Edwards:
No change was made. 128 CoNG. REC. H 3844 (daily ed. June 23, 1982). Cf. City of Lockhart
(Tex.) v. United States, 51 U.S.L.W. 4189 (Feb. 23, 1983).
1 See 128 CONG. REC. S6502-52 (daily ed. June 9,1982) (remarks of Senator Orrin Hatch);
128 CONG. REC. S 6944-48 (daily ed. June 17,1982) (remarks of Senator Strom Thurmond). One
of the most dramatic exchanges during the floor debate occurred between Senator Thur-
mond and his colleague from South Carolina, Senator Ernest Hollings, regarding the recent
history of treatment of minorities in the voting process in their state. Much, but not all,
of the flavor of this debate is lost to the reader of the record as a result of substantial
editing of the floor statements. 128 CONG. REC. S 6861-69 (daily ed. June 16, 1982); id. at
S 6924-26; 128 CONG. REC. S 6948-56 (daily ed. June 17,1982).
16 See 128 CoNG. REC. S6553 (daily ed. June 9, 1982) (remarks of Senator Robert Dole).
Following the adoption of the motion to proceed with S.1992 (see infra text accompanying
notes 374-75), Senator Mathias was asked by Hatch to take on this responsibility for the
remainder of the debate.
I Washington Post, June 10, 1982, S A, at 12 (entitled, Helms Threatens to Stall Voting
Rights Act). Helms also threatened to introduce a variety of "non-germane" floor amend-
ments on such issues as abortion, a threat that privately divided even the anti-abortion
community.
' 128 CONG. RFc. S6501 (daily ed. June 9, 1982).
370 Id.
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discrimination for the seventeen years since 1965. In Helms' judgement,
continued preclearance would result in the treatment of North Carolinians
as "second class" citizens.71
Following a lengthy opening statement by Senator Hatch, a
"4unanimous consent" agreement was reached that a vote would be held
on the following Tuesday, June 15, on a cloture motion to terminate debate
on the initial procedural motion to consider S. 1992.372 Despite the North
Carolina Senators' protests that they did not intend to obstruct or delay
consideration of the measure, but simply to engage in "deliberative discus-
sion," the unanimous consent agreement was clearly aimed at ensuring
that such discussion did not turn into a filibuster."3 On June 14, a cloture
petition was filed on the motion to consider S. 1992, containing the
signatures of the requisite eighteen Senators, including thirteen Republican
members.' By a vote of eighty-six to eight the following day,375 the Senate
approved terminating the initial procedural debate and moved toward for-
mal consideration of the amendments.
The three Senators who had played leading roles in Committee, Dole,
Hatch, and Kennedy, continued to focus on fine descriptions regarding
the meaning of the new section 2 provision, in attempts to influence future
judicial interpretations. 7 Dole continued to emphasize his understanding
that the test incorporated the standard of White v. Regester, with par-
ticular emphasis on whether the political processes are "equally open,"
Hatch, meanwhile, continued his argument that the new test did not ef-
fectively achieve Dole's desired objectives, but stressed that the com-
promise was incorporated into the Act in direct response to concerns about
proportional representation. Kennedy repeatedly emphasized that the
result test had been the traditional test employed by federal courts prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Mobile.
On June 17, the Senate considered amendments. With few exceptions,
the amendments were offered without serious prospects of success. In-
dividual Senators primarily wished to articulate their concerns about the
Judiciary Committee measure. 77
" Id. North Carolina was not covered as a state, but did have a higher portion of
its counties covered than did any "non-covered" state.
11 128 CONG. REC. S6558 (daily ed. June 9,1982). Senators Helms and East did not object
to the unanimous consent agreement in the apparent realization that an earlier cloture
vote could be forced upon them regardless of their own desires. Id.
" See, e.g., 128 CONG. REC. S6556 (daily ed. June 9, 1982) (remarks of Senator Charles
Mathias); 128 CONG. REc. S6557 (daily ed. June 9, 1982) (remarks of Senator Donald Riegle
of Michigan).
128 CONG. REC. 86557 (daily ed. June 14, 1982).
128 CONG. REC. 86783 (daily ed. June 15, 1982). Voting against cloture, in addition to
Senators Helms and East, were Senators Harry F. Byrd, Jr., and John Warner of Virginia,
James McClure and Steve Symms of Idaho, Jeremiah Denton of Alabama, and John Sten-
nis of Mississippi. Id.
I"' See infra text accompanying notes 376-77.
3,1 See, e.g., Letter from the American Bar Association to U.S. Senators (June 10, 1982)
("[T]he American Bar Association supports passage of this bill and opposes any amend-
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A series of amendments were offered in succession and defeated in
turn with a minimum of debate. The first amendment, offered by Senator
East, would have deleted the new results test from S. 1992 but was
defeated sixteen to eighty-one. 8 The second amendment, also by East
was defeated fourteen to eighty-one and would have restricted the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts to impose proportional representation or quotas
to remedy voting rights violations. 79 Senator Helms offered the third,
defeated one to ninety-four, which would have authorized the courts to
order proportional representation as a remedy for voting rights
violations." Helms wanted to face the Senate to go on record in opposi-
tion to federal court orders for quotas or proportional representation
remedies. 8' The fourth amendment, offered by East and defeated thirty-
one to sixty-five, proposed to allow district courts outside the District
of Columbia to have jurisdiction over sectidn 5 cases. 82 East's final amend-
ment, which was defeated nineteen to seventy-eight, proposed to substitute
a new bailout provision similar to the one defeated in Committee."
An amendment by Majority Whip Ted Stevens was defeated thirty-
eight to fifty-nine. Stevens' amendment placed the burden of proof upon
a voter challenging a bailout petition to demonstrate that the standard
of section 2 had not been met by the applicant jurisdiction.84 Stevens of-
fered a second amendment, defeated thirty-two to fifty-eight that sought
to allow states independently to bailout.,'
Senator S.I. Hayakawa of California proposed an amendment, defeated
thirty-two to fifty-four, that would have deleted the bilingual election re-
quirements of section 203 of the Act.8 An amendment by Senator Thad
Cochran of Mississippi was defeated sixteen to seventy-four, and had
sought to incorporate the preclearance provisions of S. 1030, the legisla-
tion he had introduced during the previous session of Congress.3 7 Senator
Sam Nunn of Georgia offered an amendment, defeated thirty-eight to fifty-
five, that attempted to impose a time limit upon the Attorney General
in his objection to a submission for preclearance."8 An amendment by
ments to it .. . It is our view that from a constitutional and legal perspective, as well
as from the perspective of sound national policy, there are no amendments that could im-
prove upon the 'totality of circumstances' test in section 2, the more generous bailout pro-
vision in section 5, or the bilingual voting or national coverage provisions of this legisla-
tion:'). As on the House side, the civil rights community made clear that the "pro-civil rights"
position was opposition to any and all floor amendments. Id.
128 CONG. REC. S6956 (daily ed. June 17, 1982).
Id. at S6966.
Id. at S6969.






128 CONG. REC. S7075 (daily ed. June 18, 1982).
Id. at 87083. See supra notes 92, 180.
Id. at S7087.
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Senator Denton, defeated nineteen to seventy-three, attempted to relax
the standard for bailout."9
Senator Stevens offered a third amendment, rejected twenty-eight
to sixty-four, that sought to redefine the bailout criteria. 9 An amend-
ment by Senators Thurmond and John Warner sought to reduce the limit
on the continued preclearance requirement of covered jurisdictions from
twenty-five to fifteen years, but was defeated twenty-eight to sixty-six."'
Helms then introduced another amendment, defeated twelve to eighty-
one, which sought to delete each of the eighty-two counties of North
Carolina from the continued preclearance requirements of the Voting
Rights Act. 92 Helms' final amendment, also defeated twelve to eighty-
one, sought to exempt from section 5 coverage those jurisdictions with
black voting figures in excess of sixty percent and to extend coverage
to those jurisdictions with registration figures below 43.7 percent. 93
The only successful amendments added to S. 1992 were adopted with
the approval of the principal sponsors of the measure, without a rollcall
vote. These included a series of technical amendments proposed by Senator
Mathias,394 a technical amendment proposed by Stevens to conform provi-
sions regarding the exemption from the bilingual ballot requirements of
the Act for Alaskan Natives and Indians who possess no historical writ-
ten language,93 a technical amendment relating to the bailout standard,396
and an amendment by Senator Don Nickles of Oklahoma to limit the trig-
gering formula in section 203 to language minorities who do not speak
English "adequately enough to participate in the electoral process.""39
In the early afternoon of June 18, the Senate voted eighty-five to eight
in behalf of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.9' Only four
Id. at S7092.
3 Id. at S7098.
Id. at S7099.
332 Id. at S7100.
Id. at S7102. It was probably no coincidence that the registration figure for minorities
in Massachusetts, the homestate of Senator Kehinedy, was 43.6%. See Senate Report, supra
note 246, at 167 (Chart B). The figure for Kansas, as Senator Helms pointed out, was even
lower, at 40.3%. Id. In North Carolina, the latest available figures demonstrated a minority
registration rate of 49.2%. Id.
"1 128 CONG. REC. S6939 (daily ed. June 17, 1982).
... Id. at S6982.
Id. at S6989.
128 CONG. REC. S7104 (daily ed. June 18, 1982).
Id. at S7139. Voting against final passage of the amendments were Senators Byrd,
Denton, East, Hayakawa, Helms, Humphrey, McClure and Symms. IH Only four Senators
from the South were included in this total. Absent Senators (all of whom were on record
in support of final passage) were Senators Burdick, Danforth, Exon, Glenn, Goldwater, Lugar,
and Wallop. Id Immediately prior to final passage, Senator Mathias moved, by unanimous
consent, to the formal consideration of the pending House measure. See supra text accom-
panying notes 175-77. He then moved to substitute the final Senate language of S.1992 to
the provisions of that measure (H.R. 3112) so that final House concurrence could parliamen-
tarily be facilitated. Id.
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Senators from the States of the Old Confederacy voted in opposition to
the Act. A brief floor discussion five days later in the House of Represen-
tatives was marked by members' efforts to complete the legislative history
of the Act. The House then concurred in the Senate amendments by voice
vote.99
On June 29, 1982, President Reagan in a signing ceremony at the White
House proclaimed the right to vote "the crown jewel of American liber-
ties," saying: "This legislation proves our unbending commitment to voting
rights. It also proves that differences can be settled in the spirit of good
will and good faith."4n Immediately after witnessing the ceremony, Ben-
jamin Hooks, the Executive Director of the NAACP, asserted that minority
groups had no confidence that President Reagan's Civil Rights Division
of the Justice Department would enforce the new law.40 ' He added that
he did "want to congratulate the President, however, for belatedly at least
coming along with the Civil Rights Act."4 2
V. CONCLUSION
Three days after the President's signature was affixed to the final
version of H.R. 3112, the Supreme Court released its long-awaited opin-
ion in Rogers v. Lodge. In a six to three decision, the Rogers Court found
that discriminatory intent could be identified in jurisdictions with at-large
election systems operated along the lines of Burke County, Georgia.'
Justice White, who authored the Court's 1973 opinion in White v. Regester'"
and dissented in Mobile, wrote for the majority. He was joined by two
members of the Mobile plurality, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, as well as by Justice Stewart's replacement, Justice O'Connor.11
5
128 CONG. REC. (daily ed. June 23, 1982).
41 Washington Post, June'30, 1982, SA, at 1 (entitled, Reagan Signs Voting Rights Act
Extension).
401 N.Y. Times, June 30, 1982, SA, at 2 (entitled, Voting Rights Act Signed by Reagan).
The following day, the Justice Department issued a statement by Assistant Attorney General
Reynolds in which he said:
The Civil Rights Division will not rest on past accomplishments. Now that the
extension is law, we pledge to maintain our enforcement efforts in this area at
the same high level. Our litigation responsibilities under section 2 of the Act and
preclearance responsibilities under section 5 of the Act will continue to receive
the highest priority so that the Congressional mandate that all be afforded an
equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process, without regard to race,
color, creed, or membership in a language minority group, will indeed become
a reality.
" N.Y.Times, June 30, 1982, § A, at 2 (entitled, Voting Rights Act Signed by Reagan).
41 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), sub nom., Lodge v. Buxton.
"' See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
458 U.S. at 614. Justice Stewart announced the Court's opinion in Mobile, one in
which the Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist joined. Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55 (1980). While the Chief Justice, as stated, joined the majority in Lodge; Justices
Powell and Rehnquist, the latter a law school classmate of Justice O'Connor, chose to dis-
sent. 458 U.S. at 614.
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In many ways, Lodge and Mobile evolved from similar facts. Both cases
involved at-large election systems that had been created at a time when
blacks were effectively disenfranchised by law.416 Since the adoption of
these at-large procedures, no black candidates in either jurisdiction had
ever been elected to office."7 Mobile, Alabama and Burke County, Georgia,
each with substantial black populations,0 8 had histories of racial
discrimination4 9 and practiced bloc voting along racial lines.410
The difference between Lodge and Mobile was the standard of proof
applied by the circuit courts of appeals. In Mobile, the Supreme Court
struck down the Fifth Circuit's attempt to expand the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to include proof through an effects test.4"1 Justice White underscored
his support for an intent test in his dissent in Mobile,"2 a position he
reiterated in Lodge."" In both instances as well as in his majority opinion
in Washington v. Davis, he argued that discriminatory intent can be
inferred from the totality of the-circumstances,4"4 a contention made dur-
ing congressional hearings. White illustrated his point by reviewing the
findings of the district court in Lodge that blacks in Burke County had
historically been denied political access through methods common to the
pre-Voting Rights Act South. These methods included literacy tests, poll
taxes, and white-only primaries." In doing so, White clearly was attempt-
ing to reconcile the circumstances of Lodge with those in Mobile and White
v. Regester.416 In White v. Regester, the Justice wrote that the intent stan-
dard could be met if the plaintiff could show that the political mechanism
under attack operated as a bar to access and that the minority group had
less opportunity than others to participate in the political process.4"7 In
.06 Alabama's and Georgia's at-large systems were created in 1911 (Mobile, Alabama,
and Burke County, Georgia). In many Southern States, such as Alabama, the state constitu-
tion limited black suffrage. See supra note 38. The District Court in Lodge found that the
Georgia practice of utilizing at-large election schemes had been developed in a similar "rac[e]
neutral" environment. 458 U.S. at 614.
407 In Mobile, it was significant that no black candidate had attempted election until
1973. See supra text accompanying note 200. In Lodge, however, "there had been black candi-
dates" for the Burke County Commission. Indeed, Justice White wrote that the fact that
none of these candidates had ever been elected represented "important evidence of pur-
poseful exclusion." 458 U.S. at 622-23.
403 Mobile v. Bolden, 466 U.S. 55, 71 (1980); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622 (1982).
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982).
,10 Approximately 35.4% of the residents of Mobile had been black. Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 58 n.1 (1980). In Burke County, an area whose size was comparable to the State
of Rhode Island, the black population was 53.6%. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 626 (1982).
"' Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 71 (1980). See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 619 (1982).
412 See supra note 52.
413 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982).
Id. at 5.
4,5 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982). Many of the same factors were raised
in Mobile, pursuant to a different equal protection test. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
416 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 626 (1982).
417 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973).
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Mobile, the Court held that blacks registered and voted without
hindrance,"8 that they comprised the only active slating organization in
the city,4"9 and that they generally were not subject to the limitations
on access present in White. In contrast, the Lodge Court confirmed the
district court's holding that the sheer size of Burke County lessened black
access 420 and that past discrimination had "prevented blacks from effec-
tively participating in Democratic Party affairs and in primary elections."'"
The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act were significant in
what they failed to say, in addition to what the new statute finally con-
tained. The alterations to sections 5 and 2 will be litigated for years to come,
with the apparent legislative intent to broaden both sections at the fulcrum
of the debate.
The principal focus in the House of Representatives was on the bailout
provisions of section 5. The objective of the House was to draft an incen-
tive for recalcitrant communities in the South to incorporate minorities
more fully than they had chosen to do in the seventeen years since the
adoption of the original Act in 1965. The lure was eventual es.cape from
administrative preclearance, a procedure which, while not always burden-
some, nevertheless was viewed by many as an important political symbol
by local officials. In this sense, preclearance was a vivid stigma recalling
the sins of past generations. Apprehensions over the House amendments
to section 5 were fueled by the ambiguous language of its provisions com-
bined with concern about their permanency. In particular, the perceived
difficulty in compliance by some raised fears about covered jurisdictions
ever shedding their stigma. Others, however, were concerned that amend-
ments to section 5 would not be stringent enough, that once communities
were free of preclearance, they could never again be recaptured. The
charge that permanent preclearance also carried the potential of jeopar-
dizing the delicate constitutionality of the entire Act compounded
Representatives' already conflicting reservations.
The Senate focused its attention principally upon the meaning of the
House amendments to section 2. What began the process as an unadorned
"results" test for identifying voter discrimination evolved into an increas-
ingly ambiguous test setting forth conflicting factors for judicial considera-
tion and establishing a highly confusing disclaimer of proportional
representation.
In the effort to develop an "easier" test for establishing section 2 viola-
tions, controversy progressively developed as to whether the entire nature
of the Voting Rights Act was being transformed. In the place of an act
' Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 73 (1980).
,19 I&
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 626 (1982). See supra note 410.
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 624 (1982). In fact, the District Court found that "there
had never been a black member of the County Executive Committee of the Democratic
Party." Id.
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originally designed to afford equal opportunity for individuals at the ballot
box, the debate that emerged during the Ninety-eighth Congress focused
upon the use of the Act as a tool for dismantling the structure of self-
government errected by communities across the country. In the place of
an act whose ultimate objective was to eventually promote colorblind
public policies, the debate that emerged focused upon whether the Act
would permit color ever to be submerged in the electoral process.
As so often happens in complex legislative matters, particularly where
highly charged emotional issues are involved, the federal judiciary will
ultimately have to tell Congress what it intended to achieve in its 1982
Amendments to sections 2 and 5. Indeed, the very constitutionality of
these provisions will be the subject of considerable debate in the courts
in the years ahead. While some compromises promote stability of the law,
others merely postpone difficult policy decisions. The undeniably substan-
tial controversies involved in the Voting Rights Act debate must finally
be resolved; when they are, they will contribute in great measure toward
a definition of the objectives of civil rights policy in the United States
for the next generation.
If the new amendments serve to sensitize local and state governments
to the need to incorporate minorities into the political mainstream, and
that increased sensitivity aids in producing a society which progresses
toward politics uncluttered by preoccupation with race, then the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982 will have created for themselves a special
place in the history of our Nation.
If, instead, the ultimate product of Congress' actions is to encourage
greater consciousness of color and ethnicity in the electoral process, the
1982 Amendments will have signaled a major departure in the Nation's
understanding of "equality", transforming the focus of analysis for the
first time from the individual citizen to th" collective racial or ethnic group.
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